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ABSTRACT
Considerations for economic development within transportation planning often focus on narrow
measures of economic benefits such as job and wage growth, or the value of travel time savings.
Regional economic development depends more strongly on sources of competitive advantage,
often associated with industry clusters and their sustained productivity growth. To better address
regional economic development needs, a strategic planning process should consider
transportation investments which more effectively support regional industry clusters. An
extension of the ReS/SITE (Regional Strategies for Sustainable Intermodal Transportation
Enterprise) framework was seen as providing a logical interconnection between competitive
advantage theory, as advanced by Professor Michael Porter of the Harvard Business School, and
strategic transportation planning through its use of regional architectures.
There are four major components to this thesis. First, this thesis provides background on the
concept of regional competitive advantage and its relationship with industry clusters and
economic development. Second, it reviews the relationship between economic development and
transportation planning: exploring case studies of past regional competitive advantage analyses
and evaluating the degree to which the results were integrated within a region's transportation
plans. Third, it extends the ReS/SITE framework by integrating the concept of regional
competitive advantage within a region's on-going transportation planning process. Fourth, and
finally, it evaluates the New England region's transportation needs within the context of the
proposed framework.
The result of this work is to extend the ReS/SITE framework to include Regional Economic
Development Architecture (REDA) to accompany the previously established Regional Planning
Architecture (RPA) and Regional Service Architecture (RSA). The extended architecture reflects
the need to better integrate transportation and economic development plans by identifying and
improving the institutional linkages between economic development and transportation
organizations. Using clusters as a frame of reference, the REDA architecture gives additional
insight into economic development needs that might not typically be considered within the
transportation planning process.
The analysis suggests that although it is difficult for regional transportation planning to support
individual clusters' specialized needs, by considering clusters collectively for a particular region,
it is possible to identify transportation needs which might not be generated by the conventional
planning process with its narrow economic benefits focus.
Thesis Advisor: Joseph M. Sussman
Title: JR East Professor
Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
and Engineering Systems
3
4
Acknowledgements
First, I would like to acknowledge and thank my advisor, Professor Joseph Sussman, for
all his support during my time as a graduate student at MIT. He has been there from start
to finish, helping to develop the direction of this research topic, providing guidance in
matters above and beyond this thesis along the way, and reviewing several versions of
this manuscript.
I would also like to express my gratitude to Professor Nigel Wilson and Professor Peter
Belobaba who have both enriched my experience at MIT by teaching the value of critical
thinking and opening my mind to new perspectives.
I am grateful for the financial support provided by the U.S. Department of Transportation
through its Eisenhower Fellowship program. Dr. Ilene Payne's dedication to the
recipients of this program and her persistence in finding funding for all of us is greatly
admired and appreciated. On the topic of financial support, I would be remiss if I did not
thank the people at Northwest Airlines for their willingness to hire me three times...and
counting.
Special thanks go to Tom Kennedy and Jeff Sriver who relentlessly encouraged me to
return to school, and to MIT in particular. They are both incredible role models, and I
consider myself extremely fortunate to benefit from their mentoring.
The people who helped make my life fun during my time at school were invaluable.
Elton Lin and Mark Schofield provided countless hours of companionship during our
"'rain or shine, sleet or snow" runs along the Charles River; thanks for setting the pace.
Richard Hoppe and Georges Darido were frequent teammates, study partners, and dinner
companions; always available to give advice or aid in procrastination. I would also like
to thank Chip Bellinger for providing general amusement and a fresh source of laughter
on a regular basis over the years.
Without my family, I would not have made it this far. I sincerely thank my parents and
sister for their faith in me and their constant encouragement throughout my life. My
brand-new mother-in-law and father-in-law also deserve thanks. They have warmly
welcomed me into their family, and their visits and frequent calls to Boston were a
constant source of inspiration and happiness for me.
Most importantly, I thank my wife, Diane, for always being there. Her love and support
will always mean the most to me.
Finally, this thesis is dedicated to the memory of William Grube and Jack Toby - who
began the graduate school journey with me, but were unable to see its completion - their
counsel is missed.
5
6
Table of Contents
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................ 3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..................................... .... ........................ 5
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................... ..... .......... 7
LIST OF FIGURES.....................................................11
LIST OF TABLES.............. ..... ........... ......... ............. 13
IMPORTANT ACRONYMS...................................................14
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION................................................................17
1.1 Thesis Background and Motivation....... ......................... 17
1.2 Thesis Objectives...................................................19
1.3 Thesis Methodology and Structure .... . .......... .. ................... 20
CHAPTER 2. REGIONAL COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND CLUSTERS........23
2.1 Regions.............. ........ ........... ........... ........ .. ............................................... 23
2.1.1 D efining the Region........................................................................................ 23
2.1.2 The Growing Importance of Regions .............................................................. 24
2.2 Regional Competitive Advantage...................................26
2.2.1 Com petitive Advantage ................................................................................... 26
2.2.2 The Diamond Framework and its Outcome....................................................27
2.3 Industry Clusters ...... ...................... ........ ...................................................... 29
2.3.1 Role of Location and Competition.................................................................... 29
2.3.2 Clusters and Competitive Advantage .............................................................. 31
2.3.3 Clusters: A W orking Definition...................................................................... 31
2.3.4 Classification and Dimension of Clusters........................................................ 33
2.3.5 Identifying and Analyzing Clusters ................................................................. 36
2.3.6 Cluster Development and Growth ................................................................... 39
2.3.7 Role of Government in Clusters ..................................................................... 40
2.4 Beyond Porter: Theoretical Foundations of Clusters............................ 41
2.4.1 A re C lusters a Fad?.............................................................................................. 41
2.4.2 Five Core Theoretical Concepts for Clusters................................................. 42
2.5 Developing a Cluster Strategy ..... ................................ 44
2.5.1 Regional Circumstances Prompting Cluster Initiatives .................................... 44
2.5.2 Historical Problems Implementing Cluster Strategy ........................................ 46
2.5.3 A Cluster-Based Economic Development Framework.................................... 46
2.5.4 Evaluation and Critique of Cluster-based strategies........................................ 49
2.6 Linking Transportation to Clusters.................................51
CHAPTER 3. TRANSPORTATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.............55
3.1 Economic Development: A Working Definition............... .......... 55
3.1.1 Economic Growth versus Economic Development ........................................ 55
7
3.1.2 Transportation Infrastructure Defined ............................................................ 57
3.2 Previous Research...................................................................................................58
3.2.1 The Basic Roles of Transportation ................................................................... 58
3.2.2 The Basic Impacts of Transportation............................................................... 60
3.2.3 The Impact of Intelligent Transportation Systems ......................................... 60
3.3 "Necessary Conditions" for Economic Development .......................................... 61
3.3.1 New Themes of Transportation Infrastructure Investment..............................61
3.3.2 A Weakening Link between Transportation and Economic Development? ..62
3.3.3 Road, Rail, Airport, and Transit Impact Findings ............................................ 64
3.3.4 The Three Necessary Conditions for Economic Development......................... 67
3.4 Transportation Planning and Economic Development Policy............................68
3.4.1 The Transportation Investment Decision Hierarchy........................................68
3.4.2 The State of the Practice ................................................................................. 70
3.4.3 Examples of Formal Studies ............................................................................ 73
3.4.4 The Importance of Measurement.....................................................................75
3.5 Measuring the Impact of Transportation on Economic Development................75
3.5.1 Methods of Measurement ................................................................................ 76
3.5.2 Measurement Frameworks...............................................................................80
3.5.3 Measurement Challenges.................................................................................83
3.6 Linking Transportation Investment to Clusters - Revisited ............................... 84
CHAPTER 4. REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLANNING & RES/SITE ..... 89
4.1 Regional Planning and the Metropolitan Planning Organization.......................90
4.2 The Role of the MPO in Economic Development: The State of the Practice ....... 92
4.3 Beyond the MPO - The Georgia Regional Transportation Authority................95
4.3.1 An Introduction to Georgia Regional Transportation Authority ......................... 96
4.3.2 Motivating Needs for Restructuring the Planning Process .............................. 96
4.3.3 The C reation of G RTA ........................................................................................ 98
4.4 A Framework for Regional Transportation Planning........................................ 99
4.4.1 The ReS/SITE Framework .............................................................................. 99
4.4.2 Regional Planning Architecture and the MPO .................................................. 102
CHAPTER 5. REGIONAL CASE STUDIES ......................................................... 107
5.1 The Bay Area - Silicon Valley, California..............................................................108
5.1.1 Regional Economic Development and Clusters ................................................ 108
5.1.2 Regional Transportation Planning ..................................................................... 120
5.1.3 R egional Sum m ary ............................................................................................ 129
5.2 Twin Cities, Minnesota.............................................................................................130
5.2.1 Regional Economic Development and Clusters ................................................ 130
5.2.2 Regional Transportation Planning ..................................................................... 134
5.2.3 R egional Sum m ary ............................................................................................ 137
5.3 Tucson, Arizona ........................................................................................................ 138
5.3.1 Regional Economic Development and Clusters ................................................ 138
5.3.2 Regional Transportation Planning ..................................................................... 142
5.3.3 R egional Sum m ary ............................................................................................ 143
5.4 The Transportation Cornerstone Project, Florida ................................................ 144
5.5 Case Studies' Lessons Learned................................................................................145
CHAPTER 6. EXTENDING THE RES/SITE FRAMEWORK .............................. 147
6.1 Economic Development, Competitive Advantage, and Clusters: Revisited ....... 147
8
6.2 Defining the Cluster Initiative Architecture...........................................................148
6.3 Cluster-Specific Transportation Needs Assessment Framework ......................... 154
6.4 Regional Architecture and Economic Development..............................................164
6.5 The Extended ReS/SITE Framework ..................................................................... 166
6.6 Implications...............................................................................................................167
CHAPTER 7. EVALUATING THE NEW ENGLAND REGION ............................. 171
7.1 The New England Region.........................................................................................171
7.2 New England Regional Organizations .................................................................... 176
7.3 Cross-cutting Transportation Issues for New England ......................................... 180
7.4 Rhode Island..............................................................................................................192
7.4.1 Motivation for Cluster Initiative ........................................................................ 192
7.4.2 Cluster Initiative and Leadership Structure ....................................................... 192
7.4.3 State Cluster Inventory and Needs Assessment................................................. 193
7.4.4 Integration with Transportation Planning .......................................................... 196
7.5 Connecticut................................................................................................................197
7.5.1 Motivation for Cluster Initiative ........................................................................ 197
7.5.2 Cluster Initiative and Leadership Structure ....................................................... 198
7.5.3 State Cluster Inventory and Needs Assessment................................................. 199
7.5.4 Integration with Transportation Planning .......................................................... 201
7.6 Massachusetts............................................................................................................202
7.6.1 Motivation for Cluster Initiative........................................................................202
7.6.2 Cluster Initiative and Leadership Structure ....................................................... 202
7.6.3 State Cluster Inventory and Needs Assessment................................................. 203
7.6.4 Integration with Transportation Planning .......................................................... 205
7.7 New Hampshire.........................................................................................................207
7.7.1 Motivation for Cluster Initiative ........................................................................ 207
7.7.2 Cluster Initiative and Leadership Structure ....................................................... 208
7.7.3 State Cluster Inventory and Needs Assessment................................................. 208
7.7.4 Integration with Transportation Planning .......................................................... 209
7.8 Assessment of the Extended Framework for New England..................................210
CHAPTER 8. SUMMARY AND FINDINGS..............................219
8.1 Motivation of Thesis ................................................................................................. 219
8.2 Summary of Thesis ................................................................................................... 220
8.3 Key Findings of Thesis ............................................................................................. 228
8.4 Suggestions for Further Research ........................................................................... 232
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................... 235
APPENDIX: TRANSPORTATION PLANNING SHORTCOMINGS AND RES/SITE .243
ENDNOTES ............................................................................................................ 249
9
10
List of Figures
Figure 1-1: Economic Impact Indicators used by Transportation Planning Organizations........ 18
Figure 2-1: Diamond Model of Competitiveness ..................................................................... 27
Figure 2-2: Select U .S. C lusters................................................................................................. 30
Figure 2-3: Sample High Level Cluster Map............................................................................. 32
Figure 2-4: Progressive Classification of Clusters...................................................................... 34
Figure 2-5: Example of Bottom-Up Cluster Approach............................................................. 37
Figure 2-6: Example of Top-Down Cluster Approach .............................................................. 38
Figure 2-7: U.S. DOC Cluster-Based Economic Development Framework ............................. 46
Figure 2-8: Cluster-Based Economic Development Strategy Stakeholders .............................. 47
Figure 2-9: Cluster Growth/Concentration Matrix ................................................................... 48
Figure 3-1: Basic Roles of Transportation................................................................................. 59
Figure 3-2: Airport Impact on Economic Activities ................................................................. 66
Figure 3-3: Necessary Conditions for Economic Development ............................................... 67
Figure 3-4: Transportation and Policy Decision-Making Hierarchy ........................................ 69
Figure 3-5: Motivations for Studying Economic Development Impacts ................................... 72
Figure 3-6: Relationship between Policy and Transportation Investment .................................. 73
Figure 3-7: Investments Cited to Spur Economic Growth........................................................ 73
Figure 3-8: Traditional Framework for Evaluation of Economic Development Impact ........... 81
Figure 3-9: New Framework for Linking Transportation Investment to Development..............82
Figure 3-10: Potential Productivity Growth from Transportation Infrastructure Improvement .... 84
Figure 4-1: Evolution of the Transportation Planning Perspective........................................... 89
Figure 4-2: Atlanta's "Virtuous Cycle" of Economic Development ........................................ 97
Figure 4-3: Factors Leading to Increasing Congestions ............................................................ 98
Figure 4-4: Basic ReS/SITE Fram ework ..................................................................................... 100
Figure 4-5: Components of Regional Architecture...................................................................... 102
Figure 4-6: ISTEA-Based Regional Planning Architecture........................................................ 104
Figure 5-1: Bay Area Economic Region and Transportation Network ....................................... 109
Figure 5-2: Bay Area Cluster Causal Loop Map ......................................................................... 112
Figure 5-3: Concentration Index of Selected Regions - 1999...................................................... 114
Figure 5-4: Productivity of Selected Regions.............................................................................. 115
Figure 5-5: Bay Area Transportation and Economic Development Institutions.......................... 129
11
Figure 5-6: T he T w in C ities......................................................................................................... 135
Figure 5-7: Proposed CanaM ex Corridor .................................................................................... 141
Figure 6-1: The Cluster Initiative A rchitecture ........................................................................... 148
Figure 6-2: Relationship Among Transportation Plans Relevant for Economic Development... 153
Figure 6-3: Cluster-Specific Transportation Needs Assessment Framework .............................. 155
Figure 6-4: Expanded Strategic Plans Component of the ReS/SITE Framework ....................... 164
Figure 6-5: RSTP and the Three Necessary Conditions of Economic Development .................. 165
Figure 6-6: The Extended ReS/SITE Framework........................................................................ 166
Figure 6-7: The Revised Regional Planning Architecture........................................................... 168
Figure 7-1: N ETI Organizational Structure ................................................................................. 179
Figure 7-2: New England Regional Transportation Network...................................................... 183
Figure 7-3: The Suez Express and NAFTA Trade Corridors ...................................................... 185
Figure 7-4: Rhode Island Cluster Study and Transportation Planning ........................................ 197
Figure 7-5: Connecticut Cluster Initiative Organizational Structure ........................................... 198
Figure 7-6: Connecticut Cluster Initiatives and Transportation Planning ................................... 201
Figure 7-7: Nine Key Industry Clusters of Massachusetts - 1999 ............................................... 205
Figure 7-8: Massachusetts Cluster Initiatives and Transportation Planning................................ 207
Figure 7-9: New Hampshire Cluster Studies and Transportation Planning................................. 210
Figure 8-1: The Cluster Initiative Framework Revisited............................................................. 224
Figure 8-2: Cluster-Specific Transportation Needs Assessment ................................................. 225
Figure 8-3: The Extended ReS/SITE Comprehensive Regional Architecture Component ......... 226
Figure 8-4: The Extended ReS/SITE Framework........................................................................ 231
12
List of Tables
Table 2-1: Comparison of Economic Regions and Political Jurisdictions................................. 24
Table 2-2: Common Components of an Industry Cluster .......................................................... 31
Table 2-3: Business Networks versus Industry Clusters.......................................................... 33
Table 2-4: C luster D im ensions ................................................................................................... 35
Table 2-5: Analytical Techniques for Cluster Identification ..................................................... 38
Table 3-1: Key Assumptions and Findings............................................................................... 63
Table 3-2: Airport and Economic Impact ................................................................................. 65
Table 3-3: Example of User Benefit Allocation ........................................................................ 77
Table 3-4: Productivity Impact of Transport Investment...........................................................79
Table 4-1: MPO Regional Responsibilities .............................................................................. 93
Table 4-2: Groups Sharing in Economic Development Planning............................................. 94
Table 4-3: Fragmented Leadership Roles in Coordinating Economic Development ................ 94
Table 4-4: Poor Degree of Regional Economic Development Coordination ............................ 94
Table 5-1: Economic Vitality Components of the Bay Area RTP............................................... 126
Table 5-2: Survey of Transportation Needs Cited in Economic Development Studies............... 133
Table 5-3: Summary of Case Study Findings .............................................................................. 145
Table 6-1: Aggregate Versus More Precise Cluster Types.......................................................... 151
Table 6-2: Example of a Cluster-Level Transportation Investment Evaluation .......................... 162
Table 6-3: Example of Transportation Investments Evaluation Across all Clusters ................... 162
Table 6-4: Enhanced Structure of the ReS/SITE Evaluation Framework ................................... 163
Table 7-1: Characteristics Defining New England as a Region................................................... 172
Table 7-2: New England: Economic Region or Collection of Political Jurisdictions?........ . . . .. . . 173
Table 7-3: New England Service Industry Concentration ........................................................... 175
Table 7-4: New England Governors' Top Priorities.................................................................... 181
Table 7-5: Effectiveness of Economic Development and Transportation Investment Strategies 181
Table 7-6: Transportation Investment Options for 1-95 Congestion Relief................................. 184
Table 7-7: Transportation Investment Options for New England Intermodal Freight.................187
Table 7-8: New England Regional Airport Passenger Growth 1995-1999 ................................. 189
Table 7-9: Transportation Investment Options for New England Air Transportation.................190
Table 7-10: Economic Development Goals and Objectives for Rhode Island ............................ 196
Table 7-11: Connecticut's Cluster Inventory............................................................................... 199
Table 7-12: Summary of New England's Primary Cluster Studies ............................................. 211
Table 7-13: Inventory of New England's Clusters ...................................................................... 212
Table 7-14: New England Cluster Needs Assessment Summary ................................................ 213
13
Important Acronyms
Acronym Description
ABAG Association of Bay Area Governments
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
ASPED Arizona Strategic Planning for Economic Development
BAEF Bay Area Economic Forum
BART Bay Area Rapid Transit
CAA Clean Air Act
CALTRANS California Department of Transportation
CBA Cost-Benefit Analysis
CBD Central Business District
CI Cluster Initiative
CLIOS Complex, Large-Scale, Integrated Open Systems
CMA Congestion Management Agency
CMP Congestion Management Plan
CRA Comprehensive Regional Architecture
DECD Department of Economic and Community Development (Connecticut)
DOC Department of Commerce
DOT Department of Transportation
EDAB Economic Development Alliance for Business (Bay Area)
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EU European Union
FHWA Federal Highway Administration
FTA Federal Transit Administration
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNP Gross National Product
GRP Gross Regional Product
GRTA Georgia Regional Transportation Authority
GSP Gross State Product
GSPED Governor's Strategic Partnership for Economic Development (Arizona)
GTEC Greater Tucson Economic Council
ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
ITS Intelligent Transportation System
JIT Just-in-Time
JVSV Joint Venture Silicon Valley
LQ Location Quotient
MAC Metropolitan Airports Commission (Twin Cities)
Massport Massachusetts Port Authority - Operator of Logan Airport and the Port of Boston
MIS Major Investment Study
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MnDOT Minnesota Department of Transportation
MTC (1) Massachusetts Technology Collaborative
MTC (2) Metropolitan Transportation Commission (Bay Area)
MPO Metropolitan Planning Organization
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NEBHE New England Board of Higher Education
14
Acronym Description
NEEP New England Economic Project
NEGC New England Governor's Conference
NEPPC New England Public Policy Collaborative
NETC New England Transportation Consortium
NETI New England Transportation Initiative
NHIG New Hampshire Industries Group
PAG Pima Association of Governments (Tucson)
RASP Re ional Aviation System Plan
REDA Regional Economic Development Architecture
ReS/SITE Regional Strategies for the Sustainable Intermodal Transportation Enterprise
RI Regional Infrastructure
RIDOT Rhode Island Department of Transportation
RIPTA Rhode Island Public Transit Authority
RIEDC Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation
RIEPC Rhode Island Economic Policy Council
RPA Regional Planning Architecture -or- Regional Planning Authority
RSA Regional Service Architecture
RSTP Regional Strategic Transportation Planning
RTB Regional Transportation Blueprint
RTP Regional Transportation Plan
SELAC Southeast Los Angeles
SEPTA Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
SIC Standard Industrial Classification
SIP State Implementation Plan
SRTP Short-Range Transit Plan
STIP State Transportation Improvement Program
STP Statewide Transportation Plan
TAB Transportation Advisory Board
TEA-21 Transportation Equity Act for the 21" Century
TIP Transportation Improvement Program
TMSP Tucson Maguila Supplier Program
TWP Total Weighted Performance
UTC University Transportation Center
15
16
Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Thesis Background and Motivation
With focus on globalization in today's growing information- and knowledge-based economy, the
inclination has been to see location and geography as diminishing in importance. However, as
trade borders disappear, regions are emerging as the defining economic entity [1]. Because not
all regions prosper economically in the same way, industry, government, and academic leaders
have searched for an understanding of what dynamics create a competitive advantage for a
particular region.
The competitiveness of a region is a strong function of its productivity, or the value of the
region's output produced by a unit of labor or capital. Therefore, to generate and maintain a
competitive advantage, a region should have sustained productivity growth through continuous
innovation and upgrading of its economy. To understand the components of productivity growth,
it is necessary to focus on (1) specific industries and industry segments, not the region's economy
as a whole; and (2) the critical characteristics of a region that allows these specific industries to
create a competitive advantage [2]. These regional-specific industry segments are often called
clusters.
The productivity of a cluster is, in part, influenced by the efficiency and quality of its industries'
basic inputs, one of which is the quality of the region's transportation infrastructure and its
operation. This input is one of several policy levers that government entities can pull to facilitate
productivity growth. Because the sources of competitive advantage are at the regional level, the
most important government roles are at the state and metropolitan area level, rather than national.
In practice, the government agencies and municipalities tend to plan their transportation
infrastructure using a reactive approach in response to their own geographic area, with little or no
coordination or integration at the regional level. For example, an economic development agency
may perform cluster analyses in order to support revitalization of existing industries, while a
Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) is independently creating a twenty-year
transportation plan. Meanwhile, a state Department of Transportation may be concurrently
modeling the economic development impacts of various route alignments in order to evaluate a
proposed highway investment.
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Most of these studies focus on overly narrow measures of economic benefits for the region as a
whole, such as job or wage growth, and business output (sales). However, competitive advantage
of the region is largely dependent on how effectively its industry clusters are served by the
transportation infrastructure. The impact of an improvement in the region's transportation
infrastructure should be measured by its capacity to induce productivity growth at a regional
scale.
A recent study published by the Transportation Research Board [3], showed that two of the most
important measures of competitive advantage (productivity and industry composition) are the
least likely to be used in evaluating the economic impacts of a proposed transportation project as
shown in Figure 1-1.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
E mooynent
B us Iness DIslocdlons
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OutpJt (Bus Iness Sdes)
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Source: Weisbrod, 2000
Figure 1-1: Economic Impact Indicators used by Transportation Planning Organizations
What is needed is a shift towards a strategic regional transportation planning approach which
identifies, develops, and integrates the infrastructure factors that will (1) effectively support local
industry clusters and (2) create the opportunity to develop and maintain a regional competitive
advantage through productivity growth.
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MIT's ReS/SITE (Regional Strategies for the Sustainable Intermodal Transportation Enterprise)
framework provides a logical interconnection between regional competitive advantage theory and
regional strategic transportation planning. The ReS/SITE framework (discussed in Chapter 4)
was developed to assist in overcoming weaknesses of conventional transportation planning. The
framework incorporates the use of (1) scenarios to identify robust planning strategies rather than a
static or fixed "single" future condition; and (2) regional architecture as a tool to integrate agency
organizational interactions within strategic planning.
1.2 Thesis Objectives
The purpose of this thesis is to expand an established theoretical framework (ReS/SITE) to
address the notion of regions as competitive with each other in the regional transportation
planning process. The resulting product will be evaluated within the New England context where
the future competitive ability of the region is uncertain. The objectives of the thesis will be to:
1. Define the concept of regional competitive advantage and its relationship with industry
clusters and economic development. Discuss the role transportation infrastructure plays in
enabling and sustaining a region's competitive advantage.
2. Provide background on the current theoretical assessment of the impact of transportation
infrastructure on economic development, illustrate the methods employed in practice to
measure this impact, and review a recent framework for linking transportation investment to
economic development.
3. Explore past competitive advantage analyses and the corresponding regional transportation
plans to assess if there is a mismatch between infrastructure needs for a region's clusters and
the objectives or goals driving the transportation planning process.
4. Provide a framework for integrating the notion of regional competitive advantage within a
region's ongoing transportation and economic development planning process.
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1.3 Thesis Methodology and Structure
Based on the motivation and objectives for this work, the following methodology and structure
will be used for this thesis:
Chapter 2: Relate economic development to regional competitive advantage, describing the
methodology that economic development organizations utilize to evaluate their region's
competitive advantage and cluster composition
Chapter 3: Review the literature regarding the current theory linking transportation
infrastructure and economic development. Survey the analysis methods and tools used to
measure the impacts, and critically assess the state of the practice
Chapter 4: Explore the typical regional transportation planning process, the development of the
transportation plans, and introduce the ReS/SITE framework
Chapter 5: Conduct a review of four case studies: (1) the San Francisco Bay Area in California,
(2) Tucson, Arizona, (3) the Twin Cities in Minnesota, (4) and the Transportation Cornerstone
Project in Florida. For each case, examine:
. The regional economic development organizations and the institutional relationships
between them
. The industry clusters contained within the region, the manner in which they were
identified, and the transportation infrastructure needs, if any, which were identified by the
cluster analyses
. The region-specific transportation planning process and responsible organizations
. The institutional links between the transportation planning and economic development
organizations and the degree to which the industry cluster needs are reflected in the
regional transportation plans
Chapter 6: Based on the findings in Chapters 2 through 5, develop a framework for integrating
the notion of regional competitive advantage within a region's ongoing regional transportation
and economic development planning process, using the ReS/SITE framework as a foundation
20
Chapter 7: Apply the proposed framework to New England:
The New England region is chosen because although the region has experienced economic
growth over the past decade, growing congestion has the potential for constraining future growth
and limiting the quality of life. New England economic development has relied heavily on
industries that are relatively travel-intensive: financial services, communication services, high-
tech hardware and software, post-secondary education, and biotechnology. While the U.S.
service industry grew 25% from 1992 to 1997, Massachusetts experienced an 86% growth in the
same sector [4]. For the region to grow in these markets, it must have well developed intra-
regional as well as inter-regional connections. New England's primary transportation
infrastructure, such as 1-95 and Boston's Logan Airport, are experiencing capacity constraints that
threaten the future ability of the region to sustain its current growth and competitive ability. The
New England region also experiences economic disadvantages associated with its location in the
northeast corner of the nation, the associated higher costs of doing business, and a chronic
shortage of a skilled labor pool. These disadvantages cannot be eliminated entirely, but a
forward-looking planning framework might assist in minimizing costs by efficiently investing in
the appropriate transportation infrastructure needed to support regional productivity growth.
The use of the framework within the New England context will first require the establishment of
the fact that New England is composed of more than simply six state political jurisdictions, but in
fact represents an economic region. Next, transportation issues which impact the entire region
will be explored and potential infrastructure investments to address these pressing issues will be
cataloged. A state-by-state look at industry cluster studies will examine the degree to which
specialized transportation infrastructure needs are reflected in the state transportation plans.
Finally, an evaluation will be made regarding the degree to which regional transportation needs
are addressed individually by each New England state, and the implications for the competitive
advantage of the region.
Chapter 8: Summarize the thesis, identify the key contributions of the thesis, and suggest
several areas for future research.
Ultimately, the goal of this thesis is to provide insight as to how the notion of regional
competitive advantage fits within the regional transportation planning process. The chapters that
follow are devoted to this effort.
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Chapter 2. Regional Competitive Advantage and Clusters
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce and define the concept of regional competitive
advantage as well as one of its theoretical outcomes: industry clusters. The first step involves
developing an understanding of the growing importance of regions, and why location still matters
in a time of widespread globalization and low-cost telecommunications. Next, the theory of
regional competitive advantage and industry clusters is presented, along with a critical analysis of
whether or not the theory is simply the latest in a long line of economic development "fads" or
truly a lasting theoretical foundation. The main emphasis of this chapter will be the introduction
of a common framework for implementation of a cluster-based economic development strategy
within a region. Finally, the chapter concludes with the identification of several roles
transportation infrastructure investment and services may play within a cluster-based strategy.
2.1 Regions
During the last few decades, regions have assumed greater importance as a focus of economic
development policy and practice. The influence of regions in American government and society is
not new, having been recognized for over a century since the union of the five boroughs of New
York City created a regional metropolis [5]. However, as recent as twenty years ago, regionalism
was narrowly conceived, usually not discussed, and minimally influential. More recently, the
common geopolitical models of hierarchical, governmental, industrial, or military nation-states
were challenged. Economists, policy-makers, and politicians have begun to break away from the
nationalistic paradigm and are increasingly viewing regions in terms of their economic, social,
and strategic importance. Europeans understand this, and often describe their continent as a
collection of increasingly powerful city-states [6].
2.1.1 Defining the Region
There is no agreed-upon definition of the term "region." Traditional views of regions tended to
classify them into three types: (1) Policy-oriented regions defined by political alliances or
regional trading blocs such as the European Union (EU) or Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN); (2) Homogenous-oriented regions with respect to some physical, social, or
economic characteristic; or (3) Nodal-oriented regions focused around a central urban place.
None of these definitions captures the internal economic and cultural dynamics of a region [7].
For example, people travel across city, county, state, and country boundaries to work. Networked
industries provide an economic base across geographic borders. The media relies heavily on a
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regional marketplace. Economic infrastructure connects systems between nations and geo-
political regions. Air, water, and noise pollution cross municipal boundaries. Parks and stadiums
provide identity to an area much larger than a single city [8].
In functional terms for this paper, a region is seen not as a statistical or geographic unit, but as an
arena of economic, social, and political activity. This arena lies above the local and below the
national levels of government. These regions vary in spatial size, form, and administrative
function, involving different levels of activities by the public, private and non-profit sectors.
Pendleton (1998) provides an extensive review of the concept of regions, identifying the
differences between a political jurisdiction and an economic region. His framework for assessing
these two entities is presented in Table 2-1:
Characteristics Economic Regions Political Jurisdictions
Geographic Orientation Contiguous Contiguous
Borders
" Definition Economically based Geographically based
* Clarity Fuzzy, inherently unclear Clearly outlined
* Variation over time Change as regional economic Fixed
activity expands and contracts
" Relationship with other Permeable; overlap with other Distinct; no overlap with other
borders regions possible jurisdictions
Internal Diversity Internally diverse, as economic No comparable internal distinction;
activity varies in intensity within the assumption is that jurisdiction
region equals uniform entity
Relationship with other Interdependent Independent
similar entities
Integration of rural areas Unclear, because geographic Clear, because they cover the
extent of borders is unclear entire geography of the nation
Source: Pendleton, 1998
Table 2-1: Comparison of Economic Regions and Political Jurisdictions
For evaluating transportation investments within the context of regional competitive advantage,
the economic region is usually identified as the appropriate unit of geographic scale.
2.1.2 The Growing Importance of Regions
Over the last several decades, industrial shifts, often characterized by the term globalization, have
occurred in response to massive technological changes such as dramatically lower transportation
costs, standardization of production, and rapid, low-cost telecommunications. The result is that
regions have not only emerged as subsets of national space, but as units of international space.
Increasingly, regions are given the opportunity to compete and cooperate with counterpart regions
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across nation-state lines and continents. The local government scale is viewed as increasingly too
small to be economically viable in the resulting global economy. At the other end of the
spectrum, while nations are still the prominent unit for defense, the national scale of government
is viewed as both too large to manage everyday life and too small to regulate international affairs.
Consequently, regions may be the appropriately sized unit for competing effectively. McCarthy
(2000) identifies four factors leading to the growing importance of regions [9]:
(1) Certain challenges can be addressed more effectively at a regional scale because
individual local governments lack the capacity or resources to address some issues
without the cooperation of neighboring jurisdictions. Issues that present opportunities for
regional cooperation include: strategic economic planning, education and workforce
preparedness, research and development, transportation and communication
infrastructure, urban growth management, as well as social service, healthcare and
emergency response systems.
(2) Managing resources at a regional scale may make more economic and environmental
sense. Inefficient land use and transportation patterns can have negative effects on
regional air and water quality and congestion, which can adversely impact future regional
growth and economic development efforts. Certain infrastructure can be provided more
cost-effectively through cooperative efforts at a regional, rather than local level because
of the economies of scale afforded by the larger spatial area and population.
(3) Declining federal funding is prompting local and state governments to look to
cooperative efforts as a means of more efficiently employing their limited resources to
meet increasing demands.
(4) Social and industrial networks are evolving beyond established political boundaries. The
main economic linkages of regions, such as those involving information, skill, trade, and
investment, are increasingly with the global economy, rather than within their own
national economy.
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2.2 Regional Competitive Advantage
2.2.1 Competitive Advantage
The word "competition" conjures images of a contest or rivalry with opponents locked in a
struggle against one another attempting to gain an advantage as measured by some benchmark.
While competitiveness has drawn the attention of governments and industry alike, an accepted
definition of the term as applied to a region is difficult to find. Rodriguez (1997) defines the
competitive success of a region as "measured by its ability to offer its members access to low-
cost, quality goods; to provide low-cost resources; and to foster development and regional
prosperity [10]." Traditionally, prosperity was seen as a natural outcome of a region's natural
resources. Today, the consensus is that prosperity is created, not inherited [11]. To understand
the creation of prosperity through regional competition, Michael Porter's framework of
competitive strategy is commonly used. In his framework, Porter claims the only meaningful
measure of a region's competitiveness is productivity - the value of the output produced by a unit
of labor or capital. Productivity depends on both the quality and features of the output, and the
efficiency at which it is produced. Porter argues that a region is said to gain a competitive
advantage if it is able to sustain growth in productivity[12].
Sources of Competitive Advantage
Porter's competitive framework challenges the traditional determinants of competition. The five
most commonly cited sources of competitive advantage have typically been: (1) macroeconomic
phenomenon such as interest rates and exchange rates; (2) availability of low-cost labor; (3)
government policy such as subsidies and tariffs; (4) availability of natural resources; and (5)
differences in management practices. Though each source affects the competitive position of a
region's economy, Porter argues that none are sufficient alone, and a more complex system must
exist [13].
Sustaining Competitive Advantage
Once competitive advantage is achieved, sustaining it requires that an economy continually
upgrade itself. By upgrade, Porter is referring to improving productivity by increasing production
quality, capabilities, technology, or efficiency. Upgrading also entails developing the ability to
compete in new segments where a competitor's productivity may already be high, and the
capability to compete in entirely new industries. Industries achieve these upgrades through acts
of innovation. Innovation and change are closely tied together. Productivity growth requires
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change, but change is an unnatural act [14]. Past strategies become institutionalized, while
dedicated facilities and infrastructure solidify past practice. To experience change, innovation is
essential.
Concepts such as productivity growth, upgrading, and innovation are appealing conceptually, but
are too general and static to sufficiently describe a system. The next section describes how
Porter tied these concepts together into a dynamic model of competitive advantage.
The Diamond Framework and its Outcome
In The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Porter (1991) developed his well-known diamond
framework, shown in Figure 2-1, to explain systematically why industries found in certain
regions were able to establish and maintain a competitive advantage.
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Porter, 1998
Figure 2-1: Diamond Model of Competitiveness
The points on the diamond reflects the essential determinants for achieving competitive success
and are described in more detail as follows:
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2.2.2
Factor Conditions
The first determinant of the diamond characterizes the position of a region's factors of
production. Possession of the basic factors of production' alone is not enough to create a
competitive advantage. More important is the rate and efficiency at which a region creates,
upgrades, and deploys them in particular industries. To support competitive advantage, a factor
must be highly specialized to an industry's needs. Specialized factors are scarcer and thus more
difficult for competitors to imitate.
Demand Conditions
The second determinant refers to the regional market for an industry's product. A region with
demanding and knowledgeable buyers will pressure local industries to innovate in order to meet
high standards of product features, quality, and service [15]. The size of the home market is less
important than its social character.
Related and Supported Industries
The third set of determinants recognize that end-users and suppliers that are located in close
proximity can take advantage of rapid communication, constant flows of information, and on-
going exchanges of ideas, all of which facilitate innovation.
Firm Strategy, Structure, and Rivalry
The final determinant describes the pressure for innovation and improvement that is created from
rivalries between firms. Geographic proximity of competitors magnifies rivalry. The presence of
a competitor tends to eliminate competitive advantages gained by a firm simply being in a certain
region. Instead, geographic concentration of firms leads to an industry, rather than a single firm,
seeking out and ultimately benefiting from investments in specialized factors such as
infrastructure and educational institutions.
Government and chance are two variables that Porter adds to complete the diamond framework.
Chance events include major shifts in foreign demand, inventions, and war. Government policies
cannot alone create competitive advantages for regional industries, but they can direct and
amplify the forces within the competitive diamond, acting as a catalyst.
Porter's model captures the classical economic factors of production - capital, physical, and labor
resources, but expands it by explicitly including the advanced factors of infrastructure and knowledge
resources.
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The diamond framework has powerful implications for regional economic development strategy.
A natural outcome of the framework is the phenomenon of industry clustering, a concept that has
become one of the leading drivers behind current economic development policy. The next
section further explores this notion by constructing a working definition and examining
methodologies for identifying and classifying clusters.
2.3 Industry Clusters
2.3.1 Role of Location and Competition
Porter identifies innovation as a critical component of competitive advantage. Historically,
innovation has usually occurred in major metropolitan areas. For centuries, metropolitan cities
have stimulated new forms of communication, information management, and transportation
systems. In the history of innovation, place mattered greatly. Pascal Zachary, a leading urbanist,
has found that certain places become highly creative and innovative for a relatively short period
times of approximately 10 to 50 years [16]. As examples, he cites Manchester, England in the
Industrial Revolution and Silicon Valley. These places were highly networked, with people and
industries in competition, but learning from each other at the same time. Zachary defines three
broad categories of historically innovative regions [17]:
1) Artistic Innovators: Capital cities or city-states such as ancient Athens or 19' Century
Vienna. The accumulation of wealth by city-states' citizens, or periods of concentrated
political power and stability, afforded the ability to invest in and pursue scientific and
cultural innovation.
2) Industrial Innovators: Regions sufficiently near large cities, able to share in the knowledge
and education base, but with an artisan-craft tradition. Examples of industrial innovators
include Manchester in the 1780's, Detroit in the early 201 century, and Silicon Valley in the
late 20t Century.
3) Urban Innovators: Large metropolitan cities faced with the logistic realties of creating new
types of services for its population. Rome developed aqueducts to transport water over vast
distances, and pioneered a road and bridge infrastructure system to link its far-flung empire
to its centralized government authority. London faced with widespread and repeated
outbreak of disease, pioneered large-scale water purification. In these examples,
metropolitan cities were suddenly dealing with problems requiring either a fast learning
29
track or a breakdown in its social fabric. The same sense of urgency may still be found in
today's cities of the developing world. Cities in developed countries faced with questions of
sustainable growth and increasing congestion also have this same sense of urgency.
Although today's regional economies have access to rapid transportation and communication, and
access to global markets, one finds with almost paradoxical consistency that a relatively small
numbers of industries within a geographic area account for a major share of its economy. These
clusters of industry suggest that location and proximity are still important determinants of
competitive advantage. Porter (1998) has mapped just a few of the clusters of industry that are in
located throughout the United States' economic landscape [18]. As Figure 2-2 suggests, the
widespread evidence of industry clusters is compelling.
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Figure 2-2: Select U.S. Clusters
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Clusters and Competitive Advantage
Porter's diamond framework implies an environment that promotes clusters of competitive
industries. Geographically concentrated industries become self-reinforcing, with benefits flowing
backward and forward between points on the diamond (See Figure 2-1). Clusters affect
competitive dynamics within the diamond framework in three broad ways: (1) increasing
productivity of geographically proximate firms, (2) increasing clustered firms' capacity for
innovation and productivity growth, and (3) stimulating new business formations that expands the
cluster [19].
2.3.3 Clusters: A Working Definition
Porter (1998) defines a cluster as "a geographically proximate group of interconnected companies
and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and complementarities
[20]. Table 2-2 lists some of the components that may be found within an industry cluster:
Adapted from: Porter, 1998
Table 2-2: Common Components of an Industry Cluster
Numerous other cluster definitions exist in the literature. Examples include:
A geographically bounded concentration of interdependent businesses with active
channels for business transactions, dialogue, and communications, that collectively
shares common opportunities and threats [21]
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2.3.2
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An agglomeration of competing and collaborating industries in a region networked
into horizontal and vertical relationships, involving strong common buyer-supplier
linkages, and relying on a shared foundation of specialized economic institutions [22]
In application, the definition of a cluster is exceedingly difficult. Data and methodological
constraints may partially dictate the definition of a cluster. Few definitions adequately capture
and describe the underlying dynamics of a cluster, explain how they actually function, or answer
questions on how firms interact and produce synergy.
For clusters to become a useful subject of analysis and policy, the concept needs to be clearly
defined, but the exact criteria for clusters has depended on the institution employing the
definition: (1) Government agencies, needing to avoid appearances of favoritism and needing to
enlarge political support, tend to be as inclusive as possible and define cluster peripheries that
match political boundaries. The result is that broad categories of businesses such as tourism,
heavy manufacturing, and professional services are classified as clusters, although they appear to
have little binding the firms into a production system. (2) Academia and researchers tend to
focus on finding numeric parameters in order to conduct statistical or econometric analysis,
resulting in traditional economic development and regional science techniques and classifications;
and (3) Business schools tend to favor classification based on comparative advantage in global
markets [23]. Often, a particular cluster is "mapped," showing the important linkages between
geographically concentrated industries along with their key suppliers and economic institution.
Figure 2-3 displays the typical high-level structure of a "mapped" cluster, in this case, a computer
manufacturing cluster:
Export-Oriented Consumer Computer
Firms Electronic 4-- Hardware
Assembly Assembly
Supplier-Oriented Tool Die, Off ie & Specialized
Firms and Production Component
Machinery Supply Supply
Economic Education & Specialized Specialized Environmental
Infrastructure Training 4  Physical Financial & Regulatory
Providers Institutions Infrastructure institutions Agencies
Providers
Adapted from: Gollub, 1997, p. 2.
Figure 2-3: Sample High Level Cluster Map
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Clusters are often confused with business networks,2 although important differences exist
between them. Networks are collaborative business activities, carried out by a discrete and small
group of firms in order to generate an increase in sales or profits. In contrast, clusters are systems
in which participation relies more simply on interdependence. Rosenfeld (1997) highlights the
key differences between business networks and industry clusters:
Adapted from: Rosenfeld, 1997
Table 2-3: Business Networks versus Industry Clusters
2.3.4 Classification and Dimension of Clusters
The strength of a cluster is derived from the inherent dynamics of the system; active linkages
between cluster components are as important as concentration and proximity. Without these
dynamic linkages, even a critical mass of related firms will not operate as a production or social
system. Rosenfeld (1997) identifies a progressive classification of cluster types [24]:
1) Potential ("Wannabe") Clusters: Some requirements are in place, but critical mass and
key conditions are missing. There are often important gaps in inputs, services, or
information flow that would typically support cluster development.
2) Latent ("Underachieving") Clusters: Opportunities for working clusters exist, but
interactions and information exchange between firms are not exploited, nor are synergies
realized. Firms within a latent cluster tend not to think of themselves as clusters and
2 Also known as inter-firm cooperation or networking
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often operate "without knowledge" of each other. Latent clusters often require a cluster
development initiative to actively bring the firms together.
3) Working ("Overachieving") Clusters: Working clusters are "self-aware," able to realize
their full potential, and produce more than the sum of their parts. Interactions among
firms within working clusters tend to differ qualitatively and quantitatively from
interactions with firms outside the cluster.
Silicon Valley and the Netherlands flower cluster are examples of a working cluster. Both are an
agglomeration of connected companies that are aware of their interdependence, act on it, and
collectively operate as a system to produce more that the sum of their parts. Firms in each cluster
demonstrate the ability to learn quickly. The latent cluster is exemplified by the pharmaceutical
and biotechnology companies working around Research Triangle Park in North Carolina. The
industries employ over 24,000 people and have many attributes of a working cluster such as local
markets and specialized support services from universities and colleges. Even so, they lack
interdependence, perhaps because: (1) they are dominated by branch plants of multinational
companies rather than headquarters, or (2) smaller, individual firms, and few associations or
organizations exist to bring people together to interact. Figure 2-4 graphically represents the
progressive classification of clusters. Notice that the boundaries of the clusters are defined not by
geographic boundaries, but by economic infrastructure boundaries.
Services, support,
and infrastructure
boundary
Working ("Overachieving") Cluster Latent ("Underachieving") Cluster
LEGEND
Firm
Interactions among firms
*--- Shading indicates strength of social
Potential ("Wannabe") Cluster infrastructure
Adapted from: Rosenfeld, 1997
Figure 2-4: Progressive Classification of Clusters
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Transportation infrastructure is an important component of economic infrastructure supporting
the establishment, development, and growth of an industry cluster. One inference that can be
drawn from economic infrastructure boundaries of clusters is that both economic activities and
transportation should be planned and managed on approximately the same geographic scale. If
one can accurately define the geographic scale at which cluster economic activity occurs, one can
simultaneously define the appropriate scale at which transportation planning should occur [25].
Augmenting Rosenfeld's description of a progressive classification of clusters, Peters and Hood
identify five dimensions of clusters, summarized in Table 2-4, which help in assessing the relative
strengths and weaknesses of localized business activity [26].
Dimensions Types Examples
Geographic Scope Localized
Dispersed Japan Synthetic Fabrics
Density Dense New York Financial Services
Sparse New Hampshire Instrumentation
Activity Base Activity-rich Silicon Valley
Activity-poor Chihuahua Maguilas
Industrial Organization Core-ring Toulouse, France Aircraft Mfg.
All ring
All core
Coordinating Mechanisms Spot Markets Prato, Italy Textiles
Short-term Coalitions Hollywood Motion Picture Industry
Long-term Relationships
Hierarchies Detroit Auto Industry
Source: Peters and Hood, 2000
Table 2-4: Cluster Dimensions
Each dimension provides a different facet of cluster classification. Geographic scope refers to the
spatial extent to which the cluster firms, suppliers, supporting services, institutions are found.
The density of the cluster refers both to the absolute number of firms within a cluster and the
economic weight of the cluster in terms of concentration of the regional industries compared to
the overall national market share. The activity base of a cluster describes the frequency and
importance of the activities that are carried out by the cluster firms locally within the region. The
industrial organization refers to the nature of the relationships between firms and the distribution
of authority among firms within the cluster. Coordinating mechanisms describe the process in
which inter-firm relationships develop and are maintained over time.
35
Using the progressive classification and dimension characterization, clusters can be segmented
into two broad categories for policy analysis: (1) clusters with good long-term growth prospects,
highly localized, densely populated, and embedded within the social structure; and (2) clusters
with poor long-term growth prospects and limited scope for innovation because they are either
too narrow, too dispersed, or too loosely linked to the economy.
2.3.5 Identifying and Analyzing Clusters
The cluster concept provides the promise of leveraging economic development while avoiding
traditional zero-sum development policies [27]. However, a region interested in identifying
potential clusters within its boundaries faces a difficult task. The broad definition and the
regional specific context of clusters do not lend themselves well to a structured and repeatable
process for identification. Most regions interested in pursuing an industry cluster analysis fall
into one of three categories: (1) they have become aware of their leading industries but desire an
understanding of how linkages between the industries may be strengthened to create or sustain a
competitive advantage; (2) they are aware of their principal industries, but want to identify
unseen linkages and perhaps underdeveloped, and unrecognized regional industries; and (3) they
have little knowledge of their core regional strengths and potential, except what may be
approximated from single-industry trends [28].
The state of the practice for identifying clusters relies on ad-hoc cluster definitions and tends to
be narrow and neglect important linkages. The studies are often related as a narrative, similar to
familiar stories relating the development of Silicon Valley and the Detroit automotive industry.
The problem with these studies is that lessons and generalizations often prove difficult to apply to
other regional economies. At the other end of the spectrum of the problem, when cluster
identification is seen as purely a statistical exercise, significant clusters can remain obscured and
unrecognized. Peters and Hood (2000) observe that linkages and complementarities across
industries and economic infrastructure rarely conform to any standard industrial classification
(SIC) system or to the more readily available aggregate national trade data [29]. A quantitative,
statistical approach does not address whether relationships exist between firms and institutions,
nor does it assess the strength and weaknesses of the linkages.
The "best practice" in regional cluster analysis is usually conceived as a two-stage process: (1)
an initial scan of the regional economy using quantitative sources, and (2) a detailed, and perhaps
painstaking, investigation of specific industrial features and economic infrastructure identified in
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the scan, usually through more qualitative methods. The two-step approach relies on a "clean
slate" with no a priori segmentations of the regional economic landscape. Otherwise, priorities
based on a few narrowly defined industry segments may be viewed politically as too exclusive or
preclude the investigation and identification of previously undiscovered clusters.
Bergman and Feser (1999) suggest that the two-step process can be applied in two different ways:
a bottom-up or a top-down approach. The bottom-up approach begins with an investigation of
individual sectors and discovering linkages with other industries and related non-business
institutions. A picture of regional industry interdependence is built from the ground-up one
sector at a time, as shown in Figure 2-5. The bottom-up approach is most appropriate for small
regions with relatively few industries.
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Piywood
Source: Bergman and Feser, 1999
Figure 2-5: Example of Bottom-Up Cluster Approach
The top-down approach identifies clusters by a more rigorous quantitative analysis, first
employing an analysis of the flows connecting regional industries, and followed by data reduction
techniques (e.g. statistical cluster analysis or factor analysis). The top-down approach is shown
in Figure 2-6 and is appropriate for regions where there is sufficient industry diversity to preclude
a sector-by-sector piecing together.
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Source: Bergman and Feser, 1999
Figure 2-6: Example of Top-Down Cluster Approach
Once an approach is determined, six analytical techniques exist in order to conduct the
identification of clusters. Each technique is listed in Table 2-5, with the advantages and
disadvantages highlighted. The techniques are roughly ordered in terms of how commonly they
have been used.
Analytical
Technique Advantages Disadvantages
Expert Opinion Relatively cost and time Not generalizable. Systematic data
effective. Detailed contextual collection very hard to do well.
information
Specialization Easy, inexpensive. Can Focus is on sectors, not clusters
Indicators (LQs) supplement other methods
Input-Output: Often only major source of Often dated; Industry definitions
Trade Flow Data data on interdependence; imperfect and neglects supporting
Comprehensive and detailed institutions
Input-Output: Key measure of Data not typically available in U.S.
Innovation Data interdependence
Graph -Visualization aids interpretation Methods, software still limited
Theory/Network and analysis
Analysis
Surveys Flexibility to collect ideal data; Costly and difficult to implement
current properly
Source: Bergmen and Feser, 1999
Table 2-5: Analytical Techniques for Cluster Identification
Expert opinion techniques are the most common approach to identify clusters and utilizes
interviews, focus groups, and Delphi survey techniques. Regional experts are the key sources of
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Apply Data
Reduction
Techniques
I
information. Though relatively cost and time effective, expert opinion is not systematic enough
an approach to generalize the findings. Strongly-held opinions of experts are often
overestimated. Location Quotients (LQs) are another common but limited means of identifying
clusters. A LQ is simply a ratio of regional employment share as defined below:
LQ(i) = Regional Industry i Share of Total Regional Employment
National Industry i Share of Total National Employment
A LQ of 1.0 indicates a regional economy has the same share of employment industry i as the
nation as a whole. Location quotients exceeding 1.25 are usually taken as initial evidence of
regional specialization within a sector. Applied independent of other analyses, LQs offer almost
no insight regarding regional clusters and their interdependencies. An input-output analysis
framework regards each sector's output as another sector's input. Statistically analyzing
production flows within a region assist in identifying interdependencies and linkages. Input-
output techniques can provide useful results; given that the data is sufficiently disaggregate.
Visually mapping clusters by graphically representing the direction and magnitude of flows
between producers and suppliers is promising, but interpretation of the revealed complexities is
difficult [30]. Augmenting the qualitative and quantitative approaches, clusters can be further be
refined by characterizing their classification and dimension, as described in Section 2.3.4.
2.3.6 Cluster Development and Growth
No guarantee exists that a cluster will establish, develop, or grow. The process will depend
heavily on the efficiency of the competitive diamond's links or feedback loops (see Figure 2-1)
[31]. Similarly, relying on a concept that depends on the relative efficiency of linkages and rates
of flow of somewhat nebulous concepts, such as innovation and productivity, does not lend itself
well to rigorous policy intervention. Rosenfeld (1997) suggests that to facilitate cluster
development, a new set of measures are needed to describe and evaluate the power of cluster
dynamics and identify gaps. Though he suggests many obvious descriptors, such as number of
related firms and specialized services, Rosenfeld proposes less obvious and more important
benchmarks such as:
. Social Infrastructure: mechanisms by which firms associate
. Innovation: degree of regional firms' entrepreneurial energy
. Vision: level of regional firms' leadership ability
. Networking: level of collaborative business activity
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These criteria, combined with the dimensions presented in Section 2.3.4, better identify the
growth prospects for a region's cluster and afford policy-makers the opportunity to construct
strategies that take advantage of a cluster's strengths and reduce its weaknesses.
Cluster strategies can focus on the expansion of the regional economic base, on attracting
industries from outside the region, or a combination of the two. Enright (2000) describes three
strategies which regions have undertaken to develop clusters within their economic infrastructure
boundaries. Organic strategies look to broaden a region's economic base by first identifying the
region's clusters and then promoting development by improving information flows and
interactions among local firms, removing infrastructure constraints, and developing the
appropriately skilled labor force. Transplant strategies attempt to develop clusters by attracting
industries from outside the region that might fit particularly well within the regional economic
environment and its existing base of industry, as well as developing or attracting suppliers and
related support services. Hybrid strategies combine the previous two, usually in a sequential
manner. A region may begin by actively recruiting outside investment, and after this transplant
strategy has resulted in a critical mass of industries, shift focus to more organic strategies [32].
2.3.7 Role of Government in Clusters
Focus in the discussion thus far has focused on policy-makers and leadership from within the
cluster. What is the proper role of government in clusters? Porter (1998) claims that clusters
create new roles for government, primarily ones involving the removal of growth obstacles and
the upgrade of existing and emerging regional clusters. While short on specifics, Porter argues
that government agencies should reinforce and build on established or emerging clusters rather
than attempting to create entirely new ones ("let the market decide"). Government reinforcement
of clusters comes from removing obstacles, relaxing constraints, or eliminating inefficiencies that
impede cluster productivity and innovation. As clusters mature and develop, and their sources of
competitive advantage shift, the appropriate government priorities change as well. Early
priorities involve improving infrastructure (such as transportation) and other factor inputs within
the diamond framework (see Figure 2-1). Later roles revolve around removing constraints to
innovation [33]. This approach is in contrast with many current government policies that direct
resources at specific industries a region is hoping to attract, regardless of whether the existing
environment is suitable for their development.
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Infrastructure investment, either independently or through a private-public partnership, is often
highlighted as an appropriate government role in cluster literature. Often overlooked is that
cluster infrastructure needs, while obviously varying from region to region, also depend on what
stage in the lifecycle a cluster is currently at. Physical infrastructure investments such as airports
and highways are important early in the development of clusters, facilitating geographical
concentration and linkages of regional industries. Physical infrastructure does not necessarily
provide dynamic competitive advantage in later stages. As a cluster advances through its
lifecycle, a region will need to focus on less tangible institutional and cultural infrastructure to
create competitive advantage dynamics such as business-education partnerships, labor-
management climate, and civic capacity.
2.4 Beyond Porter: Theoretical Foundations of Clusters
Clusters in practice often bear little resemblance to Porter's ideal type. Moreover, Porter's
account of economic interdependence, geography, and competitive advantage is short on
specifics. As a result, most of the literature on clusters takes his concepts as a point of departure
[34]. In the following sections, the core theoretical foundations of why clusters exist and reasons
they are important to a region are explored.
2.4.1 Are Clusters a Fad?
Economic development policy has been marked by several fads over the past fifty years. In the
sixties, mature "smokestack" industries were the focus of recruitment to establish a solid job base.
Focus on attracting high-tech industries such as microcomputers and telecommunications was a
hallmark of development policy in the seventies and eighties. In the late eighties, policy shifted
toward the recruitment of foreign firms and the establishment of a clear regional link to the global
network. During the nineties, industry clusters had become the slogan of economic development
[35].
The rapid succession of different policy approaches raises an important question: are industry
clusters a passing fad, the latest craze in a field prone to any course of action until a more
fashionable idea emerges? Some scholars have even questioned whether there is actually
anything new or innovative regarding the theory industry clusters.
Fad or not, the rapid acceptance of cluster-based strategies by economic development
organizations is impressive, especially in the absence of evidence that cluster-based approaches
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actually work. The absence of evidence is in part because most initiatives are relatively new, and
the development period is inherently long. Dissatisfaction with existing economic development
strategies is perhaps a more powerful reason underlying the rapid acceptance by policy makers.
Bergman and Feser argue that the industry cluster concept has its greatest value in its capacity to
help the analyst, industry leader, and policymaker see the regional economy as a whole. Industry
clusters may not be as much a revolution in regional theory and models, as it is a comprehensive
approach for understanding regional economic conditions and trends. In large measure, Bergman
and Feser suggest that industry cluster analyses and policies may be viewed as applications of a
set of well-worn but rejuvenated theories of how geography and infrastructure help drive
economic growth and change [36]. Clusters are seen as permitting the possibility of linking
together several strands of regional policy interests into a single framework. Therefore, even
accounting for the faddish nature of economic development policy, Bergman and Feser argue that
the cluster concept will likely survive in some recognizable form.
2.4.2 Five Core Theoretical Concepts for Clusters
Bergman and Feser have found that five concepts underlay the core of the existing literature on
reasons for the formation of clusters and their link to competitive advantage: (1) External
economies, (2) Innovation environments, (3) Cooperative competition, (4) Inter-firm rivalry, and
(5) Path Dependence [37].
External Economies
Theories on why industries cluster in geographic proximity have existed for over a century.
Economists have cited different types of externalities to a particular firm as reasons why firms co-
locate. Agglomeration economies - defined as the cost savings firms enjoy as a result of
geographic concentration - is the most frequently cited external cause of clustering. Lower
transportation costs are one of most frequently cited cost savings leading to agglomeration of
firms. Other advantages from proximity derive from the ability to better share infrastructure and
information, and better availability of specialized facilities. These advantages, among others,
relate to the well-known economies of scale concept: as industrial concentration increases,
individual firms benefit from the development of institutional and physical infrastructure
customized to the needs of their specific industry. A more interesting, and relatively more recent
externality as compared to agglomeration, is spatial externality. These externalities are more
dynamic and commonly associated with technological advances, increased specialization, and a
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division of labor. From a policy perspective, this externality is sometimes considered more
important than the static, agglomeration cases. For static externalities, economists argue that
governments have no policy role in encouraging geographic clustering since market forces (e.g.
the existence of lower input costs) will foster agglomeration. Intervention may be appropriate for
dynamic external economies such as learning, innovation, and specialization. Both static and
dynamic external economies have well-established and accepted roots in economics in both
industrial location theory and industrial district theory.
Innovative Environments
Just as firms do not conduct business in isolation, innovation seldom occurs in isolation. Industry
clusters serve as mechanisms whereby firms exchange knowledge and information that cannot
otherwise be systematically exchanged. Characteristics of the regional environment may also
play a role in helping firms innovate. For example, land use and design issues may help explain
the unique capacity of Silicon Valley to promote innovation [38].
Cooperative Competition
The premise of cooperative competition is that competitive firms find ways to work together even
as they compete head-to-head. Examples of this sort of cooperation are few, and often anecdotal
in nature. Just-in-Time (JIT) inventory and delivery systems and repeated buyer-supplier
interactions are cited the most commonly cited examples. The more frequent and rapid the
interactions between suppliers and buyers, the more likely companies are able to identify niche
markets, and quickly respond to changing market conditions. The weakness in these two
examples is that they apply primarily to cooperating end-users and suppliers, rather than
competing end-market producers. Bergman and Feser cite four circumstances where competing
firms may see benefit from cooperation: (1) lobbying, (2) foreign market research, (3) joint
export promotion, and (4) promotion and investment in specialized infrastructure.
Inter-firm Rivalry
At first glance, emphasis on inter-firm rivalry contradicts the aforementioned of cooperative
competition. Rivalry is often stronger among firms that are geographically concentrated. Firms
in the same region compete as rivals not just for customers, but also for labor, capital investment,
publicity, and political support. This rivalry-enhanced competition is important as it creates
continued pressure to upgrade technologies, improve productivity, and innovate.
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Path Dependence
The idea of path dependence refers to the general notion that technological choices - even
apparently inefficient or inferior ones - can assume a dominant position over other alternatives
and be dynamically self-reinforcing. Leading economists, such as Paul Krugman, have recently
helped legitimize this theory with support from new, more rigorous quantitative proofs [39]. In
principal, an initial lead in competitive advantage may be a result as much from luck or historical
accident rather than from market driven decisions. Path dependence has geographical
implications because, as a general rule, businesses do indeed tend to cluster in space. Chance
may establish a cluster through a "first-to-market" success, but it can be self-reinforcing and
result in a cumulative advantage, or "lock-in-effect." Because the introduction of new technology
can be path dependent, regional development can also become path dependent, suggesting that
being a first-mover can be critical to development success.
2.5 Developing a Cluster Strategy
2.5.1 Regional Circumstances Prompting Cluster Initiatives
The motivations for developing a cluster strategy vary substantially from one region to the next.
Through a review of previously undertaken studies, Gollub (1997) has found that five scenarios
emerge as typical circumstances prompting regions to initiate a cluster review and strategy
process [40]:
Scenario 1 - Trade-Impacted Regions
As trade barriers fall and international competition increases, restructuring and relocation by
firms have caused economic disruption in many regions. Due to new trade agreements or the
arrival of more competitive products from overseas, some regions have found they can no longer
compete strictly on industries based on low-cost manufacturing. In response to the passage of
NAFTA, El Paso, Texas initiated a cluster analysis which identified economic linkages between
the greater El Paso area, the Mexican state of Chihuahua, and eastern New Mexico. The study
found substantial connections and complementarities within clusters on either side of the United
States - Mexican border, but discovered significant barriers to and untapped opportunities for
business growth across political boundaries. In response, the Camino Real Economic Alliance
(CREA) was formed to pursue cross-border initiatives for both transportation and power
infrastructure, as well as cultural expertise training for the regional firms.
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Scenario 2 - Dependant and Narrow Economies
Historically, many U.S. regional economies depended heavily on federal spending in the national
defense industry. With the end of the Cold War, these economies suffered greatly and looked for
ways in which to redefine and diversify their economic assets. Hard hit by defense downsizing,
South East Los Angeles County (SELAC) undertook a cluster-based development initiative, with
the resulting plan focused on linking facility reuse of the significant defenses contractors with
business recruitment. Central to SELAC's plan was the enhancement of Los Angeles' role as the
premiere U.S. trade center on the Pacific Rim. The new Alameda Corridor emerged as a
specialized transportation infrastructure for the region, developed expressively for the purpose of
building a high-speed multimodal transportation corridor through SELAC to connect its ports to
inland rail and trucking terminals.
Scenario 3 - Rural and Less Developed Economies
In regions with a limited industrial base, economic change driven by market forces or government
policy is difficult and rare. Less-developed economies, often in rural areas, lack the
concentration of related industries necessary to form the dynamics needed for self-sufficient
clusters. However, components of cluster initiatives have been used to develop specialized
competencies in industries3 to serve clusters whose principal businesses or distribution centers are
located in larger, distant metropolitan areas. In effect, the rural area can become a satellite source
of value to another region's clusters. With continued improvement in commercial freight services
and telecommunication, more regions with specialized economic infrastructure may find
themselves as linked-nodes to other regions' clusters. As the node grows, the region may attract
new sources of economic growth, becoming self-reinforcing.
Scenario 4 - Disadvantaged Communities
In downtown urban areas, communities may be characterized by economic isolation, poverty,
business decline, or high unemployment rates. For these communities, the cluster framework
provides a means to map out key industries and economic infrastructure located throughout the
region. A strategy is developed to link the disadvantaged community to economic opportunities
in the larger metropolitan economy by, for example, building businesses to serve as specialized
suppliers to existing clusters, or introducing specialized transportation services linking the local
labor force to the regional economy.
3 Examples industries include multimedia, software, engineering, and manufacturing of specialty products
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Scenario 5 - Opportunity Regions
Regions whose economies are strong are also motivated to undertake cluster initiatives. In
rapidly growing regions, the cluster framework helps economic development policymakers to
manage growth by identifying existing and emerging clusters, determining their requirements,
and recognizing the public and private investments necessary to further develop or sustain these
opportunities.
2.5.2 Historical Problems Implementing Cluster Strategy
Cluster initiatives historically lack an understanding of the underlying economics of clustering
and the methodology for translating cluster concepts into concrete growth policies. In practice,
most cluster-based growth strategies do little to distinguish specialized needs of the clustering
firms. The results are often initiatives based on broad sectors, based on wide-ranging industry
predictions and forecasts, or based on the desire to compete at a national and international level
without focusing on relationships at the local level [41]. Other difficulties arise in cluster strategy
implementation. Effective stakeholder cooperation is difficult because of the multitude of the
participants; while government agencies may take a very broad approach to avoid the perception
of favoritism towards any one particular industry or firm.
2.5.3 A Cluster-Based Economic Development Framework
Because specific content and goals of cluster-based strategies vary widely from region to region
reflecting unique economic circumstances, a broad framework is needed. The U.S. Department
of Commerce (U.S DOC) has developed a general framework consisting of four stages of activity
as shown in Figure 2-7. The following section summarizes the framework as described in the
U.S. DOC's Economic Development Administration 1997 publication: Cluster-Based Economic
Development: A Key to Regional Competitiveness [42].
Regional mClse MblzainDiagnostic Collaborative ImplementationCluster taeStage Strategy Stage
Framework Stage e
STAGE I STAGE 11 STAGE IlIl STAGE IV
Source: Gollub, 1997
Figure 2-7: U.S. DOC Cluster-Based Economic Development Framework
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Stace 1: Mobilization
The first stage of a cluster-based economic strategy requires widespread interest and
participation. An economic window of opportunity is typically used to bring development policy
stakeholders together. The window of opportunity may be an internal or external event that
shakes the region's economy, or more serious external forces such as market shifts impacting an
entire sector, rapidly changing technology, or tougher foreign competition for a local industry.
Trigger events are often needed for mobilization as normal economic change typically happens in
slow and subtle ways, making it difficult to convince stakeholders there is a need for action.
Within the economic window of opportunity, the mobilization effort is initiated by creating or
identifying an organization dedicated to the initiative's goals. This organization's responsibility
will be to cultivate broad private and public sector participation to achieve early buy-in. A well-
structured initiative will bring together leadership from stakeholders representing the economic
output side of the economy with the institutions that provide the region's economic infrastructure.
Some initiatives fail early in the process because participation is limited to intermediaries such as
a chamber of commerce or public planning agency. Intermediaries for the output and input sides
of the economy may often sponsor or convey cluster efforts, but they cannot do the actual work of
the development process alone. Typical regional stakeholders for a cluster initiative are shown
below in Figure 2-8. On-going leadership for the initiative must eventually be established from
these stakeholders at a regional, rather than a statewide or local level.
Source: (jollub, 1997
Figure 2-8: Cluster-Based Economic Development Strategy Stakeholders
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Stage 2: Diagnosis
Strategies for regional economic development must be informed by a broader logic than, for
example, statements such as "we need more airport capacity." The analysis of the variety,
specific structure, and relative competitiveness of the region begins with an analytically sound
diagnosis of the region's economic portfolio. Identification and classification of existing or
emerging clusters proceeds in the two-step process discussed in Section 2.3.5. Cluster
identification by a neutral non-stakeholder resource using sound data collection and analysis
methods is necessary to dispel myths regarding the region's economic situation and make
participants more receptive to change.
Once the clusters have been identified, two benchmarks are established: (1) the clusters are
assessed against similar industry clusters in key competitor regions, and (2) regional economic
infrastructure is benchmarked by determining whether or not region has provided the clusters
with the necessary economic inputs needed to support and create competitive advantage.
Results of the classification and benchmarking are often presented graphically to the stakeholders
to simplify the complex challenges and opportunities for the regional clusters. Figure 2-9 shows
an example visual representation of a hypothetical region's clusters in a 2x2 matrix framework,
with circles indicating relative size of the cluster as measured by some metric (e.g. total
employment).
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Source: Gollub, 1997
Figure 2-9: Cluster Growth/Concentration Matrix
48
Low concentration / low growth High concentration / low growth
High concentration and high growth clusters require good strategy and investment to maintain
conditions for continued development and sustenance of competitive advantage. High
concentration and low growth clusters typically require targeted improvements in economic
infrastructure. Low concentration and high growth clusters need to emphasize business
recruitment and a focus on the buyer-supplier chain to capture the share of growing markets.
Finally, low concentration and low growth clusters should be a low priority for development
efforts.
Stage 3: Collaborative Strateqv
The stakeholders assembled for mobilization now must come together for collaborative solutions
based on recognition of shared needs and negotiation of shared commitments. Working groups
for priority clusters need to be brought together to define mutually beneficial actions with
measurable outcomes. Each group will use the diagnostic data and individual specialized
experience to define the competitive challenges facing the cluster, prioritize the challenges, and
develop action items to address the shared problems. Leaders from each cluster working group
are then assembled to identify common denominators in order to define cross-cutting initiatives
for creating region-wide support for taking action. This becomes the basis for a regional vision
and overall economic strategy.
Stage 4: Implementation
Implementation does not happen automatically once the development of cross-cluster-cutting
agendas is complete. Regions may designate or create a single organization to implement the
recommended agenda, while others use a mixture of public-private partnerships. New
relationships and partnerships may form or be encouraged between supply and demand side
economic providers. Implementation may also focus on development or improvement of the
quality of regionally supplied inputs used by one or more of the clusters in the region. For
example, representatives of state and local transportation agencies, airport and port authorities,
and planning agencies may meet with companies in each cluster of industries to prioritize or
adapt plans and programs for improving transportation infrastructure and facilities.
2.5.4 Evaluation and Critique of Cluster-based strategies
As mentioned earlier, to date, only modest research has been performed on the effectiveness of
industry cluster policy in generating regional economic development. Besides the absence of
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compelling evidence, several criticisms have been raised regarding the adoption of cluster
initiatives.
1. Cluster policies contradict the "traditional" wisdom of regional industrial diversification.
Cluster initiatives may encourage overspecialization in a regional economy leading to the
danger that if a cluster fails, the regional economy fails. Critics point to examples such as
the steel industry cluster in Pennsylvania. Proponents argue that successful industry
concentrations can maintain their vitality by innovation-based diversification. As an
example, Silicon Valley's semiconductor industry shifted to personal computer software
and hardware production and then to web-based e-commerce industries.
2. Cluster-based strategies are only applicable to small, specialized firms because of the
level of trust and cooperation required for a successful cluster. Bergman and Feser
(1999) counter that the reliance on nonspecific concepts such "trust and cooperation" is
overstated for successful cluster development. A cluster comprised of enterprises that
gain no real economic self-advantage has little practical meaning. Larger companies will
participate if they see personal economic benefit from participating in the buyer-supplier
relationships, common technologies, common markets, common distribution channels,
and common labor pool offered by a given cluster [43].
3. New telecommunication and Internet technologies are replacing the need for spatial
clustering, and firms may no longer receive competitive advantage from close geographic
proximity. However, most evidence suggests electronic interchange is not likely to
replace the importance of face-to-face communication. Competitive advantage gained
from cooperation between buyers and suppliers relies on informal business and social
exchanges.
4. Cluster initiatives may apply to only large urban areas, while the vast majority of cities
and regions have little prospect for developing more than one or two viable clusters.
Rosenfeld (1997) argues that clusters can stretch over larger geographic regions if
industry leaders are willing to travel longer distances to gain the benefits of interaction
and collaboration [44].
5. Some economists feel government intervention in economic development distorts the
"market" through inappropriate forms of public ownership and subsidies [45].
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6. Some industries simply cannot take advantage of proximity benefits offered by clusters.
Examples include industries especially intensive in just one or two specific factors (e.g.
coal or timber) or one or two general factors (e.g. labor or capital) [46].
7. The value and sustainability of a regional cluster could be undermined if it is dominated
by a small number of very large companies that report to distant headquarters. This ties
the success of a cluster on strategic decisions made at a distance from its economic
infrastructure and in turn, less innovative and more at risk over the long-run. Proponents
of clusters suggest that the corporate restructuring, downsizing, and reengineering
counter this risk as more companies are giving decision-making responsibilities to branch
plants. Furthermore, key leaders in branch plants are often committed to a region [47].
2.6 Linking Transportation to Clusters
The previous sections have established the notion of regions and the link between competitive
advantage and economic development policy. Because industrial clusters represent an important,
and currently fashionable, policy approach to competitive advantage, transportation infrastructure
and service providers and planners have a need and responsibility to understand their connection
to industry clusters. Listed below are integration points for transportation infrastructure and
service within the competitive advantage cluster framework.
Transportation as a Factor Input in the Diamond Competitive Framework
Transportation systems and infrastructure are factors (or inputs) to the competitive diamond
framework, and impact the overall conditions of the system. The quality, cost, and efficiency of
the transportation infrastructure factor are critical forces in the competitive dynamics. Effectively
improving the transportation infrastructure by eliminating cluster-specific inefficiencies will
contribute to cluster productivity growth.
Transportation firms, cities, and metropolitan areas in the U.S. are developing elements of this
approach, but nowhere has the entire system been integrated to support cluster initiatives. In
1993, U.S. companies spent more the $670 billion (greater than 10% of GDP) on logistics
(packaging, loading, transporting, unloading of goods) in what many industry associations
consider an inefficient infrastructure system. The grocery industry alone estimated it could save
$30 billion (or 10%) of its logistic costs with a more efficient infrastructure. In California, more
than 300,000 work hours each day are lost due to highway traffic congestion alone [48].
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Social infrastructure, including quality of life issues, is important for clusters. Cluster firms will
find it easier to attract top-quality people if the quality of life in a region is seen as high. As
clusters flourish, the success of the clusters may ultimately causes strain on the region in which
cluster-based economic development occurred . For example, the quality of life in Silicon Valley
is seen as diminishing in part due to high levels of congestion and long commuting times.
Transportation infrastructure and planning play a key role in alleviating the strains on the
dynamic metropolitan system caused by the growth of a successful cluster.
Transportation as a Means of Supporting other Competitive Diamond Inputs
Access to a skilled labor market is another important factor condition for the competitive
dynamics of an industry cluster. The greater the efficiency with which a region provides this
access, the more able its industries will be able to create and sustain productivity growth. Rapid
and efficient long-distance transportation services can link a region to a larger, and more diverse
labor market. In New England, 1-95, a commuter rail connection, and perhaps even Acela, the
new high-speed rail service, has linked the Providence and Boston labor markets creating regional
access to a larger skilled labor market in New England. This is especially important in regions
such as New England where the workforce population growth in metropolitan areas is stagnant, if
not in decline.
Transportation as a Key Economic Infrastructure Component
Cluster competitiveness derives from its economic infrastructure - infrastructure that provides
access to highly specialized economic inputs that are not usually provided solely by the business
sector. In defining the boundaries of a regional cluster, political and geographical borders are not
appropriate. Instead, the cluster boundary is defined by the extent, reach, and efficiency of its
economic infrastructure (see Figure 2-4). An understanding of this economic infrastructure is
especially important in the Diagnosis phase of the cluster-development framework presented in
Section 2.5.3. In this phase, regional economic infrastructure, such as transportation, is
benchmarked by determining whether the region is providing the clusters with the necessary
economic inputs needed to support and create competitive advantage.
Transportation as a Key Stakeholder in a Cluster-based Initiative
In the mobilization phase of the cluster-development framework, key stakeholders assemble for
the mobilization and collaborative phases based on recognition of shared needs and negotiation of
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shared commitments. Transportation cluster-input representatives to a cluster (see Figure 2-8)
include economic infrastructure providers such as air, rail, road, and port facilities and services;
and economic infrastructure intermediaries such as regional transportation planning agencies.
Transportation as a Facilitator of Innovation
Clusters rely on innovation in order to develop and sustain a competitive advantage. Many
regard the effect of transportation investments as "energizing" innovations in non-transportation
sectors, also known as companion innovations. Social and economic advances then follow.
Transportation investments energize, rather than create innovation because of transportation's
enabling role, as it opens opportunities to do current practices better, or facilitates the creation of
new practices altogether. Garrison and Souleyrette (1996) give an example using the expansion
of the U.S. road network and food retail distribution in the mid-twentieth century. Average
square footage of new supermarkets increased from 7,000 in 1940 to 20,000 in the 1960s.
Increased store size was permitted by customer's automobile travel and the automobile's ability
to transport multiple sacks of groceries (and other non-transportation related advances, including
the increased use of home appliances such as the refrigerator). During that same period,
consumer's expenditures on food decreased from about 30 to about 20 percent of all
expenditures, while at the same time, consumer's had the advantage of greater variety of choices
[49].
Innovation also relies heavily on face-to-face communication of collaborating and competing
industries, the creation of a specialized network of buyers and suppliers, and the utilization of
specialized labor pools. Transportation provides important support for each of these components
of innovation.
Transportation as the Facilitator of Collaboration Economies - JIT Linkages
Minimized inventory and reduced sourcing, production, and delivery cycles introduced through
JIT linkages, lean manufacturing initiatives, and improved supply-chain management play a
prominent role in manufacturing cluster dynamics. Multi-modal transportation systems are
important, as clusters' efficiencies rely on cross-docking transportation facilities that permit
products to flow rapidly and seamlessly through highways, railways, seaports, and airports.
Efficient ground transportation designs also need to incorporate redundant routes and intelligent
transportation systems (ITS) to minimize the impact of congestion or accidents on connecting
systems.
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Providing Scenario-Specific Efficiencies for Cluster-based Initiatives
In Section 2.5.1, five regional circumstances were presented which often precipitate the need for
a cluster initiative. Transportation services and infrastructure serve as the critical component in
many of the resulting scenario-specific initiative actions:
. Connecting rural and smaller cities to larger metropolitan areas to create satellite nodes to
developed, but distant clusters
. As a link between disadvantaged inner urban areas with economic opportunity in the
greater metropolitan area
. Creating cross-border linkages in response to the reduction or elimination of trade
barriers and boundaries
. Create new and diverse transportation links to attract and promote diversification and
new uses for existing, but declining industries found in regions with a narrow and
dependent economic base
Transportation as an Industry Cluster Itself
Transportation services and infrastructure themselves can make up an industry cluster. Industry,
support services, and trade organizations may all concentrate in a geographic area to provide
transportation-related functions. Examples include the: Alameda Freight Corridor in Los
Angeles, a network of transportation services linking the Port of Los Angeles, manufacturing
industries, and intercontinental rail distribution yards; Fed-Ex and the related services in
Memphis, Tennessee; the shipping clusters in Singapore and Hong Kong; and the Miami cruise
ship industry.
The preceding discussion has established the notion that economic development for a region is
dependent in large part on the region's competitive advantage. Industry clusters play an
important role in the growth and sustaining of this competitive advantage, and within a cluster-
based economic development strategy, there are important roles that transportation infrastructure
and investment can play. Subsequent chapters discuss linking the role of transportation
investment and economic development strategy with that of regional transportation planning.
The next chapter begins this discussion by reviewing the link traditionally attributed to economic
development and transportation, and how transportation organizations typically incorporate
economic development goals within their planning process.
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Chapter 3. Transportation and Economic Development
There is a clear relationship between transportation and commerce. Delivery of business goods
and services, household access to stores and consumer services, and worker access to jobs all
depend on transportation facilities. As a result, decisions regarding investment in transportation
facilities can impact the level, mix, and location patterns of economic activity. Recognition of the
economic impacts of transportation is not new. Roman roads across Europe and railroads across
the U.S. have long been used as examples of the role played by transportation infrastructure in
economic expansion [50].
The link between transportation investment and economic development has broad ramifications
that go beyond transportation's basic purpose of moving goods and people from one place to
another. There is little doubt that transportation is essential to the operation of any economy, but
much still needs to be understood about ways in which a transportation system can impact and
improve a regional economy. The chapter begins by differentiating between economic growth
and economic development. Next, an overview of previous research into the link between
economic development and transportation is cited, along with a summary of a new study by two
transportation economists released in 2000. A brief assessment of the state-of-the-practice of
incorporating economic development within transportation planning is made, followed by a
discussion regarding the various methods by which the economic impact of a transportation
investment can be measured. The chapter concludes by revisiting the role that transportation
might play in the development and growth of industry clusters.
3.1 Economic Development: A Working Definition
3.1.1 Economic Growth versus Economic Development
Like the concepts of clusters and regional competitive advantage, the term "economic
development" is often vague and not well understood. The complexity of the concepts
encompassed by the term does not provide for a simple definition.
Economic development agencies typically seek to increase economic activity by increasing their
area's business expansion, retention, new-starts, and attraction. To accomplish this, they
generally work to encourage projects or programs that will: (1) reduce business operating costs
and increase business productivity; (2) expand the size of business markets; (3) increase business
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access to needed labor, supplies, services, and materials; and (4) promote the advantages of their
area. As was discussed in the previous chapter, cluster-based development strategies are
currently one of the prevalent ways economic development agencies employ to increase regional
economic activity. Despite an increasing recognition of economic development impacts as an
issue to study, the meaning of economic development remains multifaceted. The terminology
used in practice is often unclear and even inconsistent. In particular, the measurement of
economic development is often referred to as "economic impacts" leading to confusion between it
and the broader study of social benefits and costs. Even more common is the interchangeable use
of economic development and economic growth, two related but not necessarily identical terms.
Economic development is fundamentally concerned with enhancing the factors of productivity -
labor, land, capital, and technology - for a local, regional, state, or national economy. The public
sector has often been responsible for setting the stage for employment-generating investment by
the private sector. In doing so, the public sector generally seeks to increase incomes, jobs, or
productivity of resources in a particular region. However, there can be trade-offs between
economic development's goals of job creation and wealth creation. Increasing productivity, for
example, may eliminate some types of jobs in the short-run.
Economic development encompasses a wide range of concerns. To economists, economic
development is an issue of economic growth, measured principally in terms of measurable change
in income, employment, or gross regional product (GRP). To business leaders, it may simply
involve the wise use of public policy that will increase competitiveness. To people who think
government should be directly active in the economy, economic development may be seen as
interchangeable with industrial policy. Vaughan and Bearse (1981) define the difference between
economic development and economic growth as follows [51]:
Economic Development: A qualitative change which entails changes in the structure of the
economy, including innovations in institutions, behavior, and technology.
Economic Growth: A quantitative change in the scale of the economy - in terms of investment,
output, consumption, and income.
Defined this way, development is both a prerequisite and result of growth. Development is prior
to growth in the sense that growth cannot continue long without the sort of innovations and
structural changes that are the result of development. But growth, in turn, will drive new changes
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in the economy, causing new products and firms to be created as well as incremental innovations.
Together, these advances allow an economy to increase its productivity, enabling the production
of more outputs with fewer inputs over the long haul. For the purposes of this thesis, Vaughan
and Bearse's differentiation between growth and development will be used, as their definition for
development is analogous to the competitive advantages dynamics which manifest themselves in
a region through its working industry clusters.
3.1.2 Transportation Infrastructure Defined
Before discussing the link between transportation infrastructure investment and economic
development, it is first necessary to more precisely define the term "infrastructure."
Infrastructure can be defined as the durable capital of a region; its location is fixed. Annual
expenditure on infrastructure in the United States is significant. In 1990, the United States spent
$113 billion on all categories of infrastructure, including $70 billion on highways, bridges and
mass transit; $19 billion on water supply, $9 billion on airports and aviation, $8 billion on water
resources, and $7 billion on disposing solid waste. The annual infrastructure outlay is equivalent
to 6% of all government expenditures, equaling approximately $400 per person. Although
infrastructure spending is non-trivial, as a percent of GNP, it has declined over the past decades
falling from 2.3% of GNP in 1967 to 1.7% in 1990 [52].
Transportation infrastructure includes canals, ports, railways, airports, communications (e.g. air
traffic control), roads, and terminals. Transportation facilities, services, systems, and networks
are all considered under the broad category of transportation infrastructure for the purposes of this
research. Two basic methods are used to evaluate the adequacy of transportation infrastructure:
an engineering approach and an economic efficiency approach. The engineering approach
evaluates two qualities of the transportation infrastructure: (1) the extent to which it incorporates
the state-of-the-art technology and design, and (2) the extent to which it performs intended
functions according to standards of reliability, durability, safety, mobility, and accessibility. In
the economic efficiency approach, the focus is on the degree to which the transportation
infrastructure enhances the productivity of the private and public sector. For example, treating
the economy as if it were a single large company, an economist could gauge the extent to which
total output could be produced less expensively with a different mix of inputs, and specifically
with a mix that includes either a larger quantity, better quality, or both of transportation
infrastructure.
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Banister and Berechman (2000) identify six characteristics of transportation infrastructure [53]:
1. Transportation infrastructure involves delivery systems allowing the provision of services
to individual customers.
2. Transportation infrastructure usually has substantial elements of a natural monopoly.
3. Transportation costs may form a small but important part of the total costs of the products
in which they are used. The losses that result from infrastructure service failure are often
very substantial relative to the basic cost of the service provision.
4. The sunk costs of establishing transportation infrastructure are substantial. A high
proportion of the total cost of the transportation service has been irreversibly incurred
before it is actually offered to customers.
5. Initially, the capital costs of transportation infrastructure are large relative to operating
costs.
6. In the United States and Europe, most investment today is being channeled into replacing
and upgrading existing infrastructure rather than into new infrastructure.
Having defined economic development and infrastructure, we now move into a discussion of the
role of transportation in economic development.
3.2 Previous Research
An on-going study at MIT has explored the role and impact of transportation investment on
economic activity [54]. Abel Mufioz-Loustaunau (1998) summarized the previous research to
date and his findings are presented in the following sections [55].
3.2.1 The Basic Roles of Transportation
Munoz-Loustaunau explains that transportation is not an end unto itself, but is instead primarily a
derived demand for other purposes. Although it is intuitively felt that investment in
transportation infrastructure has a relationship to the economic activities of a region, it is difficult
to establish the exact nature of this relationship due to the complexities involved. General
agreement as to the relationship is found when looking at the extreme conditions. The impact of
the transportation investment will be greater where there are few or no routes, and smaller for a
well-networked region.
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To understand the magnitude of the impact, Muhoz-Loustaunau argues that the effect will be
dependent on the condition of the regional economy. He categorizes four basic roles that
transportation can play into a conceptual framework to evaluate the transportation system in a
region:
1. Transportation investments may be needed to avoid the deterioration of existing
infrastructure, and support or facilitate the flow of persons and freight being generated by
current economic activity. In this role, transportation sustains the present economic
activity. Investment in transportation infrastructure will generally follow and catch-up to
regional economic growth.
2. Transportation investments may be needed in response to demand from expected
economic expansion. In this role, transportation acts to retain the present economic
activity. Investment in transportation infrastructure will precede growth and may
function as a prerequisite for it.
3. Transportation investments are a means to provide an interconnected network for a region
that offers attractive services to expanding or relocating firms. In this role, transportation
acts to attract new economic activity.
4. Finally, transportation can physically link a region to the global economy.
Graphically, the framework may be presented as shown below in Figure 3-1:
Impact of Regional
Transportation System
Source: Mufioz-Loustaunau, 1998
Figure 3-1: Basic Roles of Transportation
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To apply the framework for evaluation of a regional transportation system, Muhoz-Loustaunau
gives the example of a regional goal that includes linking its economy to an established trade
flow. In this case, the state of the regional transportation's physical linkages such as airport or
seaport systems should be evaluated.
3.2.2 The Basic Impacts of Transportation
Mufioz-Loustaunau expands the economic development evaluation framework by conceptualizing
the three basic impacts of transportation investments in a regional economy. The first is the
Corridor Effect, where infrastructure does not impact the region internally, but impacts the
through traffic. The second basic impact is the Crossroads Effect, where infrastructure improves
the links from and to the region. Finally, the third basic impact is the Productivity Effect, where
infrastructure improves regional productivity by reducing transportation costs within the region.
Based on the discussion of competitive advantage, clusters, and transportation in Chapter 2, a
fourth basic impact is proposed here: the Dynamic Effect, where infrastructure impacts structural
changes in the regional economy necessary for sustaining a region's clusters and competitive
advantage.
3.2.3 The Impact of Intelligent Transportation Systems
Muhoz-Loustaunau completes his summary of the relationship between economic development
and transportation investment by exploring the impact of Intelligent Transportation Systems
(ITS). He recommends that transportation planners need to more seriously consider ITS
investments during the transportation planning process and assess the ability of the technology to
stimulate and sustain economic development. According to Muhoz-Loustaunau, although ITS, as
an economic tool, has not yet become a common component of regional transportation plans, it
holds the promise of impacting regional economies in the following four ways:
1. Improving the flow of goods through a region, improving its productivity
2. Reducing congestion on connections to regional economic activity centers, the links to
the global economy can be strengthened
3. Substituting capital expenditures with less expensive operational improvements frees
funds for investment within the regional economy for other projects supporting economic
development
4. Extensive use of private sector ITS technologies can provide a new market for regional
industries, possibly generating job growth in the future
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3.3 "Necessary Conditions" for Economic Development
In 2000, David Banister and Joseph Berechman released a study assessing the link between
transportation infrastructure investment and economic development. The authors argue that
political and institutional factors provide the broader context in which transportation investment
decisions are made. Their findings are presented in the following sections.
3.3.1 New Themes of Transportation Infrastructure Investment
In the 1990's, five main themes regarding transportation infrastructure investment and economic
development emerged in the United States and Europe [56]:
1. The lack of investment in infrastructure of all types (including transportation) is having
an adverse effect on efficiency and productivity.
2. Attempts are increasingly being made by economists and planners to identify under what
conditions measurable development effects can be identified.
3. Environmental arguments have emerged as a significant consideration.
4. Industry's general view is that competitiveness is being jeopardized by a lack of
investment in regional infrastructure. With congested transportation networks, product
distribution has the risk of becoming increasingly unreliable.
5. The concept of induced traffic became mainstream with the recognition that economic
values of road infrastructure investment can be either under- or overestimated by the
omission of induced traffic volumes.
The themes illustrate that transportation investment are increasingly being regarded as part of a
broader system. Sussman (2000) terms these broad systems as CLIOS, or Complex, Large-Scale,
Integrated, Qpen Systems [57]. Within this framework, the infrastructure investment-
development system is complex as the degree and nature between economic development and
transportation infrastructure is imperfectly known, and difficult to predict. The impact of a
CLIOS system is manifested over a large-scale geographic area , which is appropriate given the
regional scale of competitive advantage and economic development. The feedback loops
between the points's on Porter's competitive diamond (see Figure 2-1) integrate factor inputs,
including transportation infrastructure, with the other competitive diamond subsystems. Finally,
to properly assess any transportation investment, it must be done within an open system, with
respect to economic, social, and political aspects [58].
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3.3.2 A Weakening Link between Transportation and Economic Development?
Historically, with few links in a regional transportation network, the impacts of investment could
be easily identified and casual relationships inferred. Assumptions were made that a high quality
transportation infrastructure was an essential prerequisite for economic development and growth.
This assumption has not been rigorously tested, despite becoming a common rational for
investment decisions. Traditionally, transportation investment was popular with the public as it
allowed them to develop and maintain a mobile lifestyle. Transportation investment was also
traditionally popular with industry, which often argued that new or improved infrastructure would
make them more competitive and allow for job growth [59]. For developing countries, these
casual relationships may still hold. The World Bank's position on the link between transportation
investment and development is clear:
"Transport is central to development. Without physical access to jobs, health,
education, and other amenities, the quality of life suffers; without physical access to
resources and markets, growth stagnates, and poverty reduction cannot be sustained.
Inappropriately designed transport strategies and programs, however, can result in
networks and services that aggravate the condition of the poor, harm the environment,
ignore the changing needs of users, and exceed the capacity of public finances [60]."
For more advanced economies, where transportation infrastructure is already well-developed and
more complex markets are in operation, a key question emerges: are the same arguments for
linking transportation investment and economic development still relevant? Banister and
Berechman believe new priorities are present in developed, regional economies that cause many
of the traditional arguments to be weakened, or to even no longer apply. These new priorities
include: (1) transportation investment increasingly viewed as a process with strong political,
social, and environmental implications; (2) flexible location decisions by the public and industry
create patterns of interactions and travel which are more complex; (3) new economic forces at
work as regional economies move from manufacturing-based to ones based on service and
information industries; and (4) a changed demographic profile of the population, with increased
life expectancy and new household structures [61].
Even as the impact of geography and transportation costs regain credibility with mainstream
economists for explaining economic growth, Banister and Berechman claim the importance now
allocated to transport costs is too great and question the degree to which a firm's competitiveness
will improve from transport cost reduction. Their research indicates that transport costs are
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increasingly a smaller part of total production costs, yet it seems to have been given a
disproportionately large role in explaining the competitive advantage and location decisions of
firms [62]. However, if transportation costs are considered more broadly within the total
logistics costs for firms, their competitive impacts increase in importance.
Using case studies drawn from road, rail, and airport investments in North America and Europe,
Banister and Berechman investigated the appropriateness of seven recent assumptions of the
relationship between economic development and transportation infrastructure. The seven
assumptions and the basic findings from their research are shown in the table below. Section
3.3.3 provides a summary look at the findings from the modal case studies.
Transportation & Development Assumption Findings
Maybe. Most networks in developed
The growth impact of any new transportation facility will be countries are well-connected, so the
significant. impact of any new link is likely to be smallindividually, but the combined effects of
new links may be substantial
Transport costs are a declining part of total production and ir kely ton fallun furtheraspo stin costs
information based employment increases
Vibrant economic conditions are more important than True. Transportation infrastructure can
infrastructure enhance this factor but not substitute for it
Unique regional characteristics over which the development Trueimpacts are to be felt are an important consideration.
Results from specific case studies on the link between
transportation investment and economic development can be A cautious "Yes"
generalized
The role of technological change in impacting the relationship
between economic development and transportation Unclear
investment is known.
It is possible to asses the course of economic development in
a region in the case that a given transportation investment is Unclear
not made.
Adapted From: Banister and Berechman, 2000
Table 3-1: Key Assumptions and Findings
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Road, Rail, Airport, and Transit Impact Findings
Banister and Berechman investigated several case studies regarding recent investment in
highway, rail, and airport infrastructure and its impact on the associated region's economic
development. Their findings are summarized briefly below, and supplemented by additional
findings for transit service investment.
Road Investment
Banister and Berechman found most recent road investment have taken place in specific corridors
where development has been encouraged, or in locations between and around cities to expand the
inter-urban network. Justification for most of the road cases examined, including the London ring
road M25, was based on a link between transport investment and economic activity or
development. Yet, in each of the cases, the critical role of policymaking and its interaction with
existing economic conditions was not clearly identified. Most quantitative analysis was focused
on determining the cost savings in terms of travel times, with minimal to no attempt to quantify
economic impacts [63]. Additionally, Munoz (1998) has looked at the U.S. Interstate Highway
System, and made the following conclusions regarding highway investments [64]:
1. Highway investments are generally able to produce positive effects on the economy, but
since this does not always happen, it suggests that other factors within the regional
economy must be taken into consideration.
2. The rate of economic growth and development varies over time, and depends on the
location of the highways. Investment in interconnected highway investment generally
generated better results than local, relatively unconnected roads.
3. Although U.S. productivity growth benefited from the interstate highway investment, the
transportation infrastructure's impact was second order. The main factors of productivity
growth were related to other factors such as growth in population.
Rail Investment
The researchers found that investment in rail systems have often been justified not only based on
cost-benefit analysis, but also by broader employment and development benefits. In fact, many
of the investment decisions would not have been considered if only the transport benefits were
used. Several projects were examined, including the Japanese Shinkansen, and the French TGV.
Banister and Berechman suggest that rail investments do not act as the primary catalyst for
economic change, but they can act to reinforce change that is already or likely to take place.
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3.3.3
Airport Investment
In examining the role of airport investment and development, Banister and Berechman found that
airports with similar volumes of traffic could generate significantly different economic impacts
based on their traffic mix. An important determinant of traffic mix was the size and diversity of
the regional economy. To identify the precise contribution of airport investment to a region,
Bannister and Berechman propose a four-step analysis process [65]:
1. Analyze the structure of the region's economy, together with the role that the airport plays
within it. The authors characterize an airport by type and traffic mix in an effort to assess the
role airport investment can play as shown below in Table 3-2:
Passengers
Airport Type (millions/yr) Traffic Mix Economic Impact Characteristics Examples
International > 15 Designated gateway or continental Attracts international company HQs Heathrow,
Gateway scheduled services. Full range of and distribution centers. Large-scale Amsterdam,
scheduled services. Charter. Freight. retailing centers. Long-haul tourism. Paris CDG,
General Aviation. Maintenance Exercises economic influence JFK / SFO,
nationally and internationally. Chicago,
Extensive off-airport influence. Atlanta
National Hub 3 - 15 Important national interlinking role National based airlines. International Rome,
airfreight. Important national firms. Oslo,
Capital city tourism Zurich
Regional 0.1 - 12 Can serve specialist markets. May Supports high-value export oriented Milan
Airports exercise an important international role. industry. High frequency scheduled
passenger services
Tourist 1 - 20 Specialize in high volume of leisure charter Large-scale maintenance operation. Gatwick,
Generator flights. Supplemented by scheduled flights. Important commercial trading Manchester
Some cargo flights
Tourist 1 - 12 Specialize in handling inbound charters Essential focus for inbound tourism.
Receiver Center for ground handling.
Opportunity to establish a supply
network
Transit and Varies Long-haul scheduled services with interline Attracts stop-overs. Duty fee trade Anchorage
Interline operations and trans-shipment depot. Important
cargo and shipping operation
Adapted from: Banister and Berechman, 2000
Table 3-2: Airport and Economic Impact
2. Isolate and analyze the significance of each airport infrastructure variable that supports the
regional economy.
3. Assess the economic impact of the airport business in terms of the different types of
employment and purchasing.
4. Evaluate the social aspects, given the airport investment's potential impacts on the wider
labor market and cultural activities within the region.
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The framework proposed for airport evaluation is graphically shown in Figure 3-2:
Movement of Goods and Services
Air Transport Industry
IeDirect 
Expenditure
Direct Expenditure: - --..--...--
(e.g. wages and salaries,
, sls and se Taxation Visitor Expenditure
investment
Geente Indirect Expenditure
Expndue
Direct Employment Expendure Attracted Employment
Induced
Employment
Source: Banister and Berechman, 2000
Figure 3-2: Airport Impact on Economic Activities
Transit Investment
Public transit can impact the location and intensity of physical development within a metropolitan
region, but its ability to influence physical development does not necessarily imply economic
development for the region as a whole. Despite frequent claims that construction of a transit
system will produce economic growth, Huang's (1995) extensive survey of the literature
identified only two empirical studies which attempted to systematically measure economic
growth impacts, and significantly, no studies measuring economic development. Each study
reached opposite conclusions. One study, the impact of BART on the San Francisco Bay Area,
found no significant effects on economic growth, while a study on SEPTA found large, long-term
effects on regional output, employment, and income. The BART study methodology treated
economic growth as a single variable, without recognizing the complexities of the economic
development process. The SEPTA study directly translated travel time and congestion reductions
into increased economic growth, another questionable methodology [66]. Without further
empirical studies on transit's impact on economic development, it is difficult to reconcile the
conflicting conclusions from these studies.
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3.3.4 The Three Necessary Conditions for Economic Development
Bannister and Berechman found that in developed countries where there is already a well-
connected transportation network, further investment in that infrastructure would not on its own
result in economic growth. Transportation infrastructure acts as a complement to other, more
important underlying conditions, which also must be met if further economic development is to
take place. Transport investment is not the sole necessary condition for economic development,
but acts in a supporting role with other factors at work. This same argument can be made for
almost any type of infrastructure investment, not strictly transportation, but it is useful to
explicitly restate this argument because so many large-scale transportation investments are
largely justified on the simple notion of "promoting economic development." Banister and
Berechman claim the three sets of necessary conditions required for development to occur with
infrastructure investment are: (1) economic conditions, (2) investment conditions, and (3)
political, policy, and institutional conditions. The illustration of necessary conditions is found
below in Figure 3-3:
1 +3
No investment thus no
accessibility changes
and no development
1. Economic: positive externalities; high
quality labor force; vibrant local economic
conditions or expectations
1- +2 +[ 1,2.3 I
-0
3. Political, Policy, and Institutional:
organizational and managerial framework that
are conducive to an investment;
complementary policies, and efficient
management of infrastructure facilities
1 +2
No supportive policiesEconomic thus counter
Development development effects
2+3
Accessibility changes
but no development
2. Investment: availability of fund
investments; scale of investment; its location;
network effects; timing of investment and its
efficient implementation
Adapted from: Banister and Berechman, 2000
Figure 3-3: Necessary Conditions for Economic Development
The concept illustrated above expands Mufioz-Loustaunau's framework for the basic role of
transportation. The framework demonstrates that individually, the necessary conditions will have
little or no impact on economic development. Even if they are combined in pairs, their effect will
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be limited. It is only when all three necessary conditions are present and working together that
economic development from transportation investment will follow. The goal of Chapter 6 will be
to expand the ReS/SITE framework so that its structure may explicitly take into consideration
these three necessary conditions.
Having addressed the conditions required for economic development, the following section
explores the state of the practice for incorporating economic development issues within
transportation planning.
3.4 Transportation Planning and Economic Development Policy
Transportation planners face complex questions when planning for transportation investments.
These questions are often circular, as planners are often asked: (1) what are the transportation
needs for future growth, and (2) what will be the effect of transportation investment on future
economic development. Transportation investment can take two distinct paths: infrastructure
expansion and infrastructure enhancement. Expansion includes the construction of additional
highway segments, rail lines, runways, or additional terminal capacity using traditional
technologies. Enhancements refer to new technologies that can improve the efficiency of existing
systems, examples of which include ITS, intermodal facilities, GPS, and air traffic control
systems. As transportation systems mature and competition for federal and state funding
intensifies, the questions have become more difficult. No longer is it a question of where to build
another segment of highway, or which airport needs expansion. Instead, transportation agencies
are facing increasingly complex pressures for prioritizing and selecting transportation projects.
3.4.1 The Transportation Investment Decision Hierarchy
The transportation decision-making process in the context of economic development policy is
typically portrayed as a top-down decision-making process which evolves from policy, to
program, and finally to project evaluation and selection. The hierarchy is shown in Figure 3-4:
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Political Tasotto
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Projects
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Methodology
Projects
Adapted from Weisbrod, 1999
Figure 3-4: Transportation and Policy Decision-Making Hierarchy
The economic policy defines the general aim or outcome of the planning process, while the
program assembles the resources together to implement these aims. At the policy level, decisions
are made about the objectives of the transportation infrastructure and system integration.
Transportation economists argue that good policy in the transportation sector should have the
same basic objectives as regional economic policy in general, though in practice, this is often not
the case. Given the policy objectives, program design is oriented toward identifying and
screening the most relevant and efficient project alternatives as well as for measuring and
assigning the benefits and costs. The project selection methodology moves the process from
policy toward concrete action and implementation. At every stage, information and socio-
political considerations play a role. The advantage to this type of hierarchy is that programs and
projects that are incompatible with the economic policy objectives are theoretically shed early.
This is in concept only. The reality of the transportation decision-making process is often quite
different.
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Transportation planners often face many constraints or political realities within this decision-
making process which in practice leads to a much different process. Some of these influences
include:
. Constitutional and legislative constraints as transportation funds are often earmarked for
specific spending purposes or restricted in scope of use, such as airport passenger facility
charges
. Income redistribution goals where transportation policy is used as a way to beneficially
affect the cost of living of elderly and low-income households
. Financing consideration constraints
. Funding environments where it is often easier to politically build new facilities than to
implement demand management of existing facilities
. Social planning constraints in which transportation policy is intertwined with policies
toward the environment, land use, urban renewal, and so forth
. Power constraints in which decision-making authority is not effectively placed
Because of these political realities and constraints, the state of the practice of incorporating
economic development policy by transportation agencies is different than suggested by the top-
down hierarchy.
3.4.2 The State of the Practice
Economic development impacts are usually assessed by transportation agencies only for large
infrastructure projects. For highway and transit projects, these are likely to be major system
improvements, such as new or expanded highway or transit lines. For other modes, these projects
tend to be specific terminals such as airports, seaports, or intermodal facilities. Economic
development analysis is done less commonly at the state or regional level for entire spending
programs or for incremental improvements. The number of agencies, such as Metropolitan
Planning Organizations (MPOs) and state Department of Transportations (DOTs), with a policy
of formally including economic development analysis as a regular component of their project
evaluation is small.
Most transportation agencies at the state and national level recognize economic development as
an important consideration for some of their transportation investment decisions. However, most
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agencies only sporadically conduct detailed studies. Such studies are usually undertaken only for
large investments or for situations where concerns about economic development impacts emerge
as a major factor.
There are several reasons cited for the small role played by economic development impact
analysis for transportation projects. These include [67]:
1. Transportation agencies' need for a more validated link between transportation and
economic development at the transportation corridor or facility level.
2. The need of more complete and transparent economic development analysis tools.
3. The development of more consistent standards or guidelines for agencies regarding how
and when economic development impacts should be evaluated and measured
4. The lack of institutional links between transportation planning organizations and
economic development policymakers
Weisbrod (2000) surveyed 52 transportation planning departments representing 36 states, 7
Canadian provinces, and 8 MPOs. He found that the motivations for specifically studying
economic development impacts often had little to no relationship to specific economic
development goals. The results, shown in Figure 3-5, show that more than one-half of all
agencies reported having been motivated to study economic development effects as a response to
local concerns about the adverse effects of proposed transportation investments, or as a factor in
project ranking and selection.
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Figure 3-5: Motivations for Studying Economic Development Impacts
Economic development goals need to be integrated within transportation more broadly than the
survey suggests is currently being undertaken. Regional policy is an important consideration in
any economic impact assessment of a transportation investment. Banister and Berechman cite the
critical role of transportation and economic policy and how it influences and strengthens the
potential impact of transportation infrastructure investment [68]. The three necessary conditions
discussed in 3.3.4 may have conveyed the impression that each set is equally important. This is
an incorrect portrayal of reality, since political and policy decision-making actually affects,
directly, or indirectly, the other two sets of necessary conditions. The Venn Diagram in Figure
3-6 abstractly conveys the relationship between the three necessary conditions.
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Source: Banister and Berechman, 2000
Figure 3-6: Relationship between Policy and Transportation Investment
3.4.3 Examples of Formal Studies
A survey of 40 state DOTs was made by Perkens (1992) [69]. When asked about which
investments were made with the specific intention to spur economic growth, the most frequently
cited investment was access to industrial park. The following figure shows which investments
were cited by the DOTs. Only 28% of the respondents conducted economic evaluation of the
infrastructure investment cited.
Access to idustrial Park 13.1%
Expand Existing Hghways 12.6%
Hghw ay Interchanges 12.6%
Airports 10.1%
E Development Corridors 9.5%
Bypass/Beltw ay 9.0%
Railroad Facilities and Vehicles 8.0%
Bus Facilities and Vehicles 6.5%
V
Coastal Ports 3.5%
Rapid Transit Facilities 3.5%
E
Parkw ays/Scenic Route 3.5%
Hgh Speed Ground Transport Facilities 2.5%
Inland Ports 2.0%
0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0% 10.0% 12.0% 14.0% 16.0%
Percent of State DOTs
Source: Perkens, 1992
Figure 3-7: Investments Cited to Spur Economic Growth
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The overlapping area represents
the set of conditions that must be
present for economic growth to
occur.
In the cases where transportation planning agencies have a process for recognizing economic
development impacts, they are often merely a set of procedures for recognizing the impacts, as
opposed to formal policies. A few formal policies do exist, examples of which are given below:
TEA-21
The Transportation Equity Act of the 21" Century (TEA-21) provides for the federal funding of
transportation investments and distribution of those funds between 1999 and 2003. It has played
a significant role in raising the visibility of economic development as a component of
transportation planning in the United States by explicitly identifying economic development
considerations as one of several key factors in project funding decisions. The act sets forth a
framework, jointly administered by the Federal Highway Department (FHWA) and Federal
Transit Agency (FTA) for investment decisions made by the State DOTs and MPOs. One of the
seven planning factors within the framework is to "support the economic vitality of the
metropolitan area, especially by enabling global competitiveness, productivity, and efficiency
[70]." The other six planning factors within the framework - connectivity, accessibility and
mobility, environment and quality of life, system management, system preservation, and safety -
also have economic development impacts.
Louisiana Port Prioritization Program
Louisiana has a statewide system of prioritizing port investments between its eighteen river ports
and six seaports. The program creates a process to evaluate all proposed investments based on
their economic return for the state economy. Projects are ranked on the economic return to the
state taxpayers. By requiring a state-wide perspective, the program avoids investing in port
projects that simply relocate existing activity and focuses on statewide economic benefit [71].
Wisconsin Translink 21
The Wisconsin Department of Transportation adopted an investment strategy intended to provide
a multimodal framework for evaluating economic priorities. Within the framework, alternative
statewide transportation strategies were rated by how they would affect the state's key target
industries. From this framework, the DOT created more detailed plans for a 25-year
transportation plan. As part of this process, the DOT coordinates its strategies with local
businesses and economic development organizations [72].
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Montana TranPlan 21
The Montana DOT formally reviewed the state's economic development trends and issues and
linked them to transportation issues in four areas: (1) rural access to outside markets, (2)
economic diversification, (3) international trade, and (4) tourism. From these linkages, the
department adopted a series of specific policies that promoted initiatives in each of these areas
[73].
The World Bank
The World Bank evaluates specific transportation investments by considering a wide variety of
factors including their potential effectiveness in reducing transportation costs for product
distribution, improving economic linkages with rural and international markets, and improving
worker access to jobs. The factors are subsequently used in constructing measures of expected
social value and rates of return for transportation investments [74].
3.4.4 The Importance of Measurement
Having an economic policy as a consideration in transportation investment does not guarantee
that economic development will occur. Furthermore, it is unclear how the benefits and impacts of
the investment on economic development should be measured to evaluate the transportation
project. The estimation and measurement of benefits of transportation infrastructure spending is
important in three ways: (1) in establishing budgets and allocations, (2) in selecting among
alternative projects, and (3) in selecting design alternatives. The next section will briefly explore
several methodologies used to evaluate the benefits, and survey two frameworks in which
represent two different ways of allocating benefits and assessing if the infrastructure investment
will impact regional economic development.
3.5 Measuring the Impact of Transportation on Economic
Development
The evolution of measuring the impact of infrastructure investment decisions has evolved over
the last several centuries. Early business and government decision makers used the a rule of
thumb approach which weighed the "pros and cons" of the alternatives. In the 1800s, Pareto
offered a more structured framework with his "Pareto Principle" which was the notion that a
decision was good for society if it made at least one person better off without impairing the well-
being of others. The principal in practice was relatively unhelpful in that most projects create
winners and losers. In the 1930's, Hicks and Kaldor offered a more applicable framework, the
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"Hicks-Kaldor Principle," which stated that a project was worth doing if the benefits exceed the
costs and the "winners" could, in theory, compensate the losers [75]. This principle formed the
basis of cost-benefit analysis (CBA), which has remained the most common form of measuring
economic impacts. CBA has significant difficulties, among which are: (1) measuring the benefits
of infrastructure that does not currently exist and will interact with other systems, (2) distributing
the benefits and costs over time and discounting appropriately, and (3) incorporating
measurement uncertainty.
In Chapter 1, Figure 1-1 depicted that transportation investment effects on economic development
are usually measured in terms of the impact of a project or program on the growth of a region's
economy. Principally, it is measured in terms of change in output, gross regional project,
personal income, and employment. Other, more important indicators focus on particular aspects
of economic development impact, rather than overall expansion of a region's economy.
Strikingly, productivity, the most important measure for assessing regional competitive
advantage, is found to be the least commonly used measure of a transportation investment's
economic impact. In general, economic growth is the focus of the measurements, not economic
development.
3.5.1 Methods of Measurement
Economic development impact analysis is not typically viewed as a substitute for the evaluation
of transportation systems; rather it is used as a complementary form of analysis. It is exceedingly
difficult to determine how the benefits of a transportation investment can and should be
measured. Over the past several decades, several types of economic analysis have emerged in
an attempt to address this issue, each measuring benefits differently and pursued by different
proponents. Each economic analysis technique will be briefly explored.
User Benefit Analysis
Nearly all major highway projects are justified and assessed by some calculation of user cost
savings and its economic value. The benefits are measured in terms of improvement in travel
time, travel expense, and safety, all expressed in terms of a money value. A common
categorization of benefits will break out the benefits as shown below:
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Annual Impact (in Millions)
Trip Type Benefit Type Primary Area Rest of Region Total Region
Work Time $3.8 $1.0 $4.8
Operating Cost ($0.4) ($1.5) ($1.9)
Safety $1.2 $0.6 $1.8
Non-Work Time $4.2 $1.7 $5.1
Operating Cost ($0.5) ($1.9) ($2.4)
Safety $1.8 $0.8 $2.6
Total $10.1 $0.7 $10.8
Table 3-3: Example of User Benefit Allocation
The methodology to compute these benefits typically involves traffic network models developed
to represent origin-destination patterns. This methodology includes direct estimates of the full
value of user benefits for all trips on the network. The disadvantage of this method is that it
values only direct benefits to specific transportation users, and those benefits reflect only a
limited set of direct costs, travel times, and accident costs. Dynamic externalities are ignored.
Regional-Economic Sector Benefit Models
Regional macro-economic models are increasingly being developed to make the traditional cost-
benefit studies, exemplified in the user-benefit approach, more robust. The most frequently used
regional forecasting model in the United States is the REMI (Regional Economic Model, Inc.)
model. It is a dynamic model which has the ability to forecast over long periods of time,
attempting to account for shifts in economic and demographic patterns in a regional context. At
the heart of the model, the allocation of benefits from the transportation investment is allocated to
different economic sector. Typically, for each business sector s, define:
As = Bs*CS*Ds where: (3-1)
As = Dollars of total business benefit accruing to sector s
BS = Total dollars of business activity in sector s
CS = Percent of business activity in sector s spent on transportation related costs
DS = Percent of total transportation activities by sector s that can benefit from improvement.
In addition to the business effects, market estimation models are used to assess opportunities for
expanded business market boundaries, and the additional impact on attraction of tourism and
business activity. Though this model accounts for transportation effects of cost savings and
market growth, it places no value on activities of individuals that do not involve wages. No value
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is placed on social, environmental, or quality of life issues, each of which has an impact on the
competitive advantage of the region.
Qualitative Assessment Models
Qualitative assessment methods are sometimes used for economic development analysis of
infrastructure investments. Expert interviews and business surveys of key business leaders and
local or state planning authorities can be used to evaluate the area's transportation needs,
constraints, and threats to economic growth, and how the proposed transportation investment
might improve each of these. The use of comparable case studies is sometimes used which
document the before-and-after experiences of other regions that have completed similar types of
transportation investments. This type of assessment is useful when presenting to the public, as it
is easier to understand than the more rigorous economic quantitative models [76].
Productivity Models
Many studies have tried to develop a model demonstrating a statistical link between the level of
public infrastructure stock and productivity growth. Very few of these studies have tried to
examine the effect of transportation capital only, with most studies examining aggregate
infrastructure including utilities and communication. The most common model used is the
production model shown below (in Cobb-Douglas structure):
Y = (MFP),* La * K,* Ky, (3-2)
where Y = aggregate regional output (e.g. gross regional product)
MFP = measure of multi-factor productivity
L = aggregate hours worked by labor
Kp = private capital spending
KG= non-military capital spending
t = denotes time
Given the estimated parameters above, the major objective of most studies has been to compute
the elasticity of output with respect to the public infrastructure stock, or E-, where:
(dY Y_
G ) /lI (3-2)dKG )KG
The major limitation of this model is that it assumes that the effect of public and private capital
on output occur simultaneously and independent to other variables such as the size of the labor
force or factor productivity. To address these limitations, other studies have adopted a cost
function model approach. The object of this model, like the production function model, is to
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investigate the effect of capital infrastructure on economic growth and productivity. The major
assumption of the model is that the cost function represents the behavior of industry with respect
to the demand and use of inputs, which is manifested in private industry's cost minimization
behavior. The general structure of the cost function model is shown below:
C = C(w, Kp, KG, t, Y) (3-4)
where: C is the Private Sector's cost function
w is a vector of input prices
Kp is Private Capital
KG is Public Capital
t is a time index (representing technological change)
Y is output
The key element of the studies' analyses is to determine the impact of
productivity by computing the cost elasticity: -8lnC / 8KG.
public capital on
The number of studies using production and cost models that focus strictly on transportation
infrastructure investments is very limited. Banister and Berechman (2000) examined seven
studies of primarily highway capital investments across the 48 contiguous states and found that
output elasticity with respect to transportation capital investment ranged from 0.08 to 0.384 [77].
This means that a 1% increase in capital expenditures corresponded to a 0.08% to 0.384%
increase in GRP (gross regional product). The table below compares the findings to international
studies on capital investments done during the same period:
Country
U.S. (7 Studies)
Korea
Taiwan
Mexico
Spain
Germany
Japan
France
Developing Countries
Scale
State
Country..........................
Country
Country........ ..... .....
Country
Country
Regional
Regional
Multi-national
Multi-national
Output Elasticity of Public
Capital*
0.08 - 0.384
0.19
0.18
0.05
0.24
0.05
0.20
0.08
0.07
0.07
* Highway capital was isolated in U.S. studies, but aggregated in other countries with all public capital investments
Source: Banister and Berechman, 2000
Table 3-4: Productivity Impact of Transport Investment
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The problems with production and cost models are threefold. First, the models assume that the
available level of transportation infrastructure is efficient and that better management, improved
maintenance, or operations using ITS could not increase the level of services, and assumes that
only additional investment will impact further growth. This assumption could lead to a faulty
policy guide, as better management of available infrastructure may yield the same economic
growth effects as new investment. Second, and more importantly, the models assume that
increases in transportation infrastructure lead to greater economic output, implying a one-way
direction of causality. There is no reason not to assume the opposite; where rising productivity
and output in a region leads to increased infrastructure investment. The final problem of
production and cost models is the lack of a spatial component. Because transportation services
are provided within a network, what happens in one place affects what happens in another. These
models do not incorporate spatial connections or encompass network-wide effects.
3.5.2 Measurement Frameworks
Weisbrod (2000) presents the most common framework used in assessing and allocating benefits
for transportation investments. Indirect and direct effects on business, income, and economic
growth are computed. The sum of these is determined to be the total effect on economic growth.
The total effect divided by the direct effects only is called the multiplier effect and used to
quantify the "dynamic" or induced impacts from the investment. Finally, additional effects
because of economic growth such as property values and environmental impacts are measured.
The traditional transportation impact on economic development measurement framework, rooted
in historical cost-benefit analysis, is shown in Figure 3-8 [78]:
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Source: Weisbrod, 2000
Figure 3-8: Traditional Framework for Evaluation of Economic Development Impact
Banister and Berechman disagree with the traditional measurement framework, arguing that the
degree to which an improvement in transportation infrastructure affects economic development is
not independent of the economic and demographic characteristics of a region. Similar to their
arguments summarized in Section 3.3.4, the traditional framework raises important questions,
such as:
1. Does the above framework correctly represent the relationship between infrastructure
investment and economic development?
2. Does the framework actually double-count benefits?
3. What in the framework demonstrates the link between transport investment and economic
development?
4. What are the necessary conditions for economic development to occur from a transport
infrastructure investment?
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Transportation Project/Program
Change in Costs and Markets for Purchase Supplies Indirect Effects
Directly-Affected Businesses (Capital Inputs) (SupplierBusnesses)
Multiplier Effects
Direct Effect: Pay Workers Induced Effects n Business
Change in Business Activity - (Wages) (Consumer
(Output) Businesses)
Retain Earnings
(Profits, Reinvestment)
SUM (Direct, Indirect, and Induced Effects)
Overall Growth of Business Activity
" Regional Output (business sales)
" Gross Regional Product (value added)
. Wages (personal income)
" Jobs (employment)
Other Factors Affected as a Result of Economic Development:
. Property Values
. Land Use/Development
. Envirorment
. Government Revenues and Costs
Banister and Berechman argue that the transportation system should be viewed as a constraint on
the ability to achieve economic development. An additional investment in transportation
infrastructure and systems lessens this constraint, and further enables the opportunity for
economic development. As a region's infrastructure becomes more developed, it has a less
binding effect as a constraint on economic development. In general, even a large size
transportation investment, in monetary and physical terms, often represents only a modest
expansion of an in-place network and, consequently, may have only small mobility and economic
effects [79]. To properly measure the potential economic development impacts, Banister and
Berechman have proposed a new framework shown in Figure 3-9:
Investment in
Transportation
Infrastructure
Travel Impact:
Regional Welfare Gains Travel Time, Regional Regional(Consumer Surplus) Cost, Capacity, Policy EconomicOther Level of Making Conditions
Service Variables
Potential
Mechanisms for
Economic
Development
EXTERNALITIES
Attractiveness Quality of Life Regional Characteristics Agglomeration
. . . of Region to and Intermodal of the of Regional
Investors Environmental Network Regional Labor Industries
Impacts Economies Market (Clustering)
Regional
Economic
Development
Adapted from: Banister and Berechman, 2000
Figure 3-9: New Framework for Linking Transportation Investment to Development
Several important differences exist between this new framework and traditional ones. First, the
investment multiplier is excluded from the structure. The authors argue that the multiplier effects
of an investment occur over a relatively short period, and are a static impact rather than one that
continues to develop dynamically into the future. Second, "extra" benefits such as property
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appreciation and other externalities, which arise when a reduction in transportation cost alter
relative prices in other markets, are omitted in the new framework. This effect is not considered
economic development, but instead is a symptom of development and a reflection of pricing
mechanisms. Third, specific travel time and accessibility user benefits are assigned exclusively
to the consumer surplus, reflecting that they may impact economic growth, but not development.
Finally, and most importantly, the three necessary conditions that must be present for economic
development to occur, as described in Section 3.3.4, are explicitly included in the framework.
The framework underscores Banister and Berechman's contention that economic development
from infrastructure is predicated only on the presence of certain externalities in the region. If
these externalities are not present in the regional economy, then all benefits from an investment
are confined to travel or accessibility related benefits. Since these benefits are fully represented
as welfare gains (i.e. consumer surplus), further development effects cannot be expected. It is
only when the policymaker, planner, or analyst can demonstrate the existence of these
externalities that additional economic growth benefits can be rightly assigned to the investment.
Regional competitive advantage is implicitly incorporated into the framework through the
recognition of cluster dynamics within the externalities component.
3.5.3 Measurement Challenges
The selection of the proper framework to determine and allocate the benefits of transportation
investment is often only half the challenge. There is a large gap between data that is available
and data required to answer questions raised by policy and decision makers. The challenges
related to data requirements to measure economic development impacts from transportation are
fivefold. First, a large gap in most studies is the lack of information on the flows of goods and
people. Second, most analyses of the relationship between transportation investment and
economic productivity do not take into account the intensity of use of transportation systems.
Thirdly, another deficiency is the lack of information linking location of businesses and
households to the location of transportation systems that provide the services. Most are
aggregated at the state or national level, falling far short of establishing the necessary spatial link
at the regional level or lower [80]. Next, as discussed in Chapter 2, economic data is most easily
attained for items such as job and income growth rather than measurements of net productivity
effects. The economic impacts of transportation infrastructure are extremely difficult to
disaggregate from other public capital investments, especially at the regional level. Finally, the
magnitude and significance of the effects are far from conclusive, even if given adequate
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measurement data. The causality issue discussed in Section 3.3.4 is a significant problem both in
terms of direction (e.g. economic development leading to infrastructure investment) and cause
(e.g. political and economic climates).
3.6 Linking Transportation Investment to Clusters - Revisited
Section 2.6 provided nine examples regarding the roles transportation infrastructure might play
within an cluster-based economic development. In this section, the role of transportation
infrastructure within clusters and economic development is expanded. The following aspects are
considered: productivity improvement, facilitation of cluster specialization, enabling face-to-face
communication, and providing clusters access to specialized inputs and outputs.
Productivity Improvement
Several aspects of cluster productivity that can be affected by transportation investment as shown
in Figure 3-10:
Transportation
Infrastructur e
Improvement
COST IMPACTS
* Reduced travel costs for serving
existing trips
* Reduced travel for freight
shipments
* Reduced "on -the-clock" business
travel expenses
REDUCED
INVENTORY/LOGISTICS
* Reduced Total Logistics Costs
o Ordering
o Inventory
* Time-based competition
considerations
GREATER ECONOMIES OF SCALE
AND ACCESSIBILITY
* Access to greater specialized labor
pool
* Access to greater variety of
specialized input products
Adapted from: Weisbrod, 1998
Figure 3-10: Potential Productivity Growth from Transportation Infrastructure Improvement
84
CLUSTER
PRODUCTIVITY
GROWTH
There are several limitations to the notion of productivity as a measure of economic development
impact and level of competitiveness. First, productivity measures do not necessarily capture
social benefits or negative externalities. Second, there is only a limited base of information on
how productivity effects of transportation infrastructure can differ by specific combinations of
mode, industry, and region. Finally, the marginal impact of future transportation investment on
economic development may have weakened compared to the past for several reasons: (1)
development of a ubiquitous highway system over the past 40 years increasing the accessibility of
most metropolitan areas; (2) decentralization of employment and residences to the suburb; and (3)
lack of coordinated regional transportation planning [81].
Facilitation of Cluster Specialization
Cluster growth relies on increasing specialization of the regional industries and inputs. Increased
specialization means that each region becomes increasingly concentrated and focused on specific
services and end-products as productivity is improved. To be fully able to take advantage of
these productivity gains, a larger and larger volume of goods and/or services must be exchanged
with other regions. The intensification of a region's degree of specialization presupposes an
extensive trade with other highly specialized regions, and an extensive trade in goods and/or
services presupposes a well-functioning transportation system. As a growing share of trade
between highly developed regions deals with high-value knowledge-intensive goods and services,
the importance of rapid, frequent, and reliable goods and passenger transportation is increased.
Face-to-Face Communications
There exists a need for face-to-face contacts for firms in all industries, even if contacts vary in
duration, extent, scope, purpose and so on between different firms and industries within a cluster.
An education cluster or R&D cluster have a larger relative need for face-to-face contacts. Claims
have been made that modern information technology together with telecommunications will be
able to substitute for face-to-face contact, and in turn, business trips. This is probably true for the
part of face-to-face meetings that have as their only purpose the transfer of routine information.
However, many face-to-face meetings have purposes other than the transfer of routine
information. Instead, they concern qualified knowledge transfer, the selling and buying of non-
standardized and specialized products, negotiations, non-standardized decision-making, lobbying,
and service production. In today's economy, it can be observed that a growing share of all
employees are (1) engaged in service production; (2) employed in knowledge-creation or
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knowledge-transfer jobs; and (3) receive more education, often at the university level. With these
observations, it is apparent that there are dynamics working in the direction of increasing the
demand for face-to-face contacts. Also, general diffusion of computers and cellular phones has
made it much easier to schedule business meetings, book tickets, and rent vehicles. Improving
conditions for business trips and in turn, face-to-face meetings, are a central condition for
economic integration and cluster development. Face-to-face communication is considered
essential for cluster development, playing important roles in several of the foundations of industry
clusters that were introduced in Section 2.4.2, most importantly inter-firm cooperative
competition and informal linkages between companies which facilitate innovation.
To understand the role of face-to-face communication in an industry cluster, Hanson (1995)
argues that communication linkages between firms and firm employees can be categorized into
three distinct types, each having different objectives and, more importantly from a transportation
planning perspective, requiring different degrees of transportation infrastructure to be carried out
successfully [82]. The three types of communication links are orientation tasks, planning tasks,
and programming tasks. By classifying a cluster by their communication linkages, insight can be
gained as to what intensity transportation infrastructure will be utilized by the firms within the
cluster.
Orientation tasks involve initiating new projects that require complicated discussions, difficult
negotiations, or iterative assessment of prospects. In general, these activities involve
considerable non-routine decision-making and dealing with unforeseen situations. This inherent
uncertainty makes face-to-face meetings particular important, allowing for immediate feedback.
The complexity of these orientation tasks often requires consultation with a variety of specialists
(consultants, industry experts, etc.). In turn, prearranged face-to-face meetings of varying
degrees of duration and varying locations make travel an essential component of the daily work
life of the managerial, professional, and technical labor forces of these cluster firms.
Planning tasks represent efforts to implement decisions that have already been made, including
for example, implementing marketing or production plans. Although each problem to be solved
may be unique, there are established channels of communication used in resolving, with non-
routine decision-making. The communication contacts are generally less spatially dispersed than
most orientation tasks. Often, indirect contacts via telephone, mail, or electronically are
sufficient to carry out planning tasks.
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Programmed tasks refer to routine and repetitive exchanges of information and decision-making
that is based on structured and standardized procedures. Many production, sales, and clerical
tasks fall into this category, requiring primarily indirect contacts.
Typically, the transition from orientation to programmed tasks within a firm requires less time
and tasks that require less utilization of transportation services. Therefore, a cluster whose
activities involve more orientation tasks will rely on the effectiveness of the regional
transportation infrastructure more intensely than a cluster whose activities are more often
characterized by programmed tasks.
Expandinq Access to Specialized Inputs and Outputs
The production of services in a regional economy is characterized by face-to-face contacts and a
high business travel frequency, which in turn requires a high market threshold to support its
production. The price of business trips, and in particular, the value of the time used for a business
trip, limits the inter-regional exchange of services. As a result, the degree of specialization of the
region's transportation infrastructure for this type of travel is one factor that limits the integration
of service production within a geographical area. Investments in infrastructure that reduce travel
times open new opportunities to integrate markets for producer services by an increased volume
of business travel and business travel extends the wider geographical area boundaries of a cluster
extending their market potential. Cluster firms can also have a broader and more qualified supply
of specialized inputs such as labor force and producer services. Marginal productivity improves
as inefficient producers are substituted for by more highly productive and efficient service
provides as the access and geographical reach is expanded.
In conclusion, this chapter has attempted a brief look at the relationship between economic
development and transportation infrastructure, introducing several frameworks with which to
evaluate the impact of a transportation investment. Chapter 4 moves on to a review of the
transportation planning process and introduces the ReS/SITE framework which will be used as
the foundation for integrating the notion of regional competitive advantage within the
transportation planning process.
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Chapter 4. Regional Transportation Planning & ReS/SITE
Over the past fifty years, transportation planning has reflected shifts in issues and concerns of
federal, state, and local officials. This evolving process has included (1) a broadening perspective
of what is included within a transportation system (multimodal definition, regional context, and
so forth); (2) new actions to address transportation problems; and (3) an expanding and refining
of the measurement of transportation's benefit and cost. Meyer (1999) maps the evolution of the
transportation planning process as shown in Figure 4-1. An important point reflected in the
evolution is that the process continues to expand with the addition of new criteria and planning
perspectives, rather than replacement of the new over the old. However, to a large extent, the
basic mission of transportation planning has remained the same - providing mobility in as safe
and cost-effective manner as possible. It is the scope and breadth of this mission that has changed
significantly.
Sustainability, Regional
Planning, Demand Mgmt
|Technology, growthmanagement, equity
System management, demand, fiscal
constraints, broadening criteria
Environmental and community values, transit
Comprehensive planning, land use, "balanced transportation"
Large-scale modeling, highway orientation, narrow evaluation criteria
Early 19606 Late 196ts Mid-1970s 190s 2000+
Adapted from: Meyer, 1999
Figure 4-1: Evolution of the Transportation Planning Perspective
Kho (1995) provides an excellent summary of the evolution of the transportation planning
process and a description of the roles and responsibilities of the most important stakeholders in
the current process [83]. The challenge for regional transportation planning is to overcome the
mismatch between fragmented local institutions and the scale of regional problems. The
establishment of a truly comprehensive regional body, with authority over major government
functions, is likely an unrealistic solution to this local fragmentation. In the United States,
Americans seem to be supportive of smaller government entities, with the federal government
playing a strong role in the shaping and defining of metropolitan structures and planning. In the
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absence of a single, multi-functional regional agency, responsibilities have historically been
distributed among multiple regional entities. This chapter will examine the central role the
Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) has often played in regional transportation and in the
coordination of the multiple agencies responsible for planning. Next, the creation of a new type
of planning authority, the Georgia Regional Transportation Authority, will be briefly examined
both as an example of the evolving role of regional transportation planning organizations and the
on-going deficiencies of integrating economic development within the process. Finally, the
ReS/SITE framework for regional strategic transportation planning will be introduced and
described in order to later establish a methodological approach to better integrating regional
competitive advantage considerations within the transportation planning framework.
4.1 Regional Planning and the Metropolitan Planning Organization
The roots of MPOs date back to the early twentieth century in the form of councils of city
governments. In the early 1960's, their ability to conduct wide-scale transportation planning
studies became more substantial as computer models were developed and implemented. The
Federal Highway Act of 1962 established the 3-C (Continuing, Cooperative, and Coordinated)
planning process which was to be carried out by representatives of local governments in areas
with a metropolitan population of over 50,000. The 3-C planning process gave regions veto
power over highway projects, and increased the visibility and importance of the MPO. However,
for the next three decades, the MPO typically had little control over transportation funding and
planning decisions as the state legislature controlled the matching funds necessary to obtain
federal approval for transportation projects. This began to change with the passing of the Clean
Air Act Amendments in 1977 which gave the MPO responsibility for the planning of
transportation plans in response to air quality conformity issues. Still, before the Intermodal
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991, and TEA-21 in 1998, the MPO remained
a relatively weak institution which was commonly dominated by state DOTs.
ISTEA assigned the MPO new decision-making responsibilities, along with increased flexibility
to develop transportation plans that met their region's particular needs. The Act gave the MPO
decision-making authority that had previously rested with the state DOTs or highway
departments, but required that the MPO coordinate with the state DOT on interregional projects.
ISTEA was a response to the need to devolve transportation planning and project selection to the
regional and local levels. At this scale, the framers of ISTEA felt the complex social, economic,
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and environmental issues would be better accounted for, and the MPO would serve as a forum for
discussion, as well as to provide information and analyses needed for an informed debate. In
1998, Congress passed the successor to ISTEA, TEA-21, which streamlined the MPO planning
requirements, but kept the basic decision-making authority for the MPO. The explicit
justification for this continued policy was the recognition of the growing importance of regions as
competitive units in the world economy [84]. With ISTEA and TEA-21, one of the biggest
challenges for the MPO is the requirement to find specific funding sources for all projects in its
short-term and long-term transportation plans. This requirement has been turned into an
opportunity by some MPOs as it allowed them to take new leadership roles in the region, and
allowed them to become advocates for the region at the state level. Additionally, the fiscal
constraint was a strong motivation for many MPOs' decisions to partner with state, local, and
private organizations.
Although neither ISTEA nor TEA-21 explicitly use the word "partnership," the term has become
widespread in describing the relationship between the MPO and public or private organizations.
As introduced in Chapter 2, partnerships are also a very important component of cluster-based
economic development. The need for partnerships is due primarily to two reasons: (1) although
an MPO has decision-making authority over the funding of transportation investments, they do
not have any authority for land use decisions; and (2) their role in economic development is often
an indirect one, resulting from the impact of their infrastructure and transportation service
investment decisions, rather than from a coordinated effort with economic development
organizations.
Goldman and Deakin (2000) describe the process by which regional agencies, including MPOs,
have tended to gain responsibility and authority through an incremental process of establishing
legitimacy [85]. The process, as described below, bears striking similarity to Gollub's Cluster
Policy Framework process described in Section 2.5.3.
Step 1: A coalition of citizen organizations, business groups, and regional councils of
governments defines a broad policy of regional concerns and invites stakeholders to participate in
strategies to address them.
Step 2: The coalition assesses the region's technical, civic, and political capacities for
implementing the policy and adopts action plans for meeting shortfalls in the capacities.
91
Step 3: The coalition next works to implement its action plan by strengthening existing
institutions, or creating new ones if necessary. Often, policy mechanisms are implemented that
link the region more closely together.
Step 4: A regional agency is created or designated to create a transparent and participative
structure within a system to monitor and measure policy actions over time.
The outline policy relies heavily on the partnership concept. However, although there are well-
documented partnerships with state DOTs, land-use agencies, and transportation organizations,
there is little evidence of partnerships between MPOs and economic development groups and
private organizations. Most MPOs have focused their efforts on passenger transportation issues
and investments, with only relatively recent recognition of the need to study regional goods
movements in addition to the flow of people. Historically, large-scale freight projects appear
unattractive to MPOs as they prove politically difficult due to an often concentrated negative
impact at the local level, even while providing large regional benefits. Furthermore, MPOs are
often hesitant to support public financing for projects perceived to largely benefit particular
private companies. The preceding points illustrate the difficulties that MPOs could face should
they be given a larger role in the economic development process required by cluster initiatives.
4.2 The Role of the MPO in Economic Development: The State of
the Practice
Because of ISTEA and TEA-21, most metropolitan areas in the United States now engage in
some form of regional planning through its MPOs, but Levine (1999) claims that it may be fairly
said that many of these metropolitan areas engage in transportation planning as the only form of
regional planning [86]. Because of their transportation focus, ISTEA and TEA-21 represent only
a baseline, or lowest common denominator among regional planning efforts, especially economic
development. Of course, economics is not the only factor that the MPO must take into account in
its regional transportation decision-making process. Issues of equity, wealth redistribution,
regional image, or metropolitan solidarity can be as important as economics when planning at the
regional level. While coordinated regional planning focuses on network systems such as
transportation infrastructure and utilities, they represent only two of many inputs required to
generate economic development.
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Given their often de facto status for a region's planning efforts, Levine (1999) conducted a
comprehensive survey of 248 MPOs around the United States to determine their level of
involvement in economic development. His findings are summarized below [87]:
. The survey found that only one-third of the MPOs had any
economic development planning. The most commonly cited
surveyed had specific responsibilities for are listed in Table 4-1:
MPOs CitingResponsibility
Transportation
Air Quality
Land Use
Growth Management
Economic Development
Water Quality
Airport Planning/Management
Workforce Development
Source: Levine, 1999
specific responsibilities for
issues for which the MPOs
Responsibility For
98%
50%
47%
40%
33%
30%
22%
16%
Table 4-1: MPO Regional Responsibilities
Despite the increased attention on changes in economic development practice and
involvement of new stakeholders, Levine found that local political jurisdictions still fill the
primary role in most economic development decision-making. However, a surprising number
of MPOs reported being involved in the economic development policy-making process,
nearly the same as Chambers of Commerce. The research did not allow for an assessment of
the degree involvement. In Table 4-2, the results are tabulated for the question posed to the
284 MPOs: "Which of the following groups share in developing and implementing economic
development policies for your metropolitan area?"
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Group
City Government
County Government
Chambers of Commerce
MPO
State office of economic development
Non-profit development corporations
Metropolitan economic development agency
Metropolitan public-private partnerships
Source: Levine, 1999
Regions where Group Shared inRegions where Group Shared in
Econ. Development Responsibilities
93%
85%
68%
64%
63%
47%
41%
25%
Table 4-2: Groups Sharing in Economic Development Planning
. The coordination efforts for regional economic planning was characterized
(Table 4-3) and poor (Table 4-4) as shown the results below:
as fragmented
% of Groups Taking Regional
Group Coordination Leadership Role
Private Sector 20%
MPO 15%
No one 10%
Non-Profit Group 6%
Other Public Agency 40%
Other Organization 9%
Source: Levine, 1999
Table 4-3: Fragmented Leadership Roles in Coordinating Economic Development
Degree of Coordination of Regional
Economic Development Efforts
Most Efforts Routinely Coordinated
Some Efforts Coordinated, Others Not
Ad-hoc Coordination
No Coordination
% Responding
5%
45%
25%
25%
Source: Levine, 1999
Table 4-4: Poor Degree of Regional Economic Development Coordination
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. When asked to list the four most important economic regional assets that stimulate or
enhance economic performance, the MPOs' most cited answer was transportation
infrastructure and investment, an unsurprising result given the MPOs' roots in transportation
planning. However, the result is of some concern, given the discussion in Section 3.3.2 that
highlighted the notion that transportation investment is actually playing a declining role in
economic development in the developed world.
. When assessing economic development, the most common forms of measurement by MPOs
were: (1) change over time in per-capita median income - as a basic measure of local well-
being; and (2) change over time in regional share of national income - as a measure of the
overall competitiveness of a metropolitan region. Based on earlier discussions regarding the
proper indicators of economic development, these two measures do not capture the dynamic
externalities required for the ability to create and sustain competitive advantage as they
simply measure only economic growth.
In summary, although only one-third of MPOs have a specific responsibility for economic
development, over two-thirds reported sharing in economic development planning, indicating that
the while MPOs are not playing a leadership role, they are involved in many of the efforts. The
relative importance placed on transportation infrastructure for economic development, along with
measures relating to growth rather than development, demonstrate that MPOs have not yet
embraced the fact that transportation plays a more secondary role of providing specialized
infrastructure and services in support of other, more important competitive forces in the region.
Having introduced the MPO, the next section briefly presents an example of a regional
transportation planning organization that has expanded beyond traditional regional transportation
planning roles.
4.3 Beyond the MPO - The Georgia Regional Transportation
Authority
The experience of Atlanta in the late nineties provides a good example of the evolving role of
regional transportation planning organizations and the process described in the previous section
by which a regional organization gains authority and legitimacy.
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4.3.1 An Introduction to Georgia Regional Transportation Authority
In 1998, the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce organized a group of business leaders, political
officials, and academics to study the region's degrading air quality and transportation problems.
The assembling of these stakeholders was primarily motivated by the (1) the EPA's threat to
withhold almost $0.5 billion in federal transportation funding because of air quality non-
attainment; and (2) concern that the region's continued economic vitality rested on finding
solutions to these problems. The assembled stakeholders created a commission to explore the
root causes of the region's transportation problems. One of the main conclusions of the
commission was that the region's MPO, the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC) did not have
the proper authority to address the situation. The commission recommended the restructuring of
the regional planning process with increased authority to coordinate transportation planning, the
outcome being the creation of the Georgia Regional Transportation Authority (GRTA), a
governor-appointed body of 15 regional leaders.
4.3.2 Motivating Needs for Restructuring the Planning Process
From 1960 to 1990, the population of Atlanta grew 142%, mostly in low-density areas outside of
the central business district (CBD). Population growth occurred in parallel to the dispersal of
employment centers beyond the CBD. To accommodate this growth, an auto-dominated
transportation network was built, reflected in the fact that Atlanta now leads the nation in vehicle
miles per capita traveled. Even with a large investment in road construction and expansion, the
regional congestion grew, estimated at over $1.5 billion annually in fuel expense and lost time in
1999. Air quality also grew increasingly worse, with the city classified as a non-attainment area
relative to the Clean Air Act standards. Sixty-eight percent of all NOx emissions are from mobile
sources, meaning that the dependence on the automobile was an important factor in the air quality
problem [88].
Air and transportation problems attracted negative regional and media attention that questioned
the perception of a high quality of life in Atlanta. National real estate firms downgraded
Atlanta's growth prospects in 1997. This combination of congestion, potential withdrawal of
federal funding, and the real estate industry's potential reluctance to invest in Atlanta forced the
region's businesses, as represented by the Greater Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, to take action
[89].
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The commission formed by the Chamber of Commerce concluded that the crisis was threatening
to eliminate two of the four basic components of the development strategy that Atlanta's
economic development organizations had been following - expanding road infrastructure and
perceived high quality of life. The commission represented Atlanta's economic development
cycle as a "virtuous cycle" and identified the threats to its continued perpetration as shown in
Figure 4-2:
Potential of Link Severed by
Quality of Life Decline
Attractive place to
live and work
Expansion into L Economnic and
new areas population growth
New Infrastructure
built to support growth
Potential of Link Severed by
Loss of Federal Funding
Adapted from: Trelstad, 2000
Figure 4-2: Atlanta's "Virtuous Cycle" of Economic Development
Losing federal funding and decreasing quality of life both threatened to severe the links the
commission felt were binding together the "virtuous cycle" of Atlanta economic development.
Based on the assessment of the cycle of economic development, the commission defined the
ultimate goal of their reevaluation of the regional planning process was "to develop an effective,
balanced transportation system that would help Atlanta sustain economic growth and a good
quality of life [90]."
Because of the threat posed by congestion to the cycle of economic development, the stakeholder
commission mapped out the factors, shown in Figure 4-3 which were leading to the increasing
problem.
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Source: Trelstad, 2000
Figure 4-3: Factors Leading to Increasing Congestions
As a result of the analysis of the factors leading to congestion, the commission determined that
technological solutions and an expansion in the road network would be inadequate responses.
Instead, they turned their attention to the regional transportation planning process. The
commission discovered that the current process involved ten separate regional county DOTs
which sent their plans to the central MPO, which simply aggregated all ten plans into a "regional
plan," with no objective criteria used to evaluate the collective impact of the transportation
investments on congestion [91].
4.3.3 The Creation of GRTA
The final outcome of the commission's investigation of the regional issues was the creation of the
GRTA in 1999. The regional organization was designed to have broad planning powers with
land-use authorities in order to address the set of interconnected problems. The new organization
was given three main authorities: (1) control over federal and state transportation funding which
have regional impacts; (2) the ability to set minimum planning standards for metropolitan
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counties that, if not met, can cause state grants to be withheld; and (3) the ability to approve and
implement regional transit facilities.
It is important to emphasize that these authorities represent an approach which is nothing short of
radical for regional planning in the U.S. context. While it is too early to assess the overall impact
of the GRTA, four lessons can be drawn from the process that led to its creation [92]:
1. Crisis plays an important role in creating the stimulus for political action. This is similar
to what was discussed in Section 2.5 for the stimulus to develop and implement a cluster
initiative.
2. Private and academic partnerships are important and add a level of objectivity to the
process.
3. Rather than trying to create the perfect planning agency, regions need to consider simply
improving the alignment between existing state, regional, and local organizations. The
GRTA helps create this alignment through its broad authority and its ability to connect
federal and state policy with local plans
4. The simple system reflected in Atlanta's "virtuous cycle" demonstrates that the
complexities of economic development are still not fully appreciated, even in very
progressive regional planning efforts. The important role played by Atlanta's leading
industry clusters was overlooked, effectively ignoring the significant driver of the
region's competitive advantage.
4.4 A Framework for Regional Transportation Planning
4.4.1 The ReS/SITE Framework
The ReS/SITE (Regional Strategies for the Sustainable Intermodal Transportation Enterprise) was
developed in the mid-nineties by a MIT research group as a framework for analyzing the
transportation issues in the Province of Mendoza, Argentina. The Province was evaluating a
proposal to create an intermodal link to Santiago, Chile and on to the Port of Valparaiso, by way
of a railroad tunnel through the Andes Mountains, thereby providing Argentina access to the
Pacific Rim. The ReS/SITE framework grew out of the recognition that the tunnel could not be
evaluated without consideration of the broader regional transportation strategy. In developing the
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framework, a review of strategic transportation plans from around the world was undertaken.
Based on the review, shortcomings in the current regional strategic planning process were
identified. The shortcomings were classified into eight categories, including the relevant category
for this thesis: the need to more adequately address economic development and the importance of
assessing the significance of transportation investment to develop and sustain a regional
competitive advantage. A more complete description of the identified shortcomings and how the
ReS/SITE framework addresses them can be found in the Appendix, along with references for the
theoretical development and application of the framework. The basic ReS/SITE framework is
shown below in Figure 4-4:
Source: Sussman and Conklin, 2001
Figure 4-4: Basic ReS/SITE Framework
Conklin and Sussman summarize the components of the framework as described below [93]:
Scenarios
Scenarios grew out of the concept from industry in which business plans are developed to
effectively address a large array of potential future outcomes. In this context, scenarios are a
range of structured views of the future. The ReS/SITE research found that many transportation
100
SScenarios
Strategic Issues,
Directions and
Options
Strategic Plans
Regional Regional
Architectur Inra structure
1 - 2 Years
5 - 8 Years
System Management and
Operations
plans project a future condition that does not consider the many factors affecting the future
possibilities. Scenarios can be used in the transportation planning process to consider different
versions of the future. Trends and possible future events are structured into scenarios within a
sequence of cause and effect events that reflect the central concerns and issues for the
transportation planning organization.
Strategic Issues, Directions, and Options
The next step in the framework involves the development of strategies that are robust across the
future possibilities identified in the scenarios. Strategy selection, rather than specific project
selection, is the main consideration of this phase where needs and an assortment of solutions are
considered. Goal-setting for the region occurs at this stage, including those involving desired
competitiveness relative to the global economic environment.
Strategic Plans
Strategic plans are based on the outcomes of the previous steps. The strategic plan is composed
of two components, regional infrastructure and regional architecture. The ReS/SITE team found
that most transportation plans sufficiently address regional infrastructure needs, which has been
the traditional focus of the regional planning process. The framework significantly expands the
output of strategic planning to include the design of a regional architecture.
Regional architecture provides a methodology to design organizational exchanges between the
public and private organizations involved in providing the regional transportation services.
Regional architecture is comprised of the following components:
1. A "map" of the institutions providing the different transportation functions and how
information is shared between them.
2. The definition of how control and information is distributed between the regional
architecture institutions
3. A guide for the institutions regarding which organizations characterizations will best
accommodate the responsibility and exchange of information
The concept of "regional architecture" was borrowed from ITS terminology, in which it is a
largely technical framework concerned with communication, information flows, and
interconnections. In this use, regional architecture is expanded to include the institutional point
of view and organizational and inter-organizational design.
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Based on an evaluation of the transportation and environmental concerns of Mexico City, Makler
(2000) expanded the regional architecture component into Regional Planning Architectures
(RPA) and Regional Service Architectures (RSA). RPA comprises the organizational structures
promoting and developing the planning agenda for a region, while RSA comprise the set of
organizations responsible for operating the transportation systems, which may be similar, but not
identical to the RPA. This issue will be explored further in Section 4.4.2.
System Manaqement and Operation
System management and operations is the short-term analogy of the strategic planning process.
These actions work to ensure that the current transportation system is effectively working toward
meeting the short- and long-range regional transportation and economic development goals. The
management and operation plan should have the same goals as the strategic transportation plan,
but will be focused on immediate 1-2 year items.
Although the framework as been applied only in academia to date, it is built on two important
foundations that make it applicable in practice:
1. Metropolitan regions are progressively being recognized as the basic geographic element
for economic competition
2. Introduction of new technologies, such as ITS, facilitates the ability to operate and
manage transportation systems at the regional scale [94].
4.4.2 Regional Planning Architecture and the MPO
Makler expands the Regional Architecture of the ReS/SITE framework into two components,
grouping them under a "Comprehensive Regional Architecture," or CRA, umbrella as shown in
Figure 4-5.
Comprehensive Regional Architecture
Regional Service
Architecture
Regional Planning
Architecture
Source: Makler, 2000
Figure 4-5: Components of Regional Architecture
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The most important characteristic of CRA is the relationship between RSA and RPA, and the fact
that there could be substantial overlap between them. Makler gives the following example: A
state DOT is often both an active participant in planning activities and a manager of
transportation services, thus contributing a role in both RSA and RPA. Further, it is possible that
one division within the DOT participates in the RSA, while another participates in the RPA. But,
it is incorrect to simply assume that because an organization has internal units involved in both
the RSA and the RPA, that the parent organization provides a reliable link between the RPA and
RSA [95]. Within this expanded framework, Makler argues that it is possible to develop a
substantial descriptive analysis of transportation decision-making within a region.
Makler provides a detailed review of the transportation planning process since ISTEA [96], and
constructs the CRA for the regional transportation planning process. As discussed earlier, ISTEA
established a key role in the planning process for the MPO. But, because they vary substantially
from metropolitan area to metropolitan area, there are few generalizable roles for the MPO that
hold across all regions. In general, they provide area-wide planning services, research, and
coordination between different levels of government. ISTEA mandated four sets of
transportation plans over the short and long-term horizon. For the purposes of this paper, the two
most relevant are the plans mandated at the metropolitan or regional level: (1) the long-term
Regional Transportation Plan (RTP) and (2) the short-term Transportation Improvement Plan
(TIP). The remaining two plans are at the state level and are made up of the long-term Statewide
Transportation Plan (STP) and the short-term State Transportation Improvement Program (STIP).
The TIP is prepared by the MPO at least every 2 years, and has a scope of three years or more.
Any transportation project included in the TIP must be regionally significant and consistent with
the long-term RTP. Any project needing federal funding is required to be included, while the
inclusion of non-federally funded projects is often included for informational purposes. The
introduction of the TIP provided fiscal constraint on proposed projects, rather than the previously
published "wish lists" which often did not include identification of sources for funding [97].
Importantly, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and Federal Transit Agency (FTA) do
not participate in the approval or disapproval of the TIP, although they are involved in the
funding requests. Instead, for a project to be included in a TIP, it must receive local approval
first, then be brought to the MPO by a member of the local TIP council.
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The RTP acts as a guidance document for the TIP, which shares the same metropolitan, or
regional, scope. The RTP horizon is at least 20 years, and is revised every 3 to 5 years depending
on the air quality attainment status within the region. The plan provides the overarching roadmap
for transportation planning over the subsequent two decades, from which the TIP draws from or
adds projects. Extensive public participation characterizes the RTP process.
Makler summarizes the Regional Planning Architecture for the transportation planning process as
presented in Figure 4-6. The RPA is based on plans established in ISTEA, reaffirmed in TEA-21,
and includes the institutional relationships formed around these activities and the flow of
information, data, and resources between the RPA entities.
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Figure 4-6: ISTEA-Based Regional Planning Architecture
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Makler has attempted to de-emphasize the individual plan components, and instead focuses on the
institutions and connections between them. Makler identifies the most important feature of the
RPA illustration of institutional relationships to be the central role played by the MPO. In this
representation, the involvement of implementing agencies and other entities appear to "revolve"
around the MPO. The structure also reflects the fundamental roles of goal formulation and needs
assessment.
This chapter has described MPOs and the role in which they contribute to regional transportation
planning. Through Levine's research, it was demonstrated that although these institutions often
play a role in economic development planning, it is usually not within a leadership role. Research
on the shortcomings of current regional strategic transportation planning was summarized, and
the ReS/SITE framework was presented as a means to address many of these shortcomings. The
Regional Architecture component of ReS/SITE was covered in some detail, and offers a point of
potential integration between the strategic transportation planning framework and economic
development processes. With the conclusion of this chapter, we have accomplished three
objectives of this thesis: the introduction of regional competitive advantage and industry clusters
in Chapter 2, the link between economic development and transportation planning in Chapter 3,
and the presentation of a framework for regional strategic transportation planning in Chapter 4.
This foundation permits the investigation of regions which have undertaken cluster studies, and
the evaluation of the degree of integration between these studies and the regional transportation
plans. This investigation is presented in the following chapter.
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Chapter 5. Regional Case Studies
Having introduced the concepts of regional competitive advantage, industry clusters, economic
development, and regional strategic transportation planning; this chapter next examines case
studies concerning the application of these concepts at the metropolitan and state-wide level. The
following cases, summarized below, will be examined by looking at both the region-specific
cluster studies and relevant transportation plans:
The Bay Area - Silicon Valley: Silicon Valley is perhaps the best example of a mature,
"working" cluster. The region's MPO is unique as it has authority over discretionary highway
spending as well as multiple linkages to regional economic development organizations.
The Twin Cities - The regional MPO, responsible for developing the transportation plans, also
performed one of the earliest metropolitan-wide cluster studies in the United States. However,
regional economic development organizations virtually ignore transportation infrastructure in
their policy initiatives. The cluster policies are very "hands-off," versus the Bay Area's approach
of broad lobbying efforts.
Tucson - The region is undertaking a nationally-recognized effort to implement a systematic
cluster initiative at the regional level. Regional economic development organizations clearly
identify several transportation investment needs critical to the growth of the emerging regional
clusters, although the RTP incorporates only one of the initiatives. Promotion of clusters differs
from the Bay Area as there is a conscious effort to develop cluster-supporting institutional
networks, versus the informal, byproduct nature of cluster support-networks in the San Francisco
area.
Florida - The Transportation Cornerstone Project in 1999 represented one of the most structured
attempts at assessing transportation needs on a cluster by cluster basis. The project also
specifically looked at the institutional barriers which prevent cluster-specific transportation needs
from being met.
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5.1 The Bay Area - Silicon Valley, California
5.1.1 Regional Economic Development and Clusters
Geographic and Economic Profile of the Bay Area
The Bay Area economic region consists of the nine counties that border the San Francisco Bay:
Napa, Sonoma, Marin, and Solano counties in the North Bay; Contra Costa and Alameda counties
in the East Bay; San Francisco and San Mateo counties in the West Bay; and Santa Clara county
in the South Bay area (See Figure 5-1). The Bay Area has a total population of over 6.7 million
people and a vibrant economy, which if an independent country would be the twenty-first largest
economy in the world [98]. The region is a global productivity leader in knowledge-intensive
business clusters of telecommunications, computers and electronics, bioscience, multimedia, and
environmental technology. The region also ranks first in productivity in more traditional areas of
the economy such as retail and wholesale trade, and business services. It is second in banking
and finance, behind New York and ahead of Boston. The per capita income of $38,300 puts the
region ahead of New York City and contributes to a high quality of life for the region's residents.
Historical Development of the Bay Area Clusters
The history of the recent economic development of the Bay Area, and the Silicon Valley
technology cluster specifically, has been documented by Annalee Saxenian and summarized as
follows [99]. The origins of Silicon Valley are often traced back to the founding of Hewlett-
Packard Company (HP) in 1937 by two Stanford University graduate students starting an
electronics instrumentation business. HP and a number of other small prewar technology firms
emerged, each supported by Stanford. The initial scale of electronics production was dwarfed by
the firms in the Boston area. World War II attracted large numbers of workers to the Bay Area
for employment in war-related industries, although large East Coast companies such as General
Electric and Westinghouse dominated the military contracts which were awarded.
After the war, extensive efforts were made by Fredrick Terman, Dean of Engineering at Stanford,
in building ties between the university and local industry. Faculty and students were encouraged
to become acquainted with the region's business. In the 1950's, Stanford introduced three
institutional innovations: (1) the founding of the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) to conduct
defense-related research, (2) a program to encourage regional engineers to participate in evening
graduate courses at the university, and (3) the development of the Stanford Industrial Park. The
cluster of industrial activity grew rapidly in the 1950s, fueled by military spending, and the area's
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Source: Metropolitan Transportation Commission, November 2000
Figure 5-1: Bay Area Economic Region and Transportation Network
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growing concentration of skill and knowledge. By the late 1960s, the area was recognized as a
center of aerospace and electronics activity, although still small relative to its East Coast
counterparts. The Santa Clara county area was given the moniker of Silicon Valley in the early
1970s because of the main ingredient in semiconductors, a fast growing industry at that time. The
semiconductor industry initially began in 1955 with the Shockley Transistor Corporation, and its
offshoot, the Fairchild Semiconductor Company. By 1970, the semiconductor industry was the
largest sector in the regional economy. Multiple spin-offs by the founders of these first two
semiconductor companies over the following fifteen years included Intel as well as prominent
venture capital firms. In the sixties, the semiconductor companies were forced to produce their
own manufacturing equipment, due to the early stage of the industry. This eventually led to an
emerging infrastructure of suppliers, providing an important competitive advantage to start-ups in
the region. By the mid-1970s, Silicon Valley employed over 100,000 technology workers, and its
concentration of firms, consultants, suppliers, and venture capitalists was equal to its counterpart
in Massachusetts, the Route 128 region.
Geography played an important role in the concentration of industries. Technology companies
initially located near Stanford and its industrial park in Palo Alto, but quickly spread to cities in
the south, including San Jose. The boundaries of the peninsula between San Francisco Bay and
the Santa Cruz mountains in the west forced a density of development that minimized distance
between firms and allowed for frequent informal communications. The resulting dense
development facilitated the creation of a technical culture that represented a "loosely linked
confederations of engineering teams" [100]. This culture created a flexible system organized
around the region and its professional and technical networks, rather than a system organized
around any one particular firm.
Informal exchange and communication became increasingly important to the rapid growth in
Silicon Valley. The informal exchange was often more valuable than the more conventional, but
less timely, communication channels such as industry journals and conferences. Informal
communication channels facilitated an extremely high-level of job-hopping as they also
functioned as efficient job search networks. The high rates of job mobility forced firms to
compete more intensely for technical talent. Geographic proximity of companies also facilitated
job mobility, as moving to a new job often proved little to no disruption to personal, professional,
or residential ties. Venture capital financing also benefited from geographical proximity, as
investors could be directly involved with their ventures, by advising on business plans and
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strategies, recruiting managers, and serving on the Board, rather than remotely as was more
traditionally done.
Firms in the region entered an economic crisis in the early- and mid-eighties as Japanese
manufacturers entered the market with more efficient semiconductor technologies, and the
semiconductor became a commodity rather than a specialized product. In the face of this
economic competition, industries in the region evolved new business practices. Firms focused on
what they did best, and contracted out the rest by locating activities globally to take advantage of
each region's unique, specialized offering. Companies "unbundled" by outsourcing activities
such as design, manufacturing, testing, marketing, and procurement. The region prospered once
again as extensive networks linked contractors, subcontractors, and customers both locally and
globally [101].
In the mid-1990s, the region found itself in another crisis, one of its own making rather than
brought on by a competing region. Congestion and the high cost of living and doing business
were nothing new to the region, but the price of success had become very evident in the late
1990s during the growth of Internet companies. Increasingly, high-tech companies shunned
Silicon Valley for places ranging from Montana to Texas. Firms found it difficult to convince
workers to relocate when faced with extremely high housing costs. Another detriment to the
region is the lack of employee loyalty, a factor that had initially contributed to the Valley's
success. Double-digit attrition rates became common in the late-1990s, with most employees
having a 24- to 36-month time horizon. Though Silicon Valley has a large, skilled labor pool, it
can cost twice as much to hire employees, who are subsequently retained sometimes only half as
long. Educational and cultural positives are declining as teachers, artists, public servants, and
other non-technology workforce members are being displaced from the area [102].
Figure 5-2 presents a simplified representation of the causal dynamics at work in the development
of technology clusters and the problems that they currently face in the region. The figure is an
expansion of the "virtuous cycle" presented in Chapter 4 to explain Atlanta's economic growth.
In this case, feedback loops are added to represent the dynamics of the system as a combination
of positive reinforcing loops and balancing loops. Five loops have been identified in the
simplified dynamic map of the region. The first reinforcing loop, R1, explains the initial high
growth of businesses and households in the region. The attractiveness of the region for attracting
high-tech industries was established early by institutional innovations introduced by Stanford
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University. Investment flowed into the region leading to the establishment of more high-tech
industries whose supplier and spin-off networks lead to an increasing attractiveness in doing
business in the region. The second reinforcing loop, R2, illustrates the other important causes of
growth, as the number of high-tech companies grew, the number of skilled workers in the area
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Figure 5-2: Bay Area Cluster Causal Loop Map
establishing their households also grew, increasing the availability of a specialized labor pool and
increasing the attractiveness of the region as a place for establishing or relocating a high-tech
firm. The initial high growth in both high-tech firms and households is eventually constrained, as
shown by the three balancing loops: B1, B2, and B3. The first balancing loop, B1, describes the
result of more and more households being established in the region. At first, enough land and
infrastructure is available to support a growing quality of life and a growing number of
households; so initially loop BI is weak relative to the reinforcing loops RI and R2. Over time,
the ability of the regional infrastructure to support the growth diminishes and costs rise, reducing
the quality of life in the region eventually to a point where households are less attracted to the
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area. As the growth in households slows, the reinforcing loop, R2, works to counteract the initial
expansion, with a smaller available pool of skilled workers to support high rates of expansion.
The next balancing loop, B2, captures an important dynamic in the area reflecting the fact that the
region will have difficulty building its way out of congestion. As the number of households
increase, congestion increases. After a delay due to time required for projects to be recognized
within the regional transportation planning process, new infrastructure is built and growth in
congestion levels is eased, but not necessarily reduced. Eased congestion leads to a high quality
of life, attracting more households, which in turn increases congestion yet again. The final
balancing loop, B3, captures the effect there is upward pressure on worker income both due to
increasing costs of living, and the fact that as the availability of the skilled workforce declines
from quality of life issues and inter-firm job movement, firms must pay more to attract and retain
their workforce. Eventually, the labor rates begin to reduce the attractiveness of the doing
business in the region, and balance the high growth rates of firms in the region. Over time, the
three balancing loops have the potential of reducing the attractiveness of the region enough that
investment in the region will eventually peak, and decline as new capital flows into more
attractive regions which exhibit the qualities which initially made the Bay Area successful.
Bay Area Clusters
The dynamics presented in the previous section describe the increasing pressures on the long-
term growth prospects for the region in terms of a high-cost of living, higher costs of labor, and
traffic congestion. However, the region still experienced a self-reinforcing cycle of economic
prosperity in the mid- and late-nineties as broadly represented within the two reinforcing loops of
Figure 5-2.
The development of the region's clusters has been path-dependent in that there has been a clear
set of historical trends and geographic circumstances directly impacting the specific forms of
development that took place. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the ability of a region to
innovate is critical to the sustained development of clusters and competitive advantage. In this
area, the Bay Area is a leader nationwide. Measuring innovation by three different criteria shows
the region to be the nationwide leader in [103]:
1. 1998 number of patents issued per 1,000 employees -- 2.49, more than 50% greater the
second-ranking region, Boston
113
- - Q ,-- - RRf--- =Z- - - - . - -- ------ - -
2. 1998 number of graduate programs in business, engineering, law, and medicine ranked in
the Top 10 nationally -- 55 as ranked in U.S. News & World Reports annual survey
3. 1997 research center concentration -- 132 government, industry, and private research
centers per million population
In addition to innovation, the concentration of industries and industry productivity of a cluster are
important components defining a region's competitive cluster. Given this criteria, there is strong
consensus among the economic development organizations within the Bay Area as to definition
of the six most competitive regional industry clusters: (1) Computers and Electronics, (2)
Telecommunications, (3) Multimedia, (4) Banking and Finance, (5) Bioscience, (6) Business
Services.
The Bay Area Economic Forum has compared each cluster to its regional competitors and
developed measures of their concentration and productivity. Employment concentration, shown
in Figure 5-3, is a relative measure, taking the national average of regional concentration of
employment by industry as 100 and comparing the each region's specific concentration in
relation to this benchmark.
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Figure 5-3: Concentration Index of Selected Regions - 1999
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Employment productivity can be measured as a gross-output per employee, or in this case,
regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per regional employee. As shown in Figure 5-4, the
identified clusters are leaders among their peer competitive regions and overall nationwide.
Regional Cluster Productivity
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Figure 5-4: Productivity of Selected Regions
Together, these six knowledge-intensive clusters account for 40% of all jobs in the region [104].
Beyond level of jobs, these industry clusters have used their productivity advantage to act as
drivers of economic growth in the region, and the base on which other jobs in the region depend.
Bay Area Economic Development Organizations
The Bay Area has maintained a competitive advantage over other regions despite the challenges
of changing technology, and the emergence of potentially lower-cost competitors. Observers
argue that the key to success is through not only the existence of physical assets, resources (or
even the weather), but also the emergence of socially and institutionally mediated forms of
cooperation between regional firms. The interdependencies of the clusters described above are
supported by a wider public and private sector which promotes innovation, information exchange,
and market-driven forms of local economic development. Business and non-profit organizations
play a facilitative role in the development of the linkages between firms. Seven of the most
prominent economic development organizations influencing the region are described below,
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along with their prominent economic development initiatives as they relate to clusters and
regional transportation investment needs.
Joint Venture Silicon Valley (JVSV): This organization is a non-profit network of business,
education, and community leaders whose mission is "to identify and solve issues affecting the
region to enable all people to succeed in the new economy [105]." In support of this mission, the
organization develops and supports efforts to enable sustainable growth and retention of Silicon
Valley technology cluster companies and industries by focusing on critical issues facing that
community. JVSV has developed an Economic Blueprint for the region which outlines initiatives
that would develop economic infrastructure required for retaining, growing and attracting
technology cluster-based industries. The initiatives were built around four major objectives: (1)
develop specialized infrastructure; (2) reduce the cost of doing business; (3) retain and expand
existing industry; and (4) support growth of new industries. The Blueprint found that the
economic infrastructure was not meeting the requirements of Silicon Valley firms. In a reversal
of prior competitive advantage, Silicon Valley's labor force, technology base, and quality of life
were found to have declined relative to competing regions. In the past, the region was able to
compensate for relatively high costs with superior and unique products. However, as the region
grew in size, the large number of institutions, jurisdictions, and individuals responsible for
regulation, taxes, and other key areas made it more difficult for regional initiatives to be
completed quickly. Smaller, less complex regions like Austin, Texas or Singapore were cited as
being able to meet rapidly changing needs of companies faster than the Bay Area.
While recognizing the cost of transportation congestion as a contributor to the rising costs and
declining quality of life in the region, the Blueprint only formally called for increased
transportation investment in support of the region's Bioscience cluster. The other
recommendations for the remaining five regional industry clusters, which were analyzed in depth
as to their current economic infrastructure needs, made no mention of additional or improved
cluster transportation requirements, while the Bioscience recommendation was vague as to
specific transportation improvements needed for the cluster [106]. Additionally, JVSV publishes
annually its Index of Silicon Valley report, which measures the economy and quality of life in
region. The report measures transportation's contribution in several ways including (1)
percentage of new housing and new jobs located within 0.25 miles of a rail station or major bus
corridor, (2) annual growth in transit ridership for the region, (3) percentage of workforce which
commutes from outside their county of employment, and (4) percentage of freeway miles
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receiving a the worst possible service level rating of "F" during the morning and afternoon peak
time periods. The most recent index in 2001 shows that although transit ridership increased in
Silicon Valley for the first time in 3 years in 2000, single-occupancy vehicles still represent 80%
of the commute trips, while over 30% of the freeway miles received a service level of "F" during
peak periods, up from 27% in 1998 [107].
Economic Development Alliance for Business (EDAB): Alameda County established the EDAB
in 1990 as a public-private partnership funded by the county, cities, municipalities, and private
sector whose mission is to "improve the Bay Area's business climate by developing and
maintaining resources, businesses, good jobs, and a high quality of life [108]." A primary goal of
the organization is to develop and enhance resources that businesses might need to compete in the
global marketplace. In support of this goal, EDAB released its Economic Development Alliance
for Business Transportation report in 1999. The report recognized the growing concern of
congestion in the region, and while acknowledging that increased congestion can be a sign of a
growing economy, it challenges the ability of the region to sustain economic growth. The
findings of the report quantified the costs of congestion at 41,800 hours per day in lost worker
productivity, resulting in an estimated $21 billion annual cost to the county in both lost worker
time and fuel costs [109]. To address this problem, EDAB brought together key leaders in the
private sector to list the business-related concerns they had about the transportation network and
were asked to brainstorm a list of potential solutions to address these issues and concerns. The
result was a transportation vision and action plan which was meant to clearly state the interests of
the business community. The recommendations were forwarded to the area's Congestion
Management Agency (CMA) responsible for prioritizing projects to be added to the region's TIP
and RTP. The business leaders called for general action items in five areas [110]:
1. Improved advocacy and communication of transportation issues by regional planning
authorities: the MPO, state and federal transportation were called on to orient themselves
to implementation of congestion solutions based on a comprehensive transportation
vision rather than a project-by-project orientation.
2. Strive for a fully integrated multi-modal transportation system: Integration of the
regional rapid transit system, BART, and the Alameda County transit agency, AC
Transit, into one organization was recommended in order to provide coordinated and
connected services.
3. Increased roadway capacity on essentially every major freeway link in the county
4. Improved efficiency of air and sea port operations
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5. Better trucking facilities in conjunction with a system of region-wide coordinated
delivery time scheduling
Bay Area Council: The Bay Area Council, founded in 1945, is a business-sector sponsored
public policy organization representing the business community and dedicated to promoting
economic prosperity and quality of life in the Bay Area region. The Council is focused on
addressing what it has identified as the three major challenges to the region's business
community: (1) increased difficulty of employee recruitment and retention; (2) increased
pressure on wages because of lack of affordable housing;, and (3) employee productivity lost
from escalating traffic congestion. In support of the third issue, the Council has adopted a
transportation action plan which broadly calls for more efficient use of existing transportation
investments and strategic investments in new capacity. The Council's most aggressive
transportation policy has been the advocacy of a new high-speed water transit system in the Bay
Area as the centerpiece of efforts to improve mobility in the region and to maintain economic
vitality. The initiative has the support of the California State Senate which passed a resolution in
the late-1990s supporting the effort and directed the region to form a Blue Ribbon Task Force to
create a implementation plan for presentation to the legislature [111].
Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG): ABAG is a public agency owned and operated by
the 100 cities and 9 counties of the San Francisco Bay Area. It was established in the early-
sixties to promote cooperation on area wide issues. Each member city and county designates a
representative to serve in the Association's General Assembly. The Assembly appoints regional
planning working groups including various joint committees with the Metropolitan
Transportation Commission, the region's MPO [112].
Bay Area Economic Forum (BAEF): The organization is a non-profit, public-private regional
partnership of business, government, academic, labor, and community leaders including the Bay
Area Council and Association of Bay Area Governments. The mission of the organization is "to
foster an outstanding environment in the region of a competitive economy to thrive and to
enhance the overall quality of life in the nine-county Bay Area [113]." The organization
regularly convenes workshops of key industry and community leaders to discus constraints
inhibiting the growth of the region's six clusters. BAEF has been a regional leader in identifying
and studying the region's core group of industry clusters. In 1999, the organization released an
extensive study examining the economic performance of the Bay Area clusters with comparable
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regions and clusters nationwide. The results of the study concluded that the future success of the
Bay Area clusters rested on their ability to continue to attract a highly skilled workforce through
its business opportunities, high quality of life, and innovation infrastructure. The report
suggested that the Bay Area competitive advantage over other regions is being eroded by the cost
of doing business. BAEF highlighted the fact that a significant portion of Bay Area workers live
in one county and commute to another country to work, and ranked the region's transportation
infrastructure quality and congestion as inferior to its peer competitive regions [114]. From a
transportation policy perspective, the organization is most heavily involved in assisting the Bay
Area Council with its high-speed water transit initiative and in studying the impact of air
transportation on the Bay Area economy, the results of which are discussed further in Section
5.1.2.
California Technology, Trade, and Commerce Agency: The agency serves as the Department of
Commerce for the State of California. Multiple economic development programs and divisions
are responsible for supporting the department's goal of "continually creating jobs and increasing
economic investment for Californians, both domestically and in the international business area
[115]." A recent addition to the agency is the creation of the California Infrastructure and
Economic Development Bank. Created in 1994 to promote economic revitalization and enable
future development, the Bank has the broad authority to issue tax-exempt and taxable revenue
bonds to provide low cost financing to public agencies for a wide variety of infrastructure and
public improvements. Highways, port facilities, and public transit are eligible for funding.
Projects are prioritized based on a scoring criteria specifically tied to economic development
potential of the project. Criteria among which points are awarded include: (1) the project's job
creation/retention per dollar of financing; (2) the project's ability to create/retain jobs within the
region's core economic base of employers or clusters; (3) demonstrated clear relationship to the
project region's economic development plan and the proposed project; and (4) demonstrated
improvement to the quality of life for the project region's residents [116].
Of all eight metropolitan regions and states surveyed within this thesis, the Bay Area has, by far,
the most numerous and active economic development organizations. The region does not have
any "official" proactive cluster initiatives, but instead, the clusters are self-aware and have
extensive networks of support institutions working on their behalf. The Bay Area is also unique
in the almost unanimous recognition of the important role transportation infrastructure can play in
cluster growth, in this case, as a constraint due to the high levels of congestion throughout the
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Bay Area transportation system. Although each economic development organization devoted a
general policy towards congestion relief, some even highlighting specific corridors for
improvement, it is significant to note that none of the organizations focused on specialized
transportation needs on a cluster by cluster basis. Instead, transportation issues were seen more
broadly, and general solutions were proposed.
5.1.2 Regional Transportation Planning
Transportation Regional Infrastructure Overview
The regional transportation infrastructure for the Bay Area is depicted in Figure 5-1 and
encompasses nine counties, 101 municipalities, over a 7,179 square mile area. The transportation
network includes 1,400 miles of highways, 308 miles of carpool lanes, eight toll bridges, 19,000
miles of local streets, 7,000 miles of transit routes, six public sea ports, six commuter ferry lines,
and three major commercial airports. In all, $4.4 billion in public funds are spent annually on
transportation in the region [117]. Transportation planning at a regional scale in the Bay Area is
an enormously complex issue, and in response, the MPO responsible for this effort, the
Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) is associated with an extensive regional
architecture to manage the operation and planning for the regional network.
MTC Structure and System Manaqement
The MTC was created in 1970 by the California Legislature to plan the transportation network for
the nine Bay Area counties. Its primary responsibilities include:
1. Development or updating of the Regional Transportation Plan every two years
2. Allocation and accounting of mass transit, highway, freight facility, and
pedestrian/bicycle routes in the region, as well as the collection and administration of
tolls on all regional toll bridges.
3. Transit operation in order to fill in the gaps of the regional public transportation system
including, for example, the bus service from the current terminus of the BART network
in Colma to San Francisco International Airport (SFO) [118].
The second responsibility is a characteristic unique to the U.S. transportation planning process in
that the MTC is authorized under state law to be the designated recipient of a major percentage of
the federal and state highway funds available to the region. This institutional characteristic
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provides the unique opportunity for the MPO to play a strong leadership role, transcending
strictly a coordination function, in the transportation planning process.
The MTC has a 19-member commissioner panel meeting each month to discuss and vote on
regional transportation planning issues. Fourteen commissioners are appointed by local elected
officials and serve four-year terms, with the most populated counties allocated two
commissioners each. The remaining commissioners are from ABAG, the San Francisco Bay
Conservation and Development Commission, the State of California's Business, Transportation,
and Development Agency, the U.S. Department of Transportation, and the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development [119].
To manage the transportation system owned and operated by many different agencies and
organizations, MTC has formed coalitions with over three-dozen federal, state, regional, and local
institutions responsible for implementing the transportation and environmental quality in the Bay
Area. The coalition is known as the Bay Area Partnership and among those included are the
California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), airport and seaport operators, and 26 regional
transit operators. The Bay Area Partnership has three operating committees - the Plans and
Programs Committee, the Legislative Committee, and the System Operations and Management
Committee. The MTC is responsible for coordinating the partnership and committees and
providing staff support for technical analysis and administration. Additionally, the MTC
Advisory Council provide opportunities for involvement by business, community, labor
organizations, academics, transit users, the freight community, the elderly, and the general public
[120].
Further institutional arrangements involve a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the
MTC, ABAG, and Caltrans through which they agree to share land use and transportation
forecasts. The MTC, ABAG, and Bay Area Quality Management District have a MOU in which
they agree to work together to prepare and update air quality plans to meet federal requirements.
Finally, the Regional Transit Coordinating Council (RTCC) administered by the MTC establishes
coordination of transit service, financial planning, and regulatory activities for the conduct of
short-range transit planning services [121].
At a system-wide level, the MTC has increasingly sponsored projects that aim to provide
consistent service to transportation users region-wide. The earliest projects were the
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administration of call boxes and roving freeway tow trucks for incident management. These
efforts have expanded to include regional real-time traveler information systems, and a single
transit information telephone number. Upcoming projects include TransLink, a smartcard
technology integrating fare collection for all of the region's 26 transit operators [122].
The MTC has also supported project development at the corridor level in its efforts to promote a
comprehensive transportation systems management framework established in 1993 and integrated
into the current RTP. The MTC increasingly concentrates on multi-jurisdictional projects at the
corridor level. By focusing at the corridor level, the framework is able to capture vehicle- and
person-flows that require cross-jurisdictional integration necessary to plan and operate highways
and transit services as a single system. The 1998 Bay Area Regional Transportation Plan places
the region's long-term investments in the context of 16 identified travel corridors, rather than
dividing the region into its nine county components. While the corridor framework may be a
logical unit from which to manage a transportation project, it is still often mismatched with
existing institutional structures that better match political and transportation modal boundaries.
Currently, the MTC is forced to act as a project champion while attempting to fund region-wide
projects which cross fragmented jurisdictional boundaries typically resulting in funding
opposition [123].
MTC Transportation Planning
Ideas for transportation projects emerge from planning efforts at the city, county, transit operator,
and regional levels. However, in general, the major sources of projects considered for the long-
term regional transportation plan are the Congestion Management Plans and Short-Range Transit
Plans. Funded and unfunded projects are incorporated under various plans throughout the
planning process, the most important of which are summarized below:
Congestion Management Plans: The California State Assembly created a county level
transportation planning unit called Congestion Management Agencies (CMAs). Each CMA is
responsible for preparing and implementing county level transportation plans, called Congestion
Management Plans (CMPs). The CMPs serve as the base projects for consideration in the
development of the RTP.
The Regional Transportation Plan (RTP): The development of the current RTP was based
originally on three alternative policy options: (1) Option A based on addressing prior
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commitments and local plans, (2) Option B based on system maintenance and operating
management, and (3) Option C based on coordinating transportation and land use. In the
planning process, consensus was reached within the MTC that all three options were
complimentary and necessary to some degree, resulting in the merging of all three options into
the current RTP. Notable in the context of this analysis, is the absence of economic development
from the explicitly stated alternative policy options. The resulting major focus of the current
plan, adopted in 1998, is the maintenance, operations, and management of the existing
transportation system. Rather than responding to growth with major new infrastructure projects,
the 1998 RTP focuses on maintaining and improving existing highway and transit systems.
Consistent with ISTEA and TEA-21 requirements, the RTP includes only projects that the region
can afford and the projects, taken as a whole, are not planned to worsen air quality. Additionally,
state law requires the MPO to address regional issues not covered by the county-jurisdiction
constrained CMPs.
Transportation Blueprint: The MTC also leads a regional effort known as the Bay Area
Transportation Blueprint which evaluates various strategies to a improve the region's
transportation network. These improvements are typically beyond the financial resources of the
MTC and therefore not included in the RTP which includes only projects for which funding
sources have been identified. The Blueprint serves as a means to link together funded and
unfunded projects into a single document and planning framework. The current Blueprint
document identifies over $3.8 billion worth of unfunded transportation needs in the region, and
focuses primarily on providing medium-term relief in the region's most congested travel
corridors. The Blueprint covers high-profile projects such as the extension of BART from
Alameda County into the heart of Silicon Valley in San Jose and the upgrading of the Caltrain
commuter express network into a high capacity, high-frequency service [124].
Governor's Traffic Congestion Relief Plan: Released in April 2000, this statewide plan proposed
the release of $5.3 billion in efforts to reduce Statewide congestions funded by a mixture of
general state fund revenues and sale tax resources. Under this plan, the Bay Area's share is
approximately $1.6 billion, 90% of which is dedicated to the funding of public transit
improvements. The Economic Blueprint provided a framework from which to allocate the
proposed new funds [125].
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Short-Range Transit Plans (SRTP): Annually, each of the twenty-six Bay Area transit operators
is responsible for developing a SRTP which describes the service and financial plans, and capital
improvement programs for each transit service. The multiple SRTPs serve as the initial base of
transit projects for the RTPs, and provide input for the TIP planning process.
Major Investment Studies (MIS): The Bay Area Partnership, the coalition of transportation
organizations coordinated by the MTC, is responsible for identifying projects requiring MIS. The
guidelines within a MIS provide the basis for investment decisions which subsequently appear in
the RTP and TIP. The development of the MIS includes measures of project efficiency including
cost-effectiveness, financial feasibility, and equity. No mention of economic development
measures are found within the MIS development guidelines [126]
Transportation Improvement Plan (TIP): The MTC has a screening process for projects to be
included in the short-range TIP, based on a scoring criteria given to projects proposed through the
CRP, SRTP, MIS, and other MTC coordinating activities. The scoring criteria do not include
any economic development evaluations. Consistent with ISTEA and TEA-21 requirements, only
projects consistent with the RTP are included in the TIP. Additionally, even fully funded projects
will be excluded by the MTC if they are inconsistent with its RTP [127].
Freight Advisory Council Reports: The Freight Council was established to obtain advice on
freight issues and help identify and implement effective strategies to improve freight mobility in
the Bay Area. Representatives of the Freight Advisory Council also sit on the MTC Advisory
Council.
Regional Airport System Plan (RASP): The Regional Airport Planning Committee (RAPC) serves
as an advisory committee to the MTC and is responsible for developing the RASP. The RASP is
a rolling plan periodically updated since 1972, providing analysis and policy guidance on aviation
requirements for commercial and general aviation airports in the region. The plan is an
informational document and focuses on forecasts of demand and environmental concerns [128].
Because the plan does little to address the economic impact of airport investment, especially the
economic cost of inaction, economic development organizations in the region have completed
their own studies on the system and submitted the recommendations to the MTC.
124
The Bay Area Regional Transportation Plan and Economic Development
The current Bay Area RTP was examined to evaluate its incorporation of economic development
issues within its planning framework. Because of the presence of such a large number of
economic development organizations within the region, and the consensus from each organization
that increasing congestion was reducing the area's competitive advantage, it was expected that the
RTP would incorporate to some degree the concerns within the planning document.
The RTP viewed the transportation network as a system of multi-modal travel corridors
constituting the most relevant subdivision of the network. For the 14 corridors identified, five
general goals were established for the planning of each, goals which closely mirrored the
planning factors within the TEA-21 framework. For each corridor, the RTP listed the efforts to
"support the economic vitality of the region [129]." No definition was given within the plan as to
what constituted economic vitality, nor were any performance measures established. The
following table summarizes the 14 corridors and the generalized initiatives to support the
economic vitality of the regions impacted by the corridor. As shown in Table 5-1, the RTP
primarily focuses on the need to prevent midday congestion for freight traffic.
In 2000, the California State Assembly passed a bill encouraging the use of transportation system
performance measures in the development of future Regional Transportation Plans. In response,
the MTC commissioned a study by the Institute of Transportation Studies at University of
California Berkeley to evaluate performance measures including economic vitality. The study
recommended three performance measures for economic vitality which are summarized below:
" Change in Travel Time for Origin/Destination (O&D) Pairs: This measure applies for O&D
pairs specifically chosen to reflect regional goods movements. Examples of these pairs
would include manufacturing and distribution centers, seaports, and airports.
. Mobility Measures: Mobility measures related to travel time and delay or congestion for
work trips were chosen to acknowledge the general impact of mobility on the economy.
* Shippers/Business Survey of Regional Transportation: The survey will monitor and reflect
the attractiveness for the business in the region and will attempt to measure changing cost
impacts to regional industries.
125
RTP Planning Corridor Summary of Stated RTP "Economic Vitality" Issues for Corridor
- Improvements of U.S. 101 and the Northwest Pacific right-of-way are seen as
key to serving economic growth in Sonoma County
Golden Gate Corridor - Spreading duration of congestion on U.S. 101 impairs truck mobility in the
(U.S. 101 Vicinity) midday
- Spreading congestion on the weekends impairs access to recreational
destinations
North Bay East-West Corridor - Improvements that support eco-tourism (wetlands, waterfowl observation,
(Route 12 and Route 37 Vicinity) and wineries) and agriculture are important to the area's future vitality
- Conflicts between local agricultural truck traffic and other traffic can be
Napa Valley Corridor addressed through selected operational improvements
(Route 29 and Route 121 Vicinity) - Tourism is a key to the areas economic vitality, and the economy will benefit
from good accessibility to other parts of the Bay Area
- As a major freight corridor, traffic should be managed to ensure smooth
operations on 1-80 during the midday for trucks
Interstate 80 Corridor - Growing congestion on 1-80 will require improved transit connections to(Port of Oakland Vicinity) maintain access to jobs in the urban core
- Improving rail service to the Port of Oakland through the Joint Intermodal
Terminal could help enhance economic competitiveness of the port
State Route 4 Corridor - Spreading duration of congestion on Route 4 could impair truck movements.
(Route 4 Vicinity) As a major freight corridor, it will be important to ensure reliable operationsduring the midday for trucks.
- Spreading duration of congestion on 1-680 could impair truck movements in
Interstate 680 Corridor the mid-day. Traffic should be managed for reliable operations during the
(Contra Costa County Vicinity) midday for trucks
- Access to major retail centers is critical to the economic vitality of the area
- Spreading duration of congestion on 1-580 could impair truck movements. As
Interstate 580 Corridor a major freight corridor, traffic should be managed to ensure efficient truck
(Central Valley to Alameda) operations during the midday.
- As a growing suburban employment center, good local and regional access
to jobs is important
Interstate 680 South Corridor - Traffic growth in the corridor could effect efficient truck operations during the(Alameda to Santa Clara Vicinity) midday
- Corridor is critical to the economic vitality of Silicon Valley
- As a major trucking facility, spreading congestion on 1-880 could impair
Interstate 880 Corridor freight operations during the midday
(Oakland Intl Airport Vicinity) - Efficient ground access to the Port of Oakland and Oakland International
Airport is critical for the region
Fremont-South Bay Corridor - Because of the importance of accessing jobs in Silicon Valley, this corridor is(SothrnAlmea outyto -important to the economic vitality of the region
downtown San Jose Vicinity) - Reliable freeway operations need to be maintained during the midday fortrucks
- Preserving the accessibility of Silicon Valley and other high-tech companies
along 1-880 is critical to the economic vitality of the region
- Growth management concepts for the southern county can be coordinated
Santa Clara Sub-Area with transportation investment
(Silicon Valley Vicinity) - Transportation plays a major role in the economic vitality of downtown San
Jose
- Good ground access to San Jose International Airport is important due to the
large amount of business travel
Peninsula Corridor - Spreading duration of congestion could impair truck movements
(San Francisco Intl Airport Vicinity) - Maintaining good ground access to SFO is critical to the local and regional
economy
- Regional transportation projects need to be closely coordinated with city
redevelopment plans
San Francisco Sub-area - Efficient truck access to downtown is critical
- Improving multi-modal access is important to the Presidio
- Transportation services that serve the city's tourist and recreational travel
market must be maintained
Trans-bay Corridor - Trucks need reliable operation on bridges during the midday
(San Francisco Bay Bridges) - Good access to 1-580 is critical to the economic development in the city ofRichmond
Source: MTC, 1999
Table 5-1: Economic Vitality Components of the Bay Area RTP
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The report also includes measures that were evaluated but not recommended for inclusion in the
2001 Bay Area RTP. These measures included the economic cost of congestion, number of
industries relocating out of the region, delay per ton-mile traveled, and jobs directly created by
transportation investment. The measures, though beneficial for measuring the impact of
transportation on the competitive advantage of the region, were rejected due to the complexity of
calculation or the impact of exogenous factors that were not a clear outcome of transportation
investment [130].
Bay Area Regional Airports and Economic Development
The Bay Area has three international airports which contribute to the global competitiveness of
the region. These airports are Oakland (OAK), San Francisco (SFO), and San Jose (SJC). In
2000, both the MTC and FAA were evaluating projected capacity demands and alternatives to
meet them, but no formal regional inquiry was being undertaken into the airport economic
impacts. Concerned that the regional economic costs of inaction were not being fully considered,
The economic development organization, the Bay Area Economic Forum (BAEF), commissioned
a study on the overall economic impact of the Bay Area airports and its impact on regional
competitiveness.
The project was divided into two phases. The first phase estimated the local economic impacts of
the airport in terms of the direct impacts of the airport on airport related jobs, visitor spending,
and revenue generated from airport revenues. The second phase looked at the competitive
impacts of the airport related to regional businesses. Given the region's knowledge-based
industry clusters, there is a strong dependence on air travel. For example, a Bay Area company
may need to compete against firms in Texas, Germany, and China, by forming strategic alliances
with companies in Japan and Mexico and by drawing skilled workers from India and technology
for the Netherlands. Bay Area clusters also need the ability to express documents and time-
sensitive parcels in a timely manner to customers and business partners. BAEF estimated that 4.4
million passenger hours were lost in 1999 in Bay Area airport terminals, taxiing on runways, and
holding patterns [131]. Estimating the lost productivity and economic impact is not
straightforward. Some regional economic gain is found in the short run with delays as increased
airport dwell times lead to higher expenditure per passenger in the airport terminal. Less well-
understood are the subsequent medium-to-long term decision by businesses and individuals when
faced with repeated flight delays and cancellations.
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BAEF surveyed business executives and frequent air travelers from each of the six industry
clusters regarding their airport concerns. Though the survey did not disaggregate concerns by
cluster, it provided interesting insight into the competitive impact of airport delays and
congestion. Most executives surveyed indicated that they tended to locate their offices in the Bay
Area in proximity to their perception of where their identified labor force were living or wanted
to live, rather than proximity to the regional airports [132]. This result suggests industry clusters
are still making location decisions based on workforce needs, rather than transportation
infrastructure needs, thus improving airport access will have marginal impact on relocation
decisions by cluster firms.
A relatively small number of Bay Area business clusters surveyed said they were heavily
dependent upon air freight transportation services in and out of the Bay Area. Most industry
clusters use freight forwarders and cargo consolidators to arrange door-to-door transportation
services. These forwarders reported no problems making delivery deadlines due to regional
airport delays. In fact, the largest forwarders stated that they used Los Angeles (LAX) as the
primary air freight gateway, with Portland and Seattle as fallback airports. The benefits to this
approach were due to the wider choice of services and schedules and the efficiencies gained by
consolidating northern and southern California cargo into one location. Overnight shipment from
the Bay Area to LAX provides the ability for cargo to be loaded onto mid-afternoon departures
bound for domestic, Asian, or European destinations [133].
The final finding of the cluster survey attempted to assess the qualitative impact of delays.
Nearly half of the industry cluster executives surveyed stated that a delay of less than an hour had
little to no critical impact on their business, while 31% believed it had some impact, and 18%
believed it created a real loss of productive time. In contrast, the 62% saw a delay of 2 hours or
more as critical [134]. The vast majority of delays experienced by Bay Area airports are 1 hour
or less. While airport delay studies tend to aggregate total hours of delay experienced by
passengers and multiply it by a value-of-time figure to estimate economic impacts of delay, this
survey example suggests that the economic impact in terms of regional competitive advantage is
minimal.
Figure 5-5 summarizes the multiple economic development and transportation institutions for the
Bay Area. Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 described some of the institutional links between the four
sectors listed below.
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JVSV Bay Area Council
EDAB BAEF
Public
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California Technology, Trade, and Commerce Agency
Infrastructure Development Bank
California State Assembly and Governors Office
Metropolitan Transportation Commission
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Bay Area Partnership Six Bay Area Clusters
-Stanford University Regional Airport Planning CommitteeOakland, and San Jose
-University of California, Berkeley Freight Advisory Council Chamber of Commerce
Regional Transit Coordinating Council
County Congestion Management Agencies
RTP Transportation Blueprint
SRTP MIS
TIP RASP
CMP Traffic Congestion Relief Plan
Figure 5-5: Bay Area Transportation and Economic Development Institutions
5.1.3 Regional Summary
Silicon Valley is perhaps the best example of a working cluster in the United States. A strong
network of economic development organizations provide support for the region's clusters, with
most organizations citing traffic congestion as one of the three major constraints on the continued
development of its clusters (the other two constraints being a skilled worker shortage and rising
housing costs). Bay Area economic development organizations have been very proactive in
commissioning their own transportation studies and reporting their findings to the MTC, the
region's MPO. Cluster-specific transportation needs are usually not cited in these studies,
although transportation issues are highlighted as broadly impacting all clusters. The one example
of cluster-specific needs assessment, performed by the BAEF, found surprisingly that congestion
and delay at SFO airport was at most impacting clusters negatively in the second order relative to
other regional concerns. The region's main "report card" on the health of its clusters, published
annually by JVSV, includes transportation measures as one of its seven metrics.
Although the regional MPO has many links to the economic development representatives in the
Bay Area, the MTC's RTP does not incorporate cluster-based development to any significant
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degree. Instead, the RTP focuses more broadly on the TEA-21 guiding principle of "economic
vitality," and approaches congestion concerns more from the perspective of freight traffic and the
need to prevent midday congestion. For the development of the 2001 RTP, the MTC has been
directed by the California State Assembly to use specific performance measures for economic
vitality, but the recommended measures do not include any economic development metrics such
as productivity growth or cluster-specific performance criteria.
5.2 Twin Cities, Minnesota
5.2.1 Regional Economic Development and Clusters
Economic development in the Twin Cities region has evolved substantially over the past 30 years.
In the 1970s and 1980s, economic development consisted of bidding wars with other states in an
effort to lure large manufacturing plants to the region. For example, in 1985, the State of
Minnesota offered over $1 billion in tax-incentives in an effort to lure Saturn (GM) to the state
but ultimately lost the manufacturing center to Tennessee. In the early 1990s, the economic
development strategy shifted to investing in important local companies. During this period, the
state extended a low-interest credit line to Northwest Airlines to help the company avoid
bankruptcy, and protected retailer Dayton Hudson from a hostile takeover. In the early- to mid-
1990s, the region experienced a policy shift to industry clusters [135].
The region's city governments currently have a substantial role in what is considered economic
development efforts. The focus of most of these municipal efforts tends to be on jobs for the
specific city and tax base, rather than development for the region as a whole. The true economic
region has spread across twenty counties and spilled across the state border into Wisconsin. Like
most regions, the political jurisdiction of the Twin Cities is not currently reconciled with the
boundaries of the real economic region.
In the mid-1990s, the region undertook one of the nation's first comprehensive regional industry
cluster studies. The Twin Cities Cluster Study was undertaken by the Metropolitan Council, the
region's MPO, to enhance the understanding of why certain industries succeed in the Twin Cities
region. Participants included the Center for Transportation Studies at the University of
Minnesota, local economic development organizations, Metropolitan Airports Commission, the
Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT), private railroad firms, and industry leaders.
Noticeable is the absence of the Minnesota Department of Trade and Economic Development.
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The study identified four clusters and a follow-on study added an additional fifth cluster to the
region, which will be discussed below. The clusters were identified using aggregate U.S.
Department of Labor standard industrial classification system (SIC) and determined the location
quotients for each regional industry (Section 2.3.5 discussed the cluster identification process and
the hazards of using the aggregate SIC codes). The study analyzed each of the clusters
identifying the factors leading to the clusters competitive advantage as well as identifying specific
cluster needs to sustain their advantage. Except for the Financial Services cluster, transportation
infrastructure was not cited as a critical need for any specific cluster but was mentioned as a
factor condition leading to the development of some of the clusters. Additionally, the report's
broad forward-strategies included the recommendation to "incorporate economic development
considerations into transportation decision-making process [136]." The Twin Cities' five
industry clusters, and their transportation-related factor conditions as identified by the report, are
described below:
Printing and Publishing Clusters: This cluster is perhaps the region's strongest local cluster in
terms of national market share of industry employment. There are no easily identifiable firms or
institutions which served as the driving force behind the emergence of this cluster, and the region
ranked fifth among America's printing clusters in employment share behind Chicago, Los
Angeles, New York and Philadelphia [137]. The central location of the Twin Cities was
identified as an advantage for printing and publishing companies pursuing the national market.
Freight services, shipping costs, and turnaround times are important determinants of profit for this
cluster. The central location on the continent with excellent north-south and east-west interstate
connections for trucking firms and a major airline hub give the region's cluster some competitive
advantage over other areas.
Computer and Software Cluster: Less known than its competitive counterparts in Silicon Valley
and the Boston Route 128 region, the Twin Cities nevertheless has a strong concentration of
technology firms. Although the region has no single large cutting-edge software or hardware
developer, it does have a diverse range of specialized software firms. Transportation
infrastructure was not cited as a factor condition for this cluster.
Medical Devices Cluster: With firms such as Medtronic and Guidant producing the major share
of the nation's pacemakers, and 3M's extensive medical component division, the Twin Cities'
medical device cluster is referred to as "Medical Alley." The Northwest Airlines hub in
Minneapolis was cited as a contributing factor condition by providing the cluster's ability to ship
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products nationally overnight. Air transportation's importance is further emphasized by the fact
that Medtronic was Federal Express' second largest customer in the nation as Medtronic sought a
competitive advantage by having its pacemakers implanted with the freshest possible batteries
[138].
Machinery and Metalworking Cluster: This high-export related industry contributes over $1.5
billion annually to the region's export base and is made up of a diverse collection of small firms.
Transportation was not specifically cited as a factor condition to the establishment of a
competitive advantage for the cluster, but is implicitly assumed due to the export-related nature of
the cluster.
Financial Services Cluster: Transportation infrastructure was citied as a key determinant of the
formation of this cluster. The Twin Cities' historical status as a railroad terminus helped
centralize the financial services of the Upper Midwest region, including the Ninth District Federal
Reserve Bank, into the Twin Cities' area. The region is also situated so that its airline hub
infrastructure can provide access to the entire nation in generally less than four hours of flight
time. The frequency of hub city service combined with the convenience of the Twin Cities
airport, less than 10 miles from both downtowns, provides financial services easy access to
national and international markets. The cluster study recommended that in order to preserve the
competitive environment for financial services, the region should focus strategic investments in a
healthy public transit system. A strong public transit system was seen as necessary to increase
the attractiveness of the typically labor-intensive financial service firms as places to work,
particularly for low-wage workers who could not afford a private automobile.
Beyond the original cluster study by the MPO, Twin Cities' regional economic development
organizations have produced a significant body of literature of strategic initiatives to develop and
expand the regional economy. The most prominent studies were surveyed to assess the role
transportation infrastructure was seen to play in the regional economic development policies. The
results of this survey are shown below in Table 5-2.
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Economic Development Study Role of Transportation Infrastructure
Partnership. Enhancing
Competitiveness: An Industry
Approach, 1992.
Greater Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce. Building
Our Future: Regional Strategies for Economic
Opportunities. 1995.
Economic Development Association of Minnesota.
Strategies for Economic Growth: Minnesota's
Economic Development Investment Priorities. 1997
Metropolitan Council. Maintaining Our Competitive
Edge for the 21 " Century: State of the Region. 1999.
1000 Friends of Minnesota. Two Roads Diverge:
Analyzing Growth Strategies for the Twin Cities Region.
1999.
The Great North Alliance. Opportunity Forecast. April
2000.
Citizens League. Securing Minnesota's Economic
Future: A New Aaenda for the New Economv. 2000.
Office of the Governor. The Big Plan: Strategic
Directions of the Venture Administration. 2000.
Improved transportation infrastructure was not identified in the
study's recommendations
Study cited the existence of transportation infrastructure as a
component of economic development. However, of 26 economic
development strategies put forth, investment in transportation
infrastructure was not one of them
The study was the compilation of a survey of 1,000 economic
development professionals listed a key concern of economic
development in the region to be the ability of an increasingly
congested transportation/n infrastructure to limit growth. While the
study recommended the investment in public transportation as a
foundation for economic growth, transportation infrastructure was
not included in the top three priorities
Report questioned the shortage of available transit in the region, but
no explicit link transit to economic development
The study calculated the economic
scenarios: smart growth and sprawl.
costs were included as a component
costs of two regional growth
Transportation infrastructure
Study compared the Twin Cities economic performance to that of
Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Austin, and Seattle. Transportation
infrastructure was not cited in the comparisons nor as a need to
improve economic performance
The study promoted the shift of regional economic development
efforts from job creation to improving productivity. Public transit
investment was seen as a contributing factor to productivity
improvement, but transportation investment was not cited in the
final list of detailed short-term priorities
The plan focused on strategies to improve the regions status as an
overall global competitor. Telecommunications and telecommuting
were cited as infrastructure investments necessary to facilitate this
improvement, but transportation investment was not mentioned
Table 5-2: Survey of Transportation Needs Cited in Economic Development Studies
In contrast to the Bay Area where transportation needs were a prominent policy action item in
each plan reviewed, the Twin Cities economic development studies all but ignore transportation
investment as a supporting strategy in the promotion of economic growth in the region. There
may be several explanations for this, not least of which are the facts that the Twin Cities does not
currently face the same levels of traffic congestion, airport congestion and delay, or geographic
constraints.
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Minnesota Business
Minnesota's Economic
Specific, State-Specific
Economic Development Study Role of Transportation Infrastructure
Overall, the Twin Cities use of industry clusters as a policy tool to guide economic development
may be characterized as limited. The efforts have not fully coordinated the government agencies,
private industries, and academic research institutions; instead cluster policy efforts have focused
on nudging the existing clusters toward further developing their competitive advantages.
5.2.2 Regional Transportation Planning
Because of the absence of physical boundaries, such as a coastline or a mountain range, the Twin
Cities metropolitan area is distinguished by a very low population density and rapid geographic
expansion. The seven-county Twin Cities region is the third least dense or "most sprawling" of
the 25 largest metropolitan areas in the U.S., behind only Atlanta and Kansas City [139]. The
Twin Cities metropolitan area is made up of 272 separate local government units: seven county
governments, 138 cities, 50 townships, 49 school districts, 22 special purpose jurisdiction, and six
metropolitan government agencies. The center of the region is shown in Figure 5-6, highlighting
the transportation network within the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul.
The Metropolitan Council was established in 1967 to coordinate the comprehensive planning and
development of the seven-county Twin Cities region. The Governor appoints seventeen
representatives from districts of roughly equal population and each serves four-year terms. The
Metropolitan Council is empowered by the State to prepare and adopt a comprehensive
development guide for the Twin Cities. The guide includes direction for land use, parks, airports,
highways, transit services, schools, hospitals and other public buildings. The Council also serves
as the MPO for the region and the lead agency for implementing ISTEA and TEA-21
transportation planning requirements. The other major participants in the transportation planning
process are the Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC), the Regional Transit Board (RTB),
and the Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT). A Transportation Advisory Board
(TAB) is also administered by the Metropolitan Council and is responsible for assigning
transportation funding priorities and adopting programs. The TAB has 30 members representing
local municipalities, state and regional agencies, and the public.
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" The main strategy of the RTP is centered on smart growth - a pro-growth approach to
guiding development into patterns that are more compact and into areas where infrastructure
allows growth to be sustained over the long term. The strategy as it relates to development is
focused primarily on land-use issues rather than more broad economic development issues as
they relate to the region's business clusters.
. A short portion of the plan is subheaded "Strengthening Economic Competitiveness."
However, the brief policies listed under this subheading focus on strengthening "the region's
economic competitiveness by maintaining mobility for commuter travel and goods movement
as the area grows and supporting a more compact urban form [140]." Again, the policy
appears to be built more around land-use development, rather than specifically economic
development (although the two are related).
. The RTP is based around five explicitly stated planning goals, one of which is "to advance
economic competitiveness [141]." However, of the seventeen policies developed to guide the
transportation planning process in support of these five goals, only one policy directly
addresses competitiveness and economic development: Policy 12 - To Maintain a
Competitive Regional Freight Transportation System. The policy calls on MnDOT to more
effectively increase freight movements within the state transportation corridors and supports
MnDOT in its attempts to have the U.S. DOT designate 1-94 as a "Corridor of National
Significance" given its connections to the Canadian border and role as a major corridor for
international trade. The policy also calls for the preparation of a regional freight flows study
to determine infrastructure needs for improved access to freight terminals. Of the remaining
sixteen guiding policies, economic development is only indirectly addressed through land-use
coordination with transportation projects.
. The Transit System Plan component of the RTP calls for the need to double the capacity of
the bus system and develop a network of dedicated corridors to ensure the region's economic
vitality. The benefit of this policy is measured in congestion cost savings rather than
economic development impacts. Within the Metropolitan Highway Plan component of the
RTP, there is no direct mention of economic development initiatives or benefits from the
recommended policies.
The short-range TIP process is initiated when the Metropolitan Council formally requests
MnDOT and the RTB to submit a list of short-range transportation projects. The Metropolitan
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Council summarizes the projects and forwards the list to the TAB for review and adoption, and
finally returned to the Metropolitan Council for final approval. The Metropolitan Council
maintains that projects are only included in the TIP if they (1) support the Regional Blueprint and
RTP, and (2) maintain the region's economic vitality and quality of life. It is unclear from a
review of the available TIP plans how the projects are actually prioritized by considering regional
economic vitality.
Reqional Airport Study
In 1996, the State Legislature passed a resolution directing the region not to build a new airport in
the suburbs, but instead, focus on expanding the current airport, located only a few miles from the
central business district of the region, within its space constraints. The Metropolitan Airports
Commission, concerned about the constrained expansion capability of the Minneapolis
International Airport (MSP) commissioned a study by the Center for Transportation Studies at the
University of Minnesota to assess the competitive position of the region in the global economy
via the air transportation infrastructure. The authors focused on the region's export-producing
industry clusters and impact of the airport on their logistics. The conclusions of the study were
similar to the Bay Area airport study in that MSP was not considered critical to competitive
positioning achieved through efficient air cargo handling out of and into the Twin Cities region.
The study found that other cities were better situated to handle the cargo, particularly Chicago
O'Hare (ORD). In support of this assertion, the study pointed to the fact that Northwest Airlines,
with its hub at MSP, does not cycle its 747 freighters through MSP, but rather they are deployed
out of O'Hare, Kennedy, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. It is more economical for freight
carriers to ship cargo by truck from MSP to ORD overnight and consolidate with other shipments
rather than flying the same cargo directly out of MSP [142]. The study did not focus on the
competitive impacts of providing high-frequency airline hub service over a global network for
knowledge-intensive regional industry clusters.
5.2.3 Regional Summary
The Twin Cities region has only one working cluster, the Medical Devices cluster, which has
earned the area the moniker "Medical Alley." The remaining clusters cited are likely only in the
"potential" development stage. Only the initial cluster study in 1995 cited cluster-specific
transportation infrastructure as important: (1) the MSP airport for supporting the competitive
advantage of the Medical Device cluster, and (2) investment in public transit for providing access
to workers for the labor-intensive financial services cluster. The fact that the MPO, with
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responsibility for regional transportation planning, led the cluster study may have impacted the
weight placed on transportation infrastructure. The six studies surveyed did not cite investment
in transportation infrastructure as critical either for cluster-specific or general competitive
advantage development. Competitive advantage in the region was not seen tied to the Twin
Cities transportation infrastructure, although the region's geographic position in the center of the
United States was cited several times as a competitive advantage. It is important to note that this
advantage can only be taken leveraged through a well-functioning inter-regional transportation
system. Finally, the RTP did not reflect cluster-based economic development within its
framework; instead, economic concerns were mostly centered on smart growth land-use policies.
5.3 Tucson, Arizona
5.3.1 Regional Economic Development and Clusters
The State of Arizona is actively using the industry cluster framework to structure its state
economic development initiatives and is nationally recognized as a pioneer in the implementation
of a cluster-based economic development policy. State agencies work directly with the industry
clusters rather than with individual firms. The State goes to extremes not to display favoritism
towards specific industries within the clusters, but will coordinate efforts to bring together
government, education, and other support groups to form a working cluster initiative for any
emerging cluster that can organize itself and show its value to the state economy. Although
specific firms are not targeted, the state does target specific clusters.
The Arizona cluster initiatives had their origins in the late-1980s when the state's real estate
market collapsed after several decades of steady growth, sparking a severe recession. In reaction,
a consortium of public and private leaders formed a task force through a public-private
partnership, the Enterprise Network, which undertook the design of a statewide strategic planning
effort. In 1989, the Arizona Legislature enabled the Economic Development Act which directed
the State Department of Commerce to draft the first statewide strategic economic development
plan. In 1990, the Enterprise Network brought together the Department of Commerce, the
Arizona Economic Council, the Greater Phoenix Economic Council,.and the Greater Tucson
Economic Council in an effort known as the Arizona Strategic Planning for Economic
Development, or ASPED. The first phase of the ASPED project was an assessment of the state's
economic strengths and weaknesses, resulting in a strategic framework used to identify the state's
clusters. The second phase of the project was the implementation of the strategic plan through a
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process now referred to as the Governor's Strategic Partnership for Economic Development, or
GSPED. The basis of GSPED is "a cluster-based economic development strategy, involving
targeted marketing to attract and sustain industries that create quality, high-paying jobs and
benefit the economy [143]." GSPED does not draw a direct link between transportation
infrastructure and its cluster-based strategy. Indirectly, GSPED consider that "physical
infrastructure and fundamental public facilities such as roads and mass-transit, airports and
railways, water and sewage systems, and power and phone lines, transform raw land into a quality
place to live and do business. [144]"
The Greater Tucson area embarked on its own regional cluster strategy at the request of the city
of Tucson and Pima County. A data assessment of the Tucson regional economy was performed
and a survey of business leaders identified the leading economic development strategies in the
area. A strategic plan emerged from these efforts which encourage recruitment, retention, and
expansion of specific clusters of industries in the area, and overall community development. The
strategic plan also places a high degree of importance on collaborating with the statewide cluster-
based strategy.
Tucson Clusters
The region has historically recognized five industry clusters, only one of which is mature and
established, with the rest still in the emerging, or "potential," stage. Tucson's clusters are listed as
follows:
Aerospace and Defense Industry Cluster: Anchored by the Raytheon Company and consisting of
defense and space related manufacturing as well as firms which maintain and rehabilitate
commercial airline fleets.
Bioindustry Cluster: Cluster consists of businesses that create and provide products and services
characterized by life science activities. The cluster is in the emerging state and focusing on
enhancing its relationship with the University of Arizona Medical Center.
Environmental Technology Industry Cluster: A fast-growing cluster represented by its own
regional trade group, ETIC - Environmental Technology Industry Cluster. The cluster
encompasses firms that provide products and services that monitor and treat pollution, or
conserve and restore natural industries.
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Information Technology: The cluster is in its initial developing state and is being promoted by a
non-profit professional trade organization, ITASA - Information Technology Association of
Southern Arizona.
Optics Cluster: A mature and established cluster which has earned the Tucson region the
nickname "Optics Valley." The University of Arizona Optical Sciences Center produces more
graduates in optical science than any other institution in the nation. The cluster is represented by
the non-profit organization AOIA - the Arizona Optics Industry Association - and consists of
115 companies [145].
Tucson Economic Development Orqanizations and Initiatives
The most prominent economic development organization in the Tucson region is GTEC - the
Greater Tucson Economic Council. GTEC is a private, non-profit corporation created in 1994,
and funded by the city of Tucson, Pima County, and regional towns of Marana and Oro Valley.
GTEC leads the state of Arizona in administration and execution of the GSPED cluster concept,
development, and implementation. While the organization's efforts are centered around
providing tax relief and job training resources for industry clusters, it does recognize the
importance of transportation infrastructure for meeting the needs of its developing clusters. In its
literature promoting the region's attractiveness to cluster-specific firms considering relocating or
starting-up operations to the area, it highlights several advantages of the region's transportation
network [146]:
. Ease of access to the global market place and strategic position along the Canada-Mexico
trade corridor
. An expanding airport located seven miles from downtown which includes 9 daily non-stop
flights to Mexico, serving Hermosillo and Guayamas in the State of Sonora
. Two interstate highways intersect in the Tucson area: (1) Interstate 10, a cross-continental
highway connecting Tucson with Phoenix and Los Angeles to the northwest, and El Paso and
Dallas to the east, and (2) 1-19 connecting Tucson with Nogales, Mexico 63 miles to the
south
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Figure 5-7: Proposed CanaMex Corridor
Many of the organization's efforts are
focused on the link between Tucson
and Mexico. GTEC's regional
economic development plan was
specifically created to promote efforts
to more fully integrate Southwest
Arizona and the Mexican State of
Sonora as a single competitive region.
Another economic development
program administered by the City of
Tucson is called the Tucson Maquila
Supplier Program (TMSP). The
Mexican Maquiladora Industry is
known as the "twin plant" industry
and consists of foreign-owned in-
bond manufacturing plants located
across the border in Mexico which
prior to NAFTA had enjoyed special
tariff benefits. Mexican Maquiladora
plants perform a portion of the
manufacturing process for U.S.
companies, mainly component
C assembly. Most Maquiladora
Mubol ~ assembled components are returned
Source: Western CanaMEex Coalition, 2000
to the U.S. for final processing and
distribution. Even with the increased logistics of shipping components twice across the U.S. -
Mexico border, the cost of the finished product is reduced due to lower labor expenses, making it
more competitive in world markets. TMSP helps regional cluster industries identify suppliers in
Mexico who can reliably produce high quality goods at competitive costs. TMSP also promotes
the ability for clusters to maintain key components of their operation in Tucson, such as R&D
functions, final assembly facilities, and warehouse and distribution, while locating manufacturing
functions in Mexico.
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The Tucson-Mexico Project is a public-private partnership sponsored by the City of Tucson to
assist businesses and organizations improve their connections with Mexico. Mexico is Arizona's
leading export destination, with Canada the second largest. The focus of the program is the
lobbying of improvements to the CanaMex Corridor, shown in Figure 5-7. Officially designated
by Congress in 1994, the CanaMex Corridor plan is to provide a continuous 1,700 mile highway
system link from Alberta, Canada to Mexico through the Rocky Mountains, southwestern states,
and Tucson. The Tucson-Mexico Projects participates in the Western CanaMex Coalition,
formed in 1997, to provide strategic planning and enhancement of this trade corridor. The
Tucson-Mexico Project is also involved in collaboration with the Tucson Airport Authority on the
Puerto Nuevo project. The goal of the project is to develop a multidimensional distribution center
- an "inland port" - incorporating a truck hub, a bypass from 1-19 to I-10 allowing for an efficient
link to the CanaMex Corridor, a rail-truck transfer program, and enhanced air cargo facility all
centered at or near the Tucson International Airport property.
The need to invest in improved regional transportation infrastructure is gaining increased
attention. In 2000, one of Tucson's largest companies, Alpha Graphics a printing and publishing
company, decided to move its headquarters to Salt Lake City. The CEO of Alpha Graphics cited
the Salt Lake City's air transportation access as an important relocation decision variable [147].
In 2001, a report released by the University of Arizona's Office of Economic Development
showed that although the trade value of exports between Arizona and Mexico had climbed 65%
between 1995 and 1999, the Arizona's share of overall U.S. - Mexico trade declined from 5.5%
to 3.9% in the same period. Because the two states have had better, and longer, transborder
relations than other southwestern states giving a competitive advantage over other U.S. regions,
the report analyzed other potential factors which could cause the decline in overall trade share.
The study associated some of the decline with Tucson's inadequate air, rail, and highway links
given long distances between the city and Mexico's industrial centers [148].
5.3.2 Regional Transportation Planning
In 1970, the Pima Association of Governments (PAG) was designated the MPO for the Tucson
Metropolitan Area. The regional council is composed of one elected official from each Tucson
municipality and a representative from the Arizona State Transportation Board governs the PAG.
In 1988, PAG formed a citizen's committee to act as a review body for the development of its
long-range transportation plan, the TIP, and the Regional Aviation Systems Plan.
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The current RTP was adopted in 2001 and is built around four overarching policies: (1) mobility
and accessibility, (2) environment and community, (3) financial feasibility, and (4) public
support. Economic development is not explicitly mentioned as a desired outcome of the plan.
Under the second policy, environment and community, the plan describes its goal to "assure that
transportation investments provide a beneficial impact on the region's economic vitality [149]."
The RTP states that the economic impacts of transportation decisions are typically considered
during project evaluation. The economic impact analysis of projects includes an assessment of
the project costs and economic benefits to the transportation system users, and the assessment of
the cost-effectiveness of individual transportation projects. Although the economic impact
analysis provides no measure of the economic development impacts as defined within the context
of this research, PAG commits as part of it future initiatives broadening the scope of analysis of
economic impacts in subsequent RTPs.
Only one of the initiatives promoted by the Tucson economic development organizations was
recognized in the 2001 RTP: the 1-19 to 1-10 Bypass, an improvement to the CanaMex Corridor.
This project was included under the funded projects as an initiative to be further studied for
potential inclusion in the 2004 update.
5.3.3 Regional Summary
The Tucson region has undertaken a nationally recognized cluster-development initiative in
support of its one "working" cluster - Optics - and its four other "potential" clusters. The
regional initiative is part of a broader state-wide cluster-development policy. Regional economic
development organizations recognize the general role transportation infrastructure plays for its
clusters, but do not promote cluster-specific infrastructure needs. Most of the focus is devoted to
improving transborder linkages with Canada and Mexico. Despite the well-publicized and
organized cluster initiative, cluster-based economic development is not specifically mentioned in
the RTP. Furthermore, only one of the transportation-related initiatives promoted by the local
economic development organizations was recognized by the plan, and only as the subject of a
proposed study, rather than actual infrastructure investment.
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5.4 The Transportation Cornerstone Project, Florida
Project Backqround
While technically a statewide initiative, rather than a regional strategic plan, the Florida
Transportation Cornerstone Project conducted in 1999 warrants a brief mention as it is the best
example to date of a systematic attempt to assess specific transportation infrastructure needs of
industry clusters. While the identification of the three state industry clusters evaluated was based
on a rather qualitative approach, the project provides a useful framework to approach the
evaluation of industry cluster transportation needs.
The ambitious goal of the project was to assess linkages between transportation infrastructure,
business logistics, and economic competitiveness in Florida's key industry clusters; and to define
the critical factors necessary of a statewide transportation infrastructure investment strategy. The
project methodology included personal interviews with business professionals at more than 30
businesses within the three chosen industry clusters: trade and distribution clusters, high-
technology clusters, and the tourism cluster. The cluster-by-cluster analysis used the following
framework: (1) analyze and evaluate the economic and logistic trends impacting the cluster; (2)
identify the specific transportation requirements critical to the competitive advantage sought by
the cluster; (3) characterize and categorize the current transportation deficiencies experienced by
the industry cluster; and (4) present several case studies per industry cluster illustrating the
relative importance of the transportation network on its competitive situation and the impact of
any transportation infrastructure deficiencies. Based on the assessment, the project made the
following interesting recommendations:
. Establish a "Trade and Economic Corridors" program for coordinated planning, design, and
construction of corridors of statewide significance to promote economic development and
international or inter-regional trade
. Clearly and consistently link transportation planning with economic development activities at
the state and local levels by (1) adding explicit economic development goals in to state and
metropolitan long-range transportation plans; and (2) the State DOT and regional MPOs
should include economic development impacts as part of their criteria for setting priorities
among projects
. Increase business involvement in transportation planning activities
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. Elevate the importance of freight mobility in state and metropolitan transportation planning
. Create a "fast-track" for projects with high economic impact
5.5 Case Studies' Lessons Learned
Based on the prior discussion regarding the regional cluster studies and transportation planning
efforts, the findings from the four case studies can be summarized as below in Table 5-3:
Cluster-Study Findings RTP/STP
Cluster-Specific General MPO Cluster-
Transportation Transportation Involved Development
Cluster Study Lead Needs Needs in Cluster Recognized in
Region/State Organization Identified? Identified? Study? RTP or STP?
Public-Private Partnered
SF Bay Area Economic Development X X
Organizations
Twin Cities MPO X X X
Tucson City of Tucson X X
Florida Florida Chamber of Commerce X X
Table 5-3: Summary of Case Study Findings
The review of the four case studies provides the following nine observations:
1. In general, the link between economic development and transportation planning is limited or
absent in regional plans. MPO-developed Regional Transportation Plans offer general goals
for economic-based considerations, but do not define measurable performance objectives, or
recognize cluster-based economic development initiatives.
2. Silicon Valley, the Twin Cities, and Tucson each have nationally recognized examples of
strong cluster-based development initiatives, reflecting five to fifteen years worth of policy.
However, the transportation policy regarding economic development lags behind.
3. In Florida's case, and most likely representative of other initiatives conducted at a statewide
level, there is a disconnect in the geographic scope of the planning: identified clusters operate
on a regional, national, and international scale, while transportation planning occurs at a
decentralized level driven by individual MPOs.
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4. The Bay Area's cluster-based economic development organizations play a very active role in
assessing the region's transportation network, and are institutionally linked to the MPO, yet
the RTP does not reflect the economic development organizations' stated transportation
priorities.
5. Cluster-specific transportation needs are rarely identified. Common to all cluster studies was
the identification of more general transportation needs applicable across all clusters.
6. A MPO-led cluster study does not guarantee that the MPO's RTP will be tied to cluster-based
development as was demonstrated in the Twin Cities case.
7. In the cluster studies, transportation needs focused on the complete trip, crossing multiple
modes; while the RTPs tended to focus on modal-specific corridors.
8. Project prioritization for inclusion in regional transportation plans generally reflect "home-to-
work" travel issues such as travel time, delays, safety, and mobility; rather than "goods-to-
market" issues such as freight mobility and economic development.
9. Gaps in the scale of planning timeframes prevent immediate cluster needs from being
addressed in the timely manner needed to gain or maintain competitive advantage. Industry
clusters and economic development agencies often conceive of long-term planning as a three
to five year cycle. Long-term transportation planning operates on a three year cycle but with a
twenty-year planning horizon. Short-term transportation planning occurs annually, but uses
the twenty-year plan as the guiding document.
This chapter has reviewed four regions within the United States, assessing their cluster-based
economic development policies and their linkages to the regional transportation plans. Having
now introduced the theoretical background to regional competitive advantage as well as examples
of its practical application, the next chapter turns to extending the ReS/SITE framework in order
to consider strategic transportation planning within the regional competitive advantage context.
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Chapter 6. Extending the ReS/SITE Framework
The Regional Strategies for Sustainable Intermodal Transportation Enterprise (ReS/SITE)
program at MIT identified eight broad shortcomings in conventional transportation planning.
Research conducted by Muhoz (1998), Pendleton (1998), Conklin (1999), and Makler (2000)
have considered many of these insufficiencies. Recently, in their assessment of the five-year
program, Sussman and Conklin (2001) recommend that future work focus on expanding the
ReS/SITE framework to incorporate regional economic development [150]. The goal of this
chapter is to respond to the need to more adequately address economic development within
transportation planning and assess the significance of transportation investment in developing and
sustaining regional competitive advantage. The first task of this chapter is to describe a cluster
initiative architecture, capturing the important economic development-related institutions and
related strategic plans. The second task is to develop a cluster needs assessment framework
which can assist planning organizations in their evaluation and prioritization of transportation
infrastructure investment with respect to regional competitive advantage. The third task of the
chapter is to make the adjustments to Makler's Comprehensive Regional Architecture, described
in Chapter 4, needed to incorporate economic development initiatives in addition to service and
planning activities. The final task is to re-evaluate the ReS/SITE planning framework, reflecting
the revised Regional Architecture and integrating the important elements for developing and
sustaining a regional competitive advantage.
6.1 Economic Development, Competitive Advantage, and Clusters:
Revisited
As regional transportation planning has evolved, the recognition of the importance of economic
development considerations has grown, culminating with TEA-21's charge that transportation
investment decisions support metropolitan economic vitality. However, a clear link between
economic development and transportation planning remains limited or absent in most regional
plans. Chapter 5 presented case studies which demonstrated that even in regions with innovative
economic development planning, such as the San Francisco Bay Area, regional transportation
plans offer only general economic development goals, without offering measurable objectives or
active involvement from the business community.
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This thesis has made the argument that economic development requires enhancing regional
productivity. The result of economic development is a change in the structure of the regional
economy reflected in innovations within its institutions' and firms behavior and technology. A
region is said to gain a competitive advantage if it is able to sustain a growth in productivity.
Regions able to gain competitive advantage exhibit an environment which promotes
geographically-concentrated clusters of competitive industries. To address economic
development within transportation planning, it follows that it be beneficial to consider
transportation services and planning in the context of clusters. The next section will develop the
regional architecture representation of an economic development cluster initiative, illustrating the
important institutional and policy relationships to transportation planning.
6.2 Defining the Cluster Initiative Architecture
The Cluster Initiative framework was presented in 2.5.3 as a four step process. Figure 6-1
transforms the process, focusing on both the institutions and output important to a typical cluster.
CI ARCHITECTURE - - - - - - - - - - - - - -...
REGIONAL W INFRASTRUCTURE
INDUSTRIES PROVIDERS
INDUSTRY INFRASTRUCTURE
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Figure 6-1: The Cluster Initiative Architecture
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Economic Institution Representatives
The critical first step of any analysis of a region's clusters is the assembly of all key stakeholders
relevant to the economic development effort to be undertaken. Figure 2-8 gave a complete list of
the stakeholders, but from the transportation planning perspective, it is essential that the regional
MPO and transportation service and infrastructure providers participate in the early stages of the
cluster effort. Communication and institutional linkages will be established with the economic
development organizations in these initial stages. The MPO and other transportation institutions
may eventually find themselves in several roles throughout the process.
The organizations may participate in an informational role, providing data on transportation
trends as well as information and data specific to transportation projects within its existing
regional transportation plans. A specialist role may be played if the transportation organizations
provide expertise and specialized analysis to one or more of the economic input or output
representatives. For example, MnDOT has a staff of five specialists, each dedicated to one of the
five primary clusters which were identified for the Twin Cities. Efforts by the specialists include
reviewing regulations and proposed projects which specifically impact an industry, keeping
industries informed about regional and state transportation policies and programs, and focusing
on specific infrastructure requirements by particular industries. The transportation organization
might serve in a broker role, helping match industries with freight solutions to meet their needs
through an MPO Freight Advisory Council or Airport Commission; or by promoting local
policies which address job accessibility through specialized transportation solutions. Non-
transportation organizations will also fill the specialist, informational, and broker roles, as well as
the additional roles of organizer or networker. An institution acting in the organizer role could
take responsibility for incubating an industry cluster until it reaches a critical mass at which time
the organization leaves it to the cluster firms to further organize themselves. Universities often
play this role whether intentionally planned or not, such as Stanford University in the early
development of Silicon Valley, and the University of Arizona with the optics cluster in Tucson.
Transportation organizations typically do not have the ability to fulfill this role, except perhaps if
the industry cluster is specifically transportation, such as a freight and logistics cluster consisting
of specialized port facilities and intermodal infrastructure or services. The networker role assists
industries through organizing industry associations or informal networking through referral lists,
a role that is again unlikely to be played by a transportation planning organization unless it has
specific economic development responsibilities.
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Cluster Initiative Leadership Structure
Once the economic input and output institutions have been mobilized, the first plan to emerge is
the cluster initiative leadership structure. Most initiatives fail early in the process because efforts
are led by economic input intermediaries only, and while these organizations may have the ability
to sponsor or communicate cluster initiative efforts, they do not have the capacity or authority to
implement the actual work of the cluster development process. Though MPOs play a central role
in transportation planning efforts, they are not in a position to lead the cluster initiative, recalling
that only 33% of MPOs cited have economic development responsibilities. The leadership
configurations which emerge from the mobilization plan should fall under similar organizational
structures as described by Conklin (1999).
The integrated leadership structure consists of an existing organization which has responsibility
for all aspects of leading and implementing the cluster initiative. Cluster identification,
assessment, and implementation are governed from within a single organization, without the need
to create new departments within the organization. In the United States, no organization currently
exists which could fulfill this requirement as there are no observable examples of institutions with
fully-independent regional governance and overarching regional authority. The semi-integrated
structure is similar to integrated structure, except the responsibilities for economic development
and cluster initiatives may be handled by new departments created for some aspects of the effort
while other functions are shared by existing services. A metropolitan-wide planning organization
with responsibilities for both economic and other development aspects may be in a position to
create an internal group dedicated to the cluster initiative with assessment and implementation
functions shared by existing internal departments. An umbrella structure may be constructed such
that a new regional organization is created to oversee and coordinate the cluster initiative among
the economic representatives at the regional level. This structure may lack the authority found in
the integrated or semi-integrated structures, but is a more realistic solution for most regions. The
final leadership structure to emerge is the distinct structure, in which no new organization is
created to oversee the effort, while the initiative is coordinated loosely by existing economic
input or output representatives, most likely one of the intermediaries. Many current leadership
efforts fall under this last category, and as was cited in Table 4-4, are often ineffective as it is
found that 50% of all regional economic development efforts have either ad-hoc or no
coordination. We expect institutional linkages, important in regional architectures, will evolve
within the boundaries established in the initiative leadership structure.
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Regional Cluster Inventory
The outcome of the diagnosis process of a cluster initiative is a detailed inventory of the region's
emerging and established clusters. The process of cluster identification was described in Chapter
2; however the typical inventory created is composed of clusters simply identified by high-level
aggregated SIC classifications. The only meaningful way in which to address specific
transportation needs for an industry cluster is through an inventory which identifies clusters in a
more definitive and specialized manner. At the aggregate SIC classification, it is fair to say that
almost any cluster will have general needs for freight and passenger transportation infrastructure.
This generalized observation provides almost no meaningful information from which a
transportation planning organization can assess and prioritize specific transportation plans and
services from a regional competitive advantage perspective. Drawn from the survey of cluster
literature and the four cases studies addressed in Chapter 5, Table 6-1 compiles eleven commonly
identified SIC aggregate clusters. Also included in the table are cluster types that go one step
further than the SIC code in providing a more specific evaluation context for transportation
investment.
Typical Aggregate Description More Precise Cluster Type Examples
High-Tech Business/Financial Software, Networking Hardware, E-Commerce
Multimedia Publishing, Motion Picture Industry, or Advertising
Telecommunications Telemarketing or Inbound Reservations Call Centers
Banking and Financial Services Mutual Funds, Insurance, Venture Capital, Credit Card Processing
Business Services Hospital Management or Real Estate Development
Biosciences Biotechnology, Environmental Technology, Medical Devices
Optics X-ray/Laser Devices, Diodes
Manufacturing Computer Assembly, Furniture, Jewelry, Marine Equipment,Automobile, Consumer Appliances, or Consumer Electronics
Tourism Outdoor Recreation, Amusement Parks, or Casinos
Aerospace/Defense Aircraft Design/Assembly, Space, Military Base
Agriculture Wineries, Livestock
Table 6-1: Aggregate Versus More Precise Cluster Types
The basic argument is that the more precise the cluster identification, the more specialized the
transportation infrastructure can be in order to support the cluster firms. Additionally, many
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initiatives create an inventory with so many clusters that the initiative will suffer from a lack of
focus on those clusters actually critical to the region's competitive advantage. It is important to
note that all four case studies presented in Chapter 5 defined their regional clusters at the highly
aggregated level similar to what was presented in Table 6-1.
Cluster Needs Assessment
For transportation planning, the most important outcome of the collaborative strategy phase is a
detailed needs assessment for the regional clusters, containing both specialized requirements for
individual clusters and cross-cutting initiatives which address shared needs across the region. In
seeking to incorporate regional competitive advantage into the planning process, transportation
organizations should focus principally on the needs identified in the assessment. Infrastructure
and service investment can be prioritized and ranked according to the degree to which they fulfill
the competitive needs of the critical regional clusters. Regional transportation strategic options
can be evaluated by the multicriteria analysis proposed by Mufioz (1998) and Conklin (1999),
assessing the degree to which different strategies address feasibility, effectiveness, and
competitive advantage criteria. Focusing on the specific cluster needs provides transportation
planners the opportunity to move from using generic economic development goals to specific
performance measures related to the degree to which transportation investment is impacting a
region's competitive advantage. Section 6.3 proposes a high-level theoretical framework with the
potential to assist transportation planning organizations both assess the transportation needs of a
given inventory of clusters, and evaluate the degree to which a transportation strategy meets the
competitive needs of the region.
Implementation Plans
Once the needs have been assessed and a region-wide economic development strategy developed,
the implementation of the initiative requires that the cluster needs be integrated within the
regional transportation planning process. Three routinely prepared transportation plans are of
most relevance for this endeavor: the Regional Transportation Plan (RTP), the Regional
Transportation Blueprint (RTB), and the Regional Aviation System Plan (RASP). The RTP
captures funded regional transportation projects over a long-term planning horizon. Under
ISTEA, the RTP was required to exclude any project that was not fully funded. Because the RTP
and cluster initiative processes occur over different planning cycles and time horizons, it is
important the cluster-related transportation investments be captured elsewhere within the
planning architecture. In this case, a RTB is used by some regions to capture major transportation
projects and programs championed by regional stakeholders but not included in the budget-
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constrained RTP. The RTB weaves into a single blueprint funded and unfunded projects,
allowing for a strategic approach to transportation planning to be maintained despite fiscal
uncertainty. A new initiative under TEA-21 known as "Illustrative Projects" permits the
inclusion of certain unfunded transportation projects into the otherwise financially constrained
RTP. The list of illustrative projects within the RTP is composed of projects which represent
placeholders for priority future investment if additional resources beyond those identified in the
RTP financial plan become available [151]. With this TEA-21 initiative , the RTP and RTB now
overlap to a certain extent.
The final important plan to consider in the implementation stage is the RASP. Within clusters,
factors such as face-to-face communication, economic linkages, and JIT play significant roles in
sustaining competitive advantage. Airports often provide important passenger and freight
transportation infrastructure in support of these factors. Under ISTEA and TEA-21, only airport
access was required to be addressed as part of the transportation plans required at the regional
level. The RASP planning document provides a broader scope of regional aviation issues beyond
simply airport access, including concerns such as capacity, delay, integration of regional airports
within a single system, and air cargo concerns. While not critical in all cluster development
initiatives, airport issues often play an important role in the competitive advantage of certain
regional clusters. These specific needs must be incorporated within any planning process striving
to fully incorporate economic development objectives.
Transportation investment projects addressing regional cluster needs will likely be represented to
some degree in each of the three plans mentioned above, as no single plan provides complete
modal and project coverage. Figure 6-2 illustrates the relationships between the ISTEA family of
plans and economic development related transportation plans.
- REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN - - -
Regional Aviation
- System Ran
Statew ide Regional -
Transportation Plan . Transportation Ran Regional Transportation
Blueprint
State Transportation Transportation
Improvement Program Improvement Program
FAMLY OF ISTEA PLANS
Adapted from: Makler, 2000
Figure 6-2: Relationship Among Transportation Plans Relevant for Economic Development
153
To summarize Figure 6-2, the long-term STP guides each RTP, while the TIP carries out the
short-term objectives of the RTP. The STLP represent a compilation of each regional TIP,
analogously implementing the goals of the STP, creating the transportation planning cycle [152].
The RASP and RTP overlap through TEA-21's illustrative project category, while the RTB and
RTP share airport access agendas.
6.3 Cluster-Specific Transportation Needs Assessment Framework
Porter makes it clear that for a factor input, such as transportation infrastructure, to contribute to
sustaining competitive advantage, it should be tailored to the cluster's needs. Additionally,
different clusters, even in the same region, may have very different characteristics and therefore
different transportation needs. It is clear that a single-solution, or "one-size fits all" approach to
incorporating competitive advantage within strategic transportation planning will not be
sufficient. Figure 6-3, on the following page, introduces a systematic approach by which a
transportation planning organization can assess the specialized needs of an individual cluster, and
the framework is drawn from a synthesis of the material presented in the first four chapters of the
thesis, though is expected to be applied more specifically within the transportation context.
Step 1: Identify the Precise Cluster Type
The case was made in Section 6.2 that a precise cluster type must be the starting point for any
informed cluster discussion. For a cluster as broad as, for example, "Banking and Financial
Services," it would be difficult, if not impossible to investigate or implement specialized
transportation infrastructure solutions for such a generalized description. Similarly, if the
Banking and Financial Services cluster is broken into multiple sub-clusters such as Mutual Funds,
Insurance, and Venture Capital, a general solution applied to all three sub-clusters still may not
provide for the targeted improvements required to sustain competitive advantage. For example, a
venture capital cluster will likely rely more heavily on face-to-face communications versus a
more data-intensive insurance cluster which may rely more on telecommunications infrastructure.
The more precisely a cluster can be identified, the more specialized the transportation
infrastructure or service investment. The more specialized the transportation infrastructure and
services, the more scarce a resource they represent, and in turn, the more difficult for competing
regions to replicate.
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Step 2: Identify Cluster Development Staqe
Once a precise cluster has been identified and targeted, knowledge of the state of development for
a particular cluster is extremely useful in determining where to focus on the details of competitive
advantage improvements. The state of development does not refer to the age of the cluster, but
the strength of the dynamics occurring between cluster components and the degree to which they
are self-reinforcing. For working clusters, strategic transportation planning emphasis should be
placed on sustaining the competitive advantages currently being enjoyed. Strategies may need to
focus outward on improving penetration of export markets, or inward on preventing constraints
on future productivity growth such as localized congestion or accessibility to a skilled labor
markets. For latent clusters, strategic transportation planning emphasis should be placed on
growing the internal dynamics of the cluster so that it reaches the working stage. Strategies may
need to focus on improving linkages between the economic infrastructure of the cluster, for
example, the network between cluster suppliers and export producers, or providing infrastructure
and services which facilitate face-to-face communication necessary for competitive or
cooperative innovation. For potential clusters, focus shifts to strategic options which can
stimulate the formation of a latent, and eventually a working cluster. General efforts may be
focused on more the traditional external economies in which reduced transportation costs assist in
encouraging geographic concentration of interrelated industries. Specific efforts will depend on
the formation strategy chosen in the cluster initiative, as described in Step 3b.
The most important distinction is between the working/latent clusters classification and the
potential cluster classification. This distinction determines whether the strategic transportation
plan will focus on specialized investments or general strategies to provide the opportunity for a
cluster to develop over time. In other words, the intensity with which transportation planning
organizations incorporate competitive advantage within their strategic plans will depend on the
stage of the regional clusters. A working cluster is currently providing a region with a
competitive advantage and the corresponding economic development benefits. Priority should be
given to sustaining the working cluster over any other cluster type. Because of the dynamic
nature of cluster growth, there are no guarantees latent clusters will ultimately progress to a fully
working cluster. Accordingly, efforts directed at latent clusters should usually be given lower
priority than working cluster initiatives. Decision-makers may chose to disregard potential
clusters altogether, especially in light of the resource-constrained transportation planning
environment. A region without any working or latent clusters may choose to dedicate its
economic development efforts toward encouraging pre-selected industries to develop or relocate
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to the region, otherwise, specialized investment considerations for potential clusters are a low
priority, relying instead on market forces to foster geographic agglomeration of related industries.
Step 3a: Identify Cluster Dimensions
For a working or latent cluster, the next step is to characterize the cluster into relevant dimensions
or defining characteristics. The dimensions of a cluster provide a deeper understanding of the
cluster and offer the opportunity for framing the decision-making as to the most appropriate types
of transportation investment, further assisting in the development of specialized strategies. The
important dimensions within the transportation context are described below.
Geographic Scope refers to the extent to which the cluster firms, suppliers, skilled workforce, and
economic infrastructure are distributed within the region. Localized clusters are tight groupings
in a small geographic area, perhaps in a municipality. Focusing on only a segment of an overall
travel corridor might be more appropriate in the transportation planning context. Alternately,
dispersed clusters are widely spread across the region, and may call for transportation corridor or
system-wide transportation network investments.
Density refers to the quantity and economic size of the cluster. A sparse cluster may be
composed of a relatively few number firms or firms which overall contribute a proportionally
small share of economic wealth to the region. An intensely dense cluster may be populated with
hundreds of firms with economic impact, measured in total annual sales, reaching in the hundreds
of millions of dollars or more. The fewer the firms, the greater the likelihood that the required
transportation investment will occur on a smaller scale.
High-Activity clusters exist when many of the critical activities of the clusters are performed
locally, including research and development, financing, manufacturing, and marketing. Low-
Activity clusters involve only one or a few critical activities for a given cluster located within the
region, the remaining activities either being dispersed or outsourced to other regions. The degree
of activity will determine the relative importance of specialized inter-regional transportation links
versus intra-regional transportation links for low- and high-activity clusters respectively.
Industrial Organization refers to the organizational structure among firms in the cluster, with the
idea of (1) a core implying that some firms have the ability to influence the existence of other
firms within the cluster, and (2) a ring implies that the existence of any given firm is not strictly
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determined by decisions made by another firm. An example of a an "all-ring" cluster is the
Silicon Valley semiconductor industry in which there was no systematic lead firm within the
cluster, and no established hierarchy of power. An "all-core" cluster represents a vertically
integrated firm in which the "suppliers" and much of the economic infrastructure is self-contained
within a single organization, though not necessarily within a geographically centralized area. This
structure, in pure form, is exceedingly rare. A third option is a "core-ring" combination in which
one firm (the core) is the leader and has dominant influence over the suppliers and subcontractors
(the ring), with the ability to unilaterally reshape the nature of the ring. The aircraft
manufacturing cluster in Seattle, dominated by Boeing, exhibits this type of industrial
organization. The implication for strategic transportation planning is the type of public-private
institutional partnerships established during the economic development initiative. An all-core or
core-ring cluster may see a single lead firm partnering with the transportation planning and
service organizations in the strategic planning process. Transportation strategies have the
potential to be more specialized as location and other decisions by the core firm can be
coordinated with the transportation investments. On the other hand, an all-ring cluster may
necessitate that a partnership be made with a trade association or chamber of commerce rather
than specific firms.
Coordinating Mechanism refers to the way in which inter-firm relationships are managed within
the cluster. A cluster with relationships occurring in a very fluid nature either from one-time or
short-term coalitions will benefit less from specialized transportation investment and instead
profit from more general investments which improve overall accessibility. Clusters which rely on
well-established hierarchies or long-term relationships within the region can gain more benefit
from specialized fixed infrastructure with less risk that a less flexible investment will be
underutilized in the future.
Step 3b: Formation Strategies
There are several strategies a region can undertake to develop potential clusters. The
transportation infrastructure investments should be consistent with the development strategy.
Knowledge of whether or not the industries are being actively recruited from outside the region,
or if the removal of local regional constraints is in fact the policy, will influence the priority of
different infrastructure investments.
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Homegrown strategies, also known as organic strategies, focus on removing regional
infrastructure and regulatory constraints which impede the ability of local firms to develop or
improve informational flows and institutional interactions. Most of the efforts are focused on
development based on firms already present in the region. The advantage to this strategy is that it
is built upon unique features of the regional environment and can create distinct, difficult to
replicate advantages. However, there must be a strong economic base on which to build. From
the transportation planning perspective, efforts can be directed at improving the efficiency of
existing infrastructure and services.
Transplant strategies attempt to build clusters by attracting outside firms or suppliers who may fit
in particularly well with the regional economic environment. In turn, strategic transportation
plans will focus on new specialized infrastructure, rather than existing infrastructure as in the
homegrown strategy, serving instead as a means to provide an interconnected network attractive
to expanding or relocating firms outside of the region. This strategy has the similar appearance to
the 1970s economic development strategy of recruiting manufacturing industries to the region.
While these attempts often degenerated into destructive bidding competitions between regions,
the cluster perspective targets firms which would have integration potential within the region's
existing network of suppliers, and focuses on value-added activities such as research and
development and regional headquarters, rather than manufacturing alone.
Hybrid strategies are simply some combination of the homegrown and transplant approaches.
The strategy involves initial efforts to attract outside industry investment before becoming more
engaged in developing dynamics within the regional economic base. Improvements to the
existing infrastructure as well as additional investment in new facilities might be required. The
hybrid approach requires a well-defined and strong leadership structure within the cluster
initiative as the strategy might result in confusion or competition between policies to attract
outside firms and policies to develop local industry.
The first three steps of the needs assessment framework are contained within the cluster initiative
process. Identification of the clusters, subsequent prioritization of targeted clusters, and
characterization of cluster development stages and dimensions require the involvement of the
cluster initiative stakeholders within the mobilization and diagnosis stages of the initiative. To
evaluate and prioritize transportation strategic options with consideration for regional economic
development goals, the transportation planning process will require this information, but does not
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have the institutional capacity to unilaterally undertake such an endeavor. Consequently, the
overarching relationship between regional economic development and regional transportation
planning is established. The competitive advantage framework, as implemented through a cluster
initiative, will result in list of targeted clusters from which the transportation planning process
will assess transportation investments for sustaining competitive advantage and take
responsibility for incorporating the identified investments within the region's transportation
plans. The transportation planning process resides within the economic development process and
can only address the significance of infrastructure and service investment within a competitive
advantage context if the economic development process is underway and the processes are
institutionally linked to each other.
Step 4: Identify Cluster Specific Transportation Needs
The type, stage, and classification of a cluster from the first three steps provide a means to
segment and target the specialized transportation needs which will contribute specifically to
growing or sustaining the cluster's competitive advantage. Consider the following two
descriptions regarding a hypothetical regional cluster.
Description 1: A Biosciences cluster employing 4% of the regional workforce compared to a
national employment share of 3%. The cluster contains 30 inter-related firms,
one dedicated regional industry association, and is experiencing job growth of
3.5% annually.
Description 2: A Cardiovascular Medical Device working cluster characterized as localized,
sparse, and low-activity, with an all-ring and long-term relationship structure.
The first description is simplified, but similar to those commonly found in a cluster identification
study. Although the concentration and economic growth aspects of the cluster have been
quantified, the description provides little meaningful information from which to begin the
evaluation or prioritization of a transportation investment or strategic plan. The second
description implies that a targeted rather than transportation corridor level investment may be in
order due to its localized nature. The efficiency of interregional links such as airports or freight
distribution centers could be investigated as the cluster has low internal activity, with many
critical activities occurring outside the region. At the same time, the sparseness of the cluster
might imply a smaller scale investment will be needed overall. The all-ring, long-term
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relationship structure of the cluster industries further implies that a general cluster-wide, rather
than firm specific, strategy could be in order.
Because of the large variety of cluster types, further differentiated by economic and
environmental conditions unique to each region, cataloging specialized transportation needs by
multiple cluster types is beyond the scope of this research. For the purposes of this high-level
framework, the assumption is made that institutional linkages, or the economic development
architecture, between transportation and other economic development representatives will have
been established within a cluster initiative. Through these linkages, specialized transportation
needs may either be directly communicated to the transportation planning organizations, or the
cluster characterizations can be adequately communicated for analysis by transportation planning
and service providers.
While specialized transportation requirements will vary by cluster type, stage, and dimension,
Chapter 2 presented a relatively few broad categories of investment which have the ability to
sustain or grow competitive advantage dynamics. The needs assessment framework presented in
Figure 6-3 proposes five broad areas which capture the intersecting circumstances of potential
cluster-competitive needs and the ability of transportation investment to impact. These five areas
include: (1) enhancing the innovative capacity of the cluster; (2) providing the ability for
improved efficiency and scale of supplier networks; (3) improving the accessibility to, or mobility
of, a cluster's specialized workforce; (4) improving the linkages to other important economic
infrastructure such as research and financial institutions; and (5) freight and shipping issues as
related to transportation costs, access to home demand markets, and export markets. A more
detailed description of each broad area can be found in Sections 2.6 and 3.6.
Step 5: Multicriteria Evaluation of Transportation Investments
Once specialized transportation investments have been identified for each cluster type, the
evaluation of planning options can be made in two different contexts: (1) cluster-level evaluation
of specific transportation investments as they relate to individual clusters; and (2) strategic
evaluation of regional transportation plans incorporating multiple transportation investments and
a region's overall inventory of clusters. The suggested evaluation procedure follows the spirit of
the ReS/SITE methodology in that it employs a multicriteria analysis, as outlined by both Mufioz
and Conklin.
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The evaluation at the cluster level begins by determining the relative importance of the broad
transportation needs as they relate to the cluster's competitive advantage. In the theoretical
example presented in Table 6-2, a score (I) of 1 to 5 is assigned to each competitive advantage
need, with a 1 indicating a low level of importance to the cluster. The measure of importance
should be an outcome of the needs assessment step of the cluster initiative. Next, the
performance (PN) of a proposed transportation investment is scored on its ability to meet the
specialized competitive advantage need. The investment's performance scores are summed
across all transportation needs after first being multiplied by the importance factor, deriving an
overall score and ranking of options. In the hypothetical example below, the rapid transit
extension investment scored lowest in absolute score, but had the highest overall score due to its
ability to best meet the cluster's most important transportation-related competitive need.
REGIONAL CLUSTER (RCN) Airport capacity Rapid Transit Highway corridor
Expansion Extension Capacity Increase
Importance Weighted Weighted
Competitive Advantage to Cluster Performance Performance Performance Performance Performance Performance
Transportation Needs (1) (Pi) (*P1) (P2) (*P2) (P3) (*P3)
Innovation Capacity 3 4 12 3 9 3 9
Supplier Networks 2 2 4 1 2 2 4
Specialized Workforce Issues 5 1 5 4 20 2 10
Economic Infrastructure Linkages 1 3 3 2 2 2 2
Freight and Logistics 1 2 2 0 0 1 4 4
Weighted Performance (WP) 1 12 26 10 33 1 13 29
Table 6-2: Example of a Cluster-Level Transportation Investment Evaluation
The evaluation of investments at a regional level is a two-step process beginning with the
accounting for the stage of cluster development. Recall from the discussion on development
stages, that a resource-constrained transportation planning environment must prioritize cluster
investment to effectively allocate investments. Cluster-level evaluations can be aggregated
together by weighting the competitive advantage performance of the investment by the
development stage of the cluster, as shown in Table 6-3.
Airport Capacity Rapid Transit Highway Corridor
Expansion Extension Capacity Increase
Cluster
Development stage Weight WP, WP,SW WP2  WP2*SW WP, WP*SW
Regional Clusters Stage (Sw)
Region Cluster RC1 Working 5 26 130 33 165 29 145
Region Cluster RC2 Potential 1 19 19 25 25 39 39
Region Cluster RC3 Latent 3 35 105 12 36 20 60
Region Cluster RCN Working 5 14 70 7 35 13 65
Total Weighted Performance (TWP) 94 324 77 261 101 309
Table 6-3: Example of Transportation Investments Evaluation Across all Clusters
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In the example, a higher stage weight (SW) is given to working clusters over latent or potential
clusters due to their immediate impact on regional economic development. The investment's
weighted performance scores (WPN) for each individual cluster are summed across all
transportation needs after first being multiplied by the stage deriving an overall score for the
options. Each transportation investment has now been ranked by its ability to impact competitive
advantage on a regional scale. In the hypothetical example, expanding airport capacity is ranked
highest, even though its score without regards to stage development is only second best. In this
circumstance, the investment best meets the needs of the higher priority, working clusters and is
the most effective choice in addressing economic development.
In reality, regional transportation planning occurs in an environment where economic
development is just one of multiple criteria such as financial and environmental feasibility,
equity, and political issues. Additionally, a regional strategic planning framework considers a
family of investment options rather than individual investments. The final step in the evaluation
process at the regional level involves summing the competitive advantage total weighted
performance (TWP) of each transportation investment in the strategic plan and incorporating it
within the ReS/SITE Evaluation Framework as shown in Table 6-4.
Financial
Environmental
Equity
Competitive Advantage Cluster Needs (TWP of Plan) T \/\T I
Adapted from: Conklin, 1999
Table 6-4: Enhanced Structure of the ReS/SITE Evaluation Framework
The total scores are summed for each plan and the result is the ranking of overall regional
strategies. A decision-maker using this proposed evaluation tool has the ability to assess
strategies at the cluster level and the regional level, addressing competitive advantage in addition
to broader feasibility and effectiveness criteria. Strategies with the highest total score could first
be deployed by the decision-maker, followed by the next highest, until all strategies were
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Feasibility
Institutional
Individual Accessibility
Freight Mobility I I I _IEffectiveness
implemented or all resources expended [153]. The resulting plan typically reflects a long-range
infrastructure investment plan, which must also be complemented by a shorter-range systems
management and operational component incorporating the same economic development goals as
the strategic transportation plan.
6.4 Regional Architecture and Economic Development
Having completed the first two tasks of the chapter, we now turn our attention to making the
required adjustments to the notion of regional architecture in order to incorporate economic
development initiatives in addition to service and planning activities. Just as transportation
service and planning organizations are organized to produce an integrated series of plans,
economic development-oriented institutions need to coordinate their initiatives with the
implementing organizations. The concept of Regional Architectures should be further
differentiated to address the subset of institutions that focus on planning, services, and economic
development respectively. The purpose of this is to motivate the development of transportation
plans and services that are robust with respect to regional competitive advantage. Figure 6-4
expands Makler's Comprehensive Regional Architecture to include the Regional Economic
Development Architecture (REDA) sub-set. The Regional Strategic Transportation Plan (RSTP)
now include components which (1) address anticipated transportation investment needs based on
the set of possible regional outcomes captured in scenarios - the Regional Infrastructure, and (2)
address the set of relationships that describe how the service, planning, and economic
development institutions interact to provide an integrated set of transportation plans within a
region - the Comprehensive Regional Architecture (CRA).
rRSTP [------------------------------------------------------------------
Strategic Plans
Comprehensive Regional Architecture (CRA)
.. .......%I..............  ... ................. .........
Regional Se rvce \Regional Planning
Architecture (RSA) Architecture (RPA) Regional
Infrastructure
Regonal E conomic (I
Developmert Architecture (REA) - - - -
- F-g-r---4Ex-dd----P-sC--------/ITFr-----------------------------------
Figure 6-4: Expanded Strategic Plans Component of the ReS/SITE Framework
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The link between REDA and RI is very important. Unless consideration is made for economic
development policy, the RI strategic plans may not appropriately address the specialized
infrastructure necessary to develop or grow a region's competitive advantage. Three important
observations can be made regarding Figure 6-4 and the relationships that exist within the RSTP
component:
1. Similar to overlap between RPA and RSA, there may be substantial overlap between the
REDA and the RPA and RSA. As Makler points out, it would be incorrect to assume that the
presence of overlap assures provision of reliable and effective intuitional linkages. Recall
from Section 5.2 that the Twin Cities MPO, the Metropolitan Council, undertook
responsibility for a detailed cluster initiative in the mid-nineties, yet its regional
transportation plans do not frame economic development issues within the cluster context.
2. Makler also argues that the RI and RPA are not discrete and independent elements. The same
argument can be made with respect to the REDA and RI. Just as the extent to which the RI is
actually deployed is a function of the RPA's ability to develop and implement it, so to will
the RI deployment depend on the REDA's ability to identify and prioritize investments which
support competitive advantage, and integrate within the RPA and RSA elements.
3. The addition of the REDA now enables the Strategic Plans component of ReS/SITE to
incorporate planning responsibilities covering each of the three necessary conditions,
identified by Banister and Berechman in Section 3.3, required before economic development
can occur, as shown in Figure 6-5.
NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
1. Economic Conditions (REDA)o
1+3 1+2
NO investment thus 4NO supportive policies,
NO developm an ee ntilNO developm ent
Econom ~oDevelopment
2+3
Accessibility changes
bW NO development
Pb3 F litical, P licy & Institutional 2 n e t e t( I
Conditions (RPA, RSA, REDA) 2 netet(I
Figure 6-5: RSTP and the Three Necessary Conditions of Economic Development
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Planning related to regional economic conditions is contained within the REDA architecture,
while political, policy, and institutional conditions is jointly contained within the RPA, RSA, and
REDA architectures. Finally, the actual investment is contained within the RI. The presence of
planning responsibilities for the three necessary conditions within the RSTP does not assure that
economic development will occur within the region; however, the exclusion of one of the
components will result in, at best, limited economic impact. The ReS/SITE framework now
involves a more descriptive analysis of a strategic transportation decision-making process
incorporating the important elements of regional competitive advantage.
6.5 The Extended ReS/SITE Framework
The fourth and final task is to present the revised and extended ReS/SITE framework in complete
form. The final modification is minor, merely the addition of the overlapping Regional Economic
Development Architecture within the RSTP shown in Figure 6-6.
1 - 2 Years
5 - 8 Years
System Management and
Operations
Figure 6-6: The Extended ReS/SITE Framework
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Contained within the framework are other implicit links to regional economic development. The
ReS/SITE Scenario component permits multicriteria evaluation of alternatives to include regional
competitive advantage needs and potential outcomes. Cluster development scenarios, similar to
those addressed in Section 2.5.1, can be incorporated into a robust collection of potential futures
for a region. Cross-cutting and targeted actions to sustain or enhance cluster competitive
advantage are the outcomes of the collaborative strategy phase of a cluster initiative, and can be
incorporated within the Strategic Issues, Directions, and Options component of the framework.
The inclusion of REDA within the Strategic Plan component recognizes the need for institutional
and information relationships between transportation and economic development planning
stakeholders if economic issues are to be effectively incorporated within regional transportation
plans. Finally, within the System Management and Operations component, specific performance
measurements can be implemented evaluating the effectiveness of the investment to regional
competitive advantage, rather than general economic growth objectives.
6.6 Implications
Before summarizing the implications of the extended ReS/SITE framework, the remaining task is
to integrate the Cluster Initiative Architecture with the Regional Planning Architecture
established by Makler and was presented earlier in Figure 4-6. The intention is to now modify
Makler's RPA to reflect the addition of the economic development institution and planning
components. The placement of the cluster initiative is straightforward, with several institutions of
the RPA involved through their roles as economic input representatives and eventually the
potential implementation of cross-cutting cluster growth actions within regional transportation
plans. The RTP plan boundary has been slightly modified to reflect the fact that it overlaps with
both the RASP and the Transportation Blueprint, both important within the cluster context. The
resulting revised RPA is shown in Figure 6-7 incorporating both transportation planning and
economic development elements.
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Figure 6-7: The Revised Regional Planning Architecture
The central role of the MPO within the revised RPA remains, but with an important distinction.
Though the MPO might play an active role in the cluster initiative, it usually does not have the
institutional capacity to' lead the initiative. The cluster initiative, undertaken in order to support
the development of regional competitive advantage, effectively employs the Regional Planning
Architecture, meaning that the ReS/SITE framework is dependent on the pre-existence of a
cluster initiative if it is to effectively incorporate regional competitive advantage within its
components. This relationship makes sense given the prior arguments in this thesis.
Transportation investment alone cannot result in economic development as we have defined it
here, and is dependent on the interaction with other necessary conditions for the potential that
economic development occur. Having the competitive advantage theory reside wholly within the
ReS/SITE framework would violate this observation. The integration of the Cluster Initiative
Architecture with the CRA represents several other additions to the transportation planning
context: (1) it addresses a frequently cited shortcoming in current practice by including
institutional linkages between regional businesses and the transportation planning and service
organizations; (2) the evaluation of transportation infrastructure within the context of economic
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development has been linked with the theory of regional competitive advantage; and (3) the
transportation and economic development cycles are linked more closely together.
This discussion, which has focused on linking transportation investment to competitive
advantage, may give the impression of an over-importance of transportation to the competitive
advantage of a region. A critical look at the framework reveals several potential shortcomings:
1. Few examples of cluster initiatives actually exist which provide the level of detail
required by the framework to make an effective assessment of a cluster's specialized
transportation needs.
2. It is not immediately apparent which specialized transportation investments actually
support a specific type of cluster's competitive advantage.
3. A lack of empirical detailed cluster studies makes it difficult to evaluate the applicability
of the extended framework in practice.
4. The case studies presented in Chapter 5, except the state-wide Florida study, were
performed at the metropolitan level. More commonly, the cluster study is performed at
the state level which: (1) may not provide enough detail for an MPO to integrate cluster
needs within its region-level plans, or (2) may overlook clusters which cross state
boundaries but are still important when considered at a metropolitan level.
5. The framework does not specifically translate the economic development and cluster
specialized transportation needs to shorter-range operational and system management
plans, nor does the framework provide appropriate measures for evaluating these short-
range plans within the context of regional competitive advantage.
The preceding discussion has responded to Sussman and Conklin's call to more fully explore the
regional strategic planning framework within the context of regional competitive advantage and
economic development. This discussion has produced an extended ReS/SITE framework which
attempts to link economic development related-transportation investments to competitive
advantage theory. While progress has been made, empirical "proof' of the usefulness of this
construct remains. The thesis will conclude by assessing the New England region's
transportation and economic development planning environment within the context of this
extended framework.
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Chapter 7. Evaluating the New England Region
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the New England region of the United States within the
context of the extended ReS/SITE framework presented in Chapter 6. To accomplish this, the
first task is to assess the degree to which New England may in fact be regarded as an economic
region, the important scale unit for regional competitive advantage. The next task will be to
explore the economic development and transportation planning organizations which exist at a
regional scale, and the cross-cutting transportation issues affecting New England. The final task
will be to assess New England cluster initiatives and their integration with transportation planning
as suggested by the extended framework. It is hoped that regional transportation investment
decisions may be better evaluated as a result of this overview. The chapter concludes with a
critical assessment of the usefulness of the extended ReS/SITE framework.
7.1 The New England Region
The New England region is composed of the six states of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. Located in the furthermost northeast corner of the
United States, these states cover only 2% of the total area of the country, with approximately 13
million people, or 5% of the national population [154]. The region together is approximately the
size of one typical Midwestern state, and had the country been settled from West Coast to East
Coast, the region would likely have formed one single state, rather than six. The six states of
New England are linked by their history, sharing of multiple disadvantages of a poor natural
resource base (except for water), harsh climate, aging infrastructure, high energy costs, an aging
and slow-growing population, and a historical over-dependence on defense industries. Each also
shares in the advantages of a skilled workforce and a concentration of higher education
institutions.
Though generally recognized as a "region," it is somewhat unclear what specifically ties these six
states together beyond their proximity. In 1999, the New England Board of Higher Education
surveyed 1,000 New England opinion leaders, including academics, state legislators, public
policy think tanks, mayors, members of the media, community leaders, and business executives.
The New England opinion leaders were asked to characterize the qualities that define New
England as a region. Simultaneously, 1,000 randomly selected households within the region were
asked to undertake the same exercise. The results are summarized in Table 7-1:
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New England Opinion Leaders New England H
Characteristic Defining New Percent Characteristic Defining
England as a Region Responding New England as a Regi
History and Traditions 98% Geography and Climate
Education Institutions 96% Educational Institutions
Climate and Weather 93% Quality of Life
Geography 91% Economy
Technology-based Industry 78% Sports Teams
Political Culture 74%
Economy 68%
Adapted From: New England Higher Board of Education, 1999
Table 7-1: Characteristics Defining New England as a Region
ouseholds
Percent
on Responding
91%
90%
90%
80%
67%
Although the states share a history and geographic location, they do not necessarily constitute an
economic region, the important scale unit for competitive advantage analysis. New England
opinion leaders do not have a strong consensus that the economy binds the six separate political
jurisdictions into a single region. Indeed, more opinion leaders felt a subset of the regional
economies, technology-based industries, characterized New England as a region than did the
broader regional economy. Certainly, there are different implications for policy if New England
is simply a "high-tech" region versus an integrated "economic" region. Furthermore, there are
examples of artificiality to the regional boundaries. For instance, Connecticut as a whole, and
certainly Southeastern Connecticut, largely ignores the regional economic hub, Boston, relating
more intensely to the agglomeration around New York City.
Using Pendleton's (1998) framework for comparing economic regions to political jurisdictions
introduced in Section 2.1.1, we can gain some insight to the degree to which New England can be
regarded as an economic region. The geographic orientation of New England is contiguous, with
the six states coexisting within the same spatial area in the United States. Because this
characteristic is shared by both economic regions and political jurisdictions, it offers no additional
insight. The characteristics of the borders of New England are split between the two
classifications. By having borders distinctly geographically based and fixed over time, New
England is seen more as a combination of political jurisdictions. On the other hand, there is a
large degree of "economic spill" across borders such as, for example, the Boston economic
region's reach into both southern New Hampshire to the north and into Providence, Rhode Island
to the south. Economic activity varies greatly across the region, both internal to individual states
and the region as a whole, contrasting as an example, eastern Massachusetts and Boston with the
western area of the state which is primarily rural. Similarly, the economy paralleling the 1-95
corridor of Connecticut bares no resemblance to any portion of rural Maine. New England's
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relationship with other regions is interdependent. For instance, the low cost of doing business in
the U.S. "South" has had a negative impact on the higher cost region of New England in its
ability to retain and attract manufacturing industries. Finally, the large rural makeup of New
England provides comparatively little amount of economic activity, and if the region was truly
defined by its economy, large portions of each state would be excluded from the definition of
New England. Instead, these rural areas are integrated within the jurisdictions of the six states.
Table 7-2 illustrates that New England is neither specifically a distinct political jurisdiction nor a
distinct economic region. For the purposes of exploring the integration of competitive advantage
and regional transportation planning, we must assume that New England is more than a collection
of its political jurisdictions. However, to do so, we will first explore for several further aspects of
the region including the degree to which industries are shared between states, the make-up of its
workforce, and the degree of cooperation existing between the six states.
New England Characteristics Economic Region Political Jurisd
Geographic Orientation X X
Borders
Definition X
Clarity X
Variation over Time X
Relationship with Other Borders X
Internal Diversity X
Relationship with Similar Entities X
Integration of Rural Areas X
Table 7-2: New England: Economic Region or Collection of Political Jurisdictions?
iction
............................... I 
............................... .1, 
...........................................
............................................
New England Economic Sub-Regions
When looking at the region, observers often equate the New England economy with the economy
of Greater Boston, but the regional economy is obviously much more complex. For example,
only the health services industry is among the top 10 industries in each New England state, as
measured by an industry's contribution to gross state product and share of state employment
[155]. In reality, New England is composed of several economic sub-regions among which are:
1. The area encompassing Route 128 outside of Boston, the southern tier of New
Hampshire, and the 1-95 corridor to Providence, featuring one of the highest
concentrations of high-technology employment in the nation, as well as significant
biotechnology and financial services industries
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2. The Connecticut River Valley, including parts of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Hampshire, and Vermont featuring concentrations of traditional manufacturers, including
machine shops
3. Rural New England, including large parts of Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, and
Massachusetts feature concentrations of natural resource-related industries, including
tourism
4. Southern Connecticut characterized by concentrations of financial service industries and
linked very closely to New York City, outside the traditional boundaries of New England
5. Portions of Rhode Island and Connecticut sharing a significant manufacturing belt
Each of these sub-regions has different needs and concerns. Greater Boston and the southern tier
of New Hampshire may be more concerned with advanced education and training, as well as
preserving a high quality of life to attract and retain high-tech professionals, while rural New
England might focus on preserving its environmental character and promoting tourism. In each
case, analyzing state by state needs limits the ability to distinguish the true economic concerns of
distinct sub-regions within the region.
New Enqland Industries
In the past, New England tended to be more dependent on particular industries, rather than a
broad base of concentrated firms. Shipping, textiles, leather, and manufacturing industries
historically played a major role in the region's economy. The economic wealth created by these
industries funded construction of the now aging infrastructure of utility systems, railways, and
highways. As some key regional industries moved to the South and overseas, replacement
industries emerged such as fabricated metals and electronic components, giving way in the mid-
twentieth century to computers and defense-related manufacturing. More recently, the region has
undergone a significant change, shifting from manufacturing to service industries at a faster rate
than the national economy as a whole [156]. In 1997, manufacturing accounted for only 19% of
New England's employment, down from 30% in the 1970s [157]. The shift to service industries
such as business and financial services, biotechnology, legal services, and the like was fueled in
large part by the competitive strength of New England's higher education institutions. Many
service industries are now over represented in New England as measured by national employment
share, as summarized in Table 7-3.
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Industry
Investment offices
Security and Commodity Services
Pension, health, and welfare funds
Life Insurance
Colleges and Universities
Savings Institutions
Libraries
Museums and art galleries
Medical and health insurance
All New England Businesses
Source: Kolko, 1998.
1997 New England Share of1997 New England Share of
National Employment (%)
31.1
19.0
16.0
14.6
14.0
13.5
12.8
8.6
8.5
5.6
Table 7-3: New England Service Industry Concentration
While all New England businesses accounted for only a 5.6% share of the national employment,
several service industries exhibited much higher employment concentrations than average.
New England Population and Workforce
New England has long been recognized as having a well-educated, highly-skilled workforce.
However, a major threat to the regional economy is the slow to negative growth of this labor
force. The U.S. population expanded at a rate five-times that of New England between 1990 and
1998. For the same time period, the New England labor force averaged an annual increase of
zero percent [158]. Overall, the average state rank in population growth in the 1990s was in the
bottom third of the nation, with Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Maine among the four slowest
growing states in the nation. The population and workforce, although stagnant in growth, ranks
in the top third of the nation in productivity and income growth over the past twenty years, and
maintains the highest per-capita income of any U.S. region [159].
New England Regional Cooperation
The New England Board of Higher Education survey cited early in this section also polled New
England opinion leaders as to the most urgent issues facing their individual states. There was a
strong tendency towards consensus on regional priorities with, for example, "expanding the
skilled labor force" ranking as the first or second most urgent issue in each state, and
"infrastructure improvement" ranking in the top four policy issues in each New England state.
Furthermore, 86% of New England opinion leaders felt the region should work collaboratively
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toward regional goals, although importantly, only 26% of these same leaders had actually worked
on projects with government entities or organizations from other New England states [160].
Given shared regional priorities as well as the common disadvantages cited earlier, cooperation
between the New England states would appear to be more common that it actually is. Further
advantages to cooperation can be seen when the region is examined at the national political level.
Cooperation would give the region more influence in the U.S. Senate, where New England's
members outnumber California's by twelve to two. At the same time, the region's population-
based delegation in the U.S. House of Representatives is the smallest among all regions and
shrinking, lending further credence to the need for cooperation. Even given the advantages of
cooperation, there are barriers to regional cooperation that the simple constraints of state and
municipal jurisdictional boundaries, including:
1. Strong resistance to relinquishing local and state control to regional authorities
2. Historical competitive tendencies among the six New England States
3. Public support for regional cooperation in New England has often been motivated by the
self-interest of individual states and organizations, rather than the broader interests of the
region.
Despite these barriers to cooperation, the overall assumption that New England constitutes an
economic region stands for the purposes of this research. Shared priorities, disadvantages, and
multi-jurisdictional economic sub-regions all contribute to this assumption. Before looking at the
cluster initiatives undertaken in New England and their link to strategic transportation planning,
we will first explore the inventory of New England's regional organizations, as well as
transportation issues which are shared by the entire region.
7.2 New England Regional Organizations
Over the past half-century, dozens of interstate compacts and regional organizations have been
established in New England, but few remain, and even fewer are thriving. Presently, there is no
true common regional approach to economic development within New England. In the early
1990s, legislators from several states considered the creation of the New England Compact for
Economic Development, an agreement whereby any New England state losing out in competition
for a business would align its support behind another New England state still in the running, with
the reasoning that, for example, Connecticut would be better off when a business locates in
Massachusetts rather than Texas or California. After ten years, the Compact still has not been
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ratified by any state. Another example is the New England Governor's Conference, which in the
late-nineties was a fraction of its former size, and received the lowest funding of any regional
governor's organization in the U.S. [161]. A symptom of the lack of a regional economic
development approach is the effort expended by Vermont, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island in
urging Massachusetts companies to relocate to their states, though more recently, Rhode Island
has shifted to one of promoting expansion of companies within Rhode Island, rather than
relocation. Luring business away from neighboring states has historically been both an explicit
and implicit economic development goal in New England.
Section 6.2 noted that the critical first step of any cluster initiative is the assembly of all key
stakeholders relevant to the economic development effort being undertaken. While to date, no
comprehensive cluster initiative has been performed encompassing the entire New England
region, a brief inventory of existing regional institutions, both economic development and
transportation related, serves as a useful exercise in understanding the relevant regional economic
institutions. While the following list is not comprehensive, it strives to capture the primary
stakeholders which currently exist, and the relatively short list is indicative of the limited
cooperation and coordination currently taking place at the regional level.
Regional Economic Development Organizations
The New England Governor's Conference (NEGC): The NEGC has existed as an informal
alliance since the American colonial era, but was formally established in 1937 during the
depression to promote New England's economic development. Since then, the organization has
been incorporated as a non-profit corporation, with the region's six state governors serving as its
Board of Directors. The NEGC is structured so that, in theory, the Governors are able to work
together to coordinate and implement policies which are designed to respond to cross-border
regional issues. Specifically, the NEGC manages committees, made up of government officials
from each state ,which are periodically formed to address regional policies.
New England Board of Higher Education (NEBHE): The NEBHE was created in 1955 as a
private, non-profit, educational organization by the governors of the six New England states, and
subsequently granted official authorization by each state legislature and the U.S. Congress. Each
state is individually represented on the board by eight delegates appointed by their respective
state governor. Among the goals of the organization are: (1) analyze and publish regional
information related to higher education and regional economic development; (2) explore and
strengthen the connection between higher education and economic development in New England;
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and (3) promote regional coordination and efficient use of economic resources among New
England's six state governments and the region's public and private colleges and universities.
New England Public Policy Collaborative (NEPPC): A operating unit of the NEBHE, the
NEPPC was created in 1998 specifically to foster cooperation on behalf of the region's economic
development. The Collaborative brings together over 300 public policy centers and institutes
from around New England.
New England Economic Project (NEEP): NEEP is a non-profit organization founded in 1975 to
provide objective economic analyses and forecasts for the New England region. The organization
also facilitates research on regional economic issues and periodically conducts forums examining
developments in the New England economy. For example, in 1999, NEEP conducted the forum
"New England: Global Transportation Hub or Cul de Sac?" examining issues in the region's
infrastructure and their impact on the regional economy. Members of the organization represent
academic institutions, government agencies, regional utilities, and industry. Though several
government agencies are represented in NEEP, notable is the absence of transportation planning
and service organizations.
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston: Though primarily known for its monetary policy programs, the
District One Federal Reserve Bank, located in Boston, serves the six states of New England by
conducting economic research on regional issues, public policy analysis, and interpretation of
regional conditions and developments in the economy. Three of its publications focus on the
New England economy, including (1) Regional Review, a bimonthly journal on regional
economics and public policy; (2) New England Economic Review, a quarterly publication
focusing on topics relevant to the New England economy; and (3) New England Economic
Indicators, a monthly compilation of select current and historical statistics on the New England
economy. Each of these publications has occasionally focused on transportation infrastructure
issues over the past decade.
The New England Council: The Council was formed in 1925 by regional business leaders and
New England governors in response to a mass exodus of New England textile and shoe
manufacturers to the southern United States. The Council claims to be the nation's oldest
regional business organization, and currently is structured as an alliance of business, academic,
and public organizations throughout New England promoting both economic growth and a high
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quality of life for the region. Like NEEP, several government agencies are represented on the
council, but again absent are transportation planning and service organizations.
Coalition of New England Companies for Trade: The Coalition is a lobby group, located in
Washington D.C., representing regional New England companies involved with international
trade.
Regional Transportation Organizations
New England Transportation Initiative (NETI): This initiative was a cooperative venture of the
six New England states to develop a coordinated strategic transportation planning vision for the
region. Directed by a policy committee consisting of representatives from the state DOTs, EPA,
and Economic Development agencies, the two year program was undertaken at the request of the
New England Governor's Conference between 1994 and 1995. NETI included industry
representatives from each state and its organizational structure, shown in Figure 7-1, broadly
represented transportation issues at both the state and regional levels.
New En n Governor's F l Governors
Memorandumn of Understanding (MOU)
6 State DOTs and 6 State Economic Development Organizations
AdviAdministration
Project Manager
- Included regional planning commissions, EA A g es nO F dng Five Industry Representatives from
regional councils of governments, and Volpe Center, & Utilities Commissions' Each State
Fsix state Advisory Committees
Adapted From: Cambridge Systematics, 1995.
Figure 7-1: NETI Organizational Structure
New England Transportation Consortium (NETC): NETC is a cooperative effort of the New
England state transportation agencies and the state universities in the region. Its goals are the
development of improved methods of dealing with common transportation problems, focusing
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primarily on issues affecting the planning, design, construction, maintenance, and rehabilitation
of the region's highway network.
New England University Transportation Center (UTC): The New England UTC is one of ten
Federally sponsored regional research centers whose missions are to be a resource for research
and education in both passenger and freight transportation. The centers are intended both as a
national resource, and as means to address coordinate transportation research and education
programs with regional needs and initiatives. The New England UTC, housed at MIT, includes
the six state universities as well as Harvard and MIT.
1-95 Corridor Coalition: The Coalition was created in 1993 by the transportation agencies in the
congested, and multi-modal 1-95 northeast corridor. With federal funding assistance from the
USDOT, the Coalition has become more policy directed over the past eight years. Initially
focused around the coordination of ITS within the corridor, the role has expanded to addressing
mobility needs over multiple transportation modes, and addressing the need to improve the
economic vitality of the region. Beyond simply the state DOTs and ITS related organizations,
coalition membership extends to Amtrak, the Federal Railroad Administration, the Federal
Transit Administration, and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Beyond New
England, the Coalition also includes the states of New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
and Virginia.
New England Regional Air Service Initiative: A collaborative effort between the FAA, Massport,
Massachusetts Metropolitan Airport Commission, the New England Council, and regional airport
managers to investigate regional solutions to meet ever increasing demand for air travel.
7.3 Cross-cutting Transportation Issues for New England
Up to this point, we have established that New England may be regarded as an economic region,
and it has, to a limited extent, regional economic institutions that act as stakeholders in promoting
and undertaking regional initiatives. Our final task before exploring specific cluster initiatives
and regional transportation planning is to ascertain what transportation issues and infrastructure
are shared across the region.
Reqional Transportation Infrastructure - Priorities and Investment
In 1998, the National Council of State Governments analyzed the state-of-the-state address of
state governors and compiled the top priorities. At the state executive leadership level, Table 7-4
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demonstrates that neither transportation nor economic development was a top priority for all six
New England states.
K-12 Tax Higher Economic Transportation
State Education Environment Cut Education Development Investment
Connecticut X X X X
Maine X X
Massachusetts X X
New Hampshire X
Rhode Island X X X
Vermont X X X X
Adapted from: Pierce, 1998.
Table 7-4: New England Governors' Top Priorities
Other opinion leaders do not necessarily share this opinion, as the results from the NEBHE
survey demonstrate. The majority of respondents felt that economic development and select
inter-state transportation investment would be effective regional strategies.
Regional agreement to support
economic development efforts by
neighboring New England states.
79% 75% 82% 82% 81% 77% 80%
Regional development of high-speed
rail network connecting New England 78% 70% 78% 75% 83% 54% 76%
cities.
Joint planning to expand capacity of 75% 76% 75% 71% 70% 76% 74%New England's regional airports
Source: The New England Board of Higher Education, 1999.
Table 7-5: Effectiveness of Economic Development and Transportation Investment Strategies
When examining the level of New England's overall infrastructure spending, it is found that the
region invests a slightly lower percentage in infrastructure relative to economic output than the
national average. Various factors contribute to this finding, including pre-existing investments in
infrastructure due to the age of the region compared to the rest of the country, and higher
productivity levels of the region's well-educated, and highly skilled workforce. In 1994, New
England invested $5.4 billion in public infrastructure, including roads, bridges, highways, mass
transit systems, railways, waste treatment facilities, and so forth. This amount equated to
approximately $14 million in public investment for every $1 billion in regional economic output,
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slightly less than the nation as a whole at $16 million in infrastructure investment for every $1
billion in economic output. Spending levels varied from a low of $7 million per $1 billion output
in New Hampshire to a high of $17 million per $1 billion output in Massachusetts.
Transportation investment represents the vast majority of infrastructure spending in the region. In
1994, New England invested approximately $3.2 billion, or 59% of all infrastructure spending, in
transportation related projects [162]. While much of the investment may have been in projects
which primarily benefit specific states within the region, New England shares an extensive
regional transportation system, as shown in Figure 6-2.
Interstate Highway System and 1-95
The priority corridors for passenger ground transportation in New England are effectively defined
by the interstate highway systems shared within the region: (1) 1-95 in five of the six states,
except Vermont, (2) 1-93 in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, (3) 1-91 in three of the six states,
(4) 1-89 in New Hampshire and Vermont, and (5) 1-84 in Connecticut and Massachusetts. Other
Interstate Highway corridors are contained within individual states (e.g. 1-90 in Massachusetts),
but are not as relevant within the regional context.
The obvious priority for regional planners would be to focus on 1-95 as it is the primary linkage
between the New England states and the rest of the Eastern seaboard. Between Maine and
Virginia, 1-95 passes through a commercial corridor containing almost a quarter of the American
population. Along this corridor, it is the major highway feeding thirteen major airports (including
four within New England), 11 major seaports, and more than two dozen major railroad stations.
Congestion along this corridor has been a regional issue for many years. Key congestion choke
points, such as between New Haven and New York, limit New England's highway connectivity
with the adjoining Mid-Atlantic region. The Connecticut portion of 1-95 is operating at 180% of
designed capacity [163], with the section between Stamford and Greenwich ranking as the
region's busiest highway, at over 132,500 daily vehicle miles per mile of highway. This ranking
is also twelfth in the nation, though significantly behind Los Angeles' 200,000 daily vehicle miles
per mile of highway. Altogether, Connecticut has four metropolitan areas within the top fifty
national congested highway rankings, with the only other New England municipality in the top
fifty being Boston with a national ranking of eighteenth [164]. Troublesome for Connecticut is
that the congestion comes at a time when the state has had no population growth for more than a
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Figure 7-2: New England Regional Transportation Network
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decade, and the state economy as a whole grew slower than the nation in the 1990s. Even rural
Maine shares Connecticut's 1-95 congestion, albeit seasonally, when four to five million tourists
create peak demands rivaling those of Connecticut. Although Maine's highway infrastructure is
mostly adequate to handle its resident population demands, it is overwhelmed during the summer.
For the stretch of 1-95 between Boston and Providence, congestion could limit the ability to
implement an effective regional airport system if passengers are unable to conveniently access
Providence's T.F. Green Airport.
In the past, there have been seemingly endless discussions surrounding 1-95 capacity expansion
including widening the highway, adding a double-deck, building a parallel corridor and bridge
network to Long Island, and so forth. The more realistic solution is using the current capacity
more efficiently and to redirect traffic to other modes. The solutions for relieving congestion on
1-95 will require a regional approach as highlighted in congestion relief options for 1-95, listed in
Table 7-6.
Select Transportation Investment Options for 1-95 Congestion Relief
1. Diversion of commuters to rail by upgrading rail stations, increasing station parking,
improving the frequency of rail service, and upgraded local bus distribution service to and
from the rail stations
2. Improved intercity rail between Boston and Maine destinations to facilitate the peak
summer tourist traffic
3. Investment in high-speed ferry service between Boston and Maine, and between
Connecticut, Long Island, and New York City to divert commuters from 1-95
4. Diversion of truck freight traffic to coastal barges and rail, or container delivery and
pickup to alternate ports away from congested choke points4
5. Investment in ITS
a. Finding quicker and more effective ways to clear obstructions
b. Persuading drivers to stay away from 1-95 during incidents by giving more
accurate and prompt information
6. Investment in demand management and reinstatement of tolls in Connecticut which were
removed in 1990 to relieve congestion. ITS technology could allow reinstatement of
these tolls without creating the same levels of congestion
7. Upgrade the port in New London, Connecticut so that cargo bound for New England
could be unloaded north of the 1-95 choke points, rather than in New Jersey, and provide
meaningful congestion relief on 1-95 southwest into New York and New Jersey
Table 7-6: Transportation Investment Options for 1-95 Congestion Relief
4 80% of freight in Connecticut is shipped by highway; with 12%-13% of the vehicles on 1-95 each day are
trucks, compared with only 8% on nearby 1-84 (Source: Gallis, 1999).
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For any of these options to succeed, they must be managed over multiple state boundaries, as well
as regional boundaries when New York City is taken into consideration. The desired change in
behavior of both passengers and freight carriers is not confined within a single state or
municipality, and the infrastructure and technology investment must be coordinated within this
multijurisdictional reality.
New England Freight Infrastructure and Global Trade
Despite New England's historical prominence as a center of water-borne commerce, its ports
have diminished in importance relative to other cities on the eastern seaboard, in particular, the
Ports of New York and New Jersey, Baltimore, Charleston, and Halifax, Nova Scotia. In addition
to the region's dramatic loss in port prominence, it is also facing changing trade patterns due to
the globalization of trade and international trade agreements within the past decade. The world's
fastest growing trade route, called the Suez Express Corridor, links South Asia, the Indian
subcontinent, the Mediterranean, and the U.S. East Coast, as shown in Figure 7-3. Goods
reaching the East Coast from South Asia via the Suez Canal take only one to two days longer than
goods shipped by sea to the West Coast, then across country by rail, but transport costs are up to
50% less [165]. In the 1980s, there was no westbound container traffic from Asia to the United
States, but by 1996, 6% of all container traffic passed through the Suez Express Corridor, with
traffic expected to grow at an annual rate of 8% [166].
Source: Michael Gallis and Associates, 1999.
Figure 7-3: The Suez Express and NAFTA Trade Corridors
One of the fastest growing continental trade routes is the NAFTA Corridor, linking Canada to
Mexico through the U.S. Midwest. Prior to NAFTA and the large growth in Pacific imports, the
primary highway and rail connections were national rather than continental and ran from east to
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west. Some economists believe that much of the new growth in manufacturing and logistics jobs
will be along both the north-south NAFTA Corridor, and the ports and east-west rail lines
connecting this corridor to the Suez Express Corridor. Absent any intervention, it is likely that
the trade network will continue to evolve to the north of New England in Halifax, Nova Scotia,
and to the south in New York, New Jersey, Norfolk, and Charleston.
If New England fails to enhance the efficiency of freight movements to and from its own markets,
Asia, Europe, and the NAFTA corridor, the region could face a future of increasing transportation
costs which impact business location decisions, increasing dependence on truck transportation for
goods movement with implications for highway congestion, and ultimately, the region's
competitive advantage through the inefficiency of an important factor input to the economy.
Despite this risk, there appears to be no regional strategy around port development and
intermodal freight infrastructure, though individual New England states are investing in their own
ports under the auspices of remaining competitive; in reality they are competing for a diminishing
share of New England ocean shipping traffic. For example, in the late-1990s, over $200 million
of capital improvements were made at the Port of Boston, yet the seaport fell behind Portland,
Maine in the amount of cargo handled at its docks, with the port receiving only one trans-Atlantic
ship each week [167]. Besides the investment in Boston, Rhode Island and Connecticut are each
evaluating major investments in their port infrastructure. Of all the ports, only Portland, Maine
recognizes its primary role, not as a major origin and destination port, but as a container feeder
service to Halifax [168].
In addition to ocean-going trade, the region must be concerned with air freight, which is the
fastest growing mode of cargo transportation within the region. New England's shift to a high-
tech economy has increased the importance of air freight over ocean freight. In 1998, the total
value of all export shipments by air from New England was $18.5 billion, while the total value of
all export ocean shipments was just under $5 billion. From Boston's Logan Airport alone, air
exports have grown from $6.5 billion in 1998, to over $10 billion in 1999, and in terms of air
cargo volume handled, Logan now ranks eighteenth among U.S. airports, and thirty-fourth in the
world [169]. Airport capacity and access issues threaten this segment of shipment, especially in
the Boston area, as the air cargo handlers are typically faced with the same congestion as are air
passengers. In general, the New England region faces multiple intermodal freight challenges,
including:
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. Limited regional doublestack rail service, especially at its ports, which prevent cost and time
efficient intermodal transfers of containers. This service is available in competing eastern
seaboard ports of Halifax, the Port of New York and New Jersey, and Baltimore.
. Limited frequency of container vessel service making it difficult to justify and recoup port
infrastructure investments
. Inefficient competition for port traffic between New England states
. Major capacity and delay impacts at the regional air cargo hub at Logan Airport
. Aging freight infrastructure developed for traditional manufacturing exports and lacking the
specialized characteristics necessary to handle the regions shift to time-sensitive high-tech
exports
As was the case for New England's highway needs, proposed solutions to the freight issues will
require a regional approach if they are to be effective. A select number of investment options are
listed below in Table 7-7:
Select Transportation Investment Options for New England Intermodal Freight
1. Secure double-stack rail access to New England ports, including on-dock rail
infrastructure and the necessary investment to raise bridge clearances to the necessary
heights
2. Select and invest in a single regional large-scale container port. A proposed site, though
controversial, is at Quonset Point, Rhode Island. With the proper investment, the port
would offer New England the following three critical freight needs: (1) proximity and
deep-water access to the North American sea lanes; (2) on-dock rail access; (3) double-
stack rail access to the NAFTA Corridor [170]
3. Investing in port dredging to remain competitive, with the ability to serve the current
generation of mega-container ships
4. Develop a regional airport into an air freight niche airport
5. Enhance efficiency of Canadian border crossings to capitalize on proximity to the
nation's largest trading partner
6. Creation of a New England Regional Intermodal Freight Alliance to assist states in the
development and implementation of strategic, intermodal, and regional approaches to the
movement of goods in New England [171]
Table 7-7: Transportation Investment Options for New England Intermodal Freight
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New England's Regional Airport System
Air transportation is especially critical to New England, which lies in the northeast corner of the
nation, making it unsuitable as a major hub. An efficient air transportation network can
dramatically reduce this geographic handicap. The major issue of regional significance is the
overdependence on Boston's Logan Airport, which experiences significant ground- and air-side
congestion. Logan Airport has the advantage of being virtually downtown, but has not seen
significant investment in capacity for more than twenty years, and is among the nations most
congested and delay-prone airports. Because Logan Airport is surrounded by water and
residential neighborhoods, adding new runways is difficult. The notion of a second major airport
in Greater Boston has been long debated by local politicians and business leaders, but the idea has
essentially been abandoned as politically impossible. The negative impacts of Logan congestion
are multifaceted, but within the regional competitive advantage context, congestion and capacity
constraints could place a high demand on available airline seats, pushing up fares, and making
New England a more expensive place to conduct business, as well as decreasing its attractiveness
to new or expanding businesses. Additionally, New England's mix of industries are relatively
travel-intensive. Financial services, research and development firms, education institutions, and
business services such as consulting, are all heavy users of air transportation.
Five sizeable commercial airports - Bradley in Hartford, Connecticut; Manchester; T.F. Green
near Providence, Rhode Island; Portland, Maine; and Worcester, Massachusetts - lie within one
hundred miles of Boston. Additionally, Hanscom Field, a general aviation airport and Air Force
base with runways equipped to handle passenger jets, is located within 15 miles of downtown
Boston (see Figure 7-2). In 1997, these airports were operating at just 50% of their capacity, and
most could absorb a sizeable portion of the traffic flowing through Logan [172]. Virtually every
regional transportation study has recommended that New England aviation and transportation
planners view the region's largest airports as components of a single system. However, there are
significant challenges to integration of the airports, among which are:
. Lack of demonstrated success in other regions and countries in managing an inventory of
regional airports as a single, cohesive entity for domestic service. There are successful
implementations of regional airport systems involving international and domestic flights
being segregated to different airports such as in Japan, Korea, and in some European
countries
. The completion of Boston's Central Artery project, the 1-90 extension to Logan Airport under
the Boston Harbor, and $4 billion on-airport capital improvement investments by Massport,
the operator of the Logan, will dramatically improve ground access to the facility. A mixed
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message is effectively being sent to air travelers by encouraging the use of alternate airports
to Logan while concurrently improving the ground access to Logan
. In the past, the regional airports have historically based their growth plans on competing with
Logan Airport, and have traditionally harbored some political distrust of Massport intentions.
These behaviors create institutional barriers to developing an atmosphere of cooperation
between the regional airports
. Regional airports, especially Manchester and Worcester, have poor or inconvenient ground
access from the Greater Boston area
. The network effect of airlines is strong as it is expensive for airlines to operate in all regional
markets at the frequencies demanded by its business passengers and the prices demanded by
the leisure market
. The regional airports also experience neighborhood opposition to capacity and traffic
expansion. Additionally, T.F. Green has similar space constraints as Logan as it is
surrounded closely by both water and residential neighborhoods
Despite the challenges, there has been significant traffic growth at many of the regional airports,
as shown in Table 7-8. Manchester and T.F. Green have invested over $300 million in terminal
and airside improvements, and more importantly, Southwest Airlines moved into T.F. Green and
Manchester in 1996 and 1999 respectively, more than doubling the passenger traffic at each
airport. The regional airports have experienced enough growth that Massport has downwardly
adjusted its growth projections for Logan Airport. Instead of expecting 37.5 million annual
passengers in 2010, Massport now forecasts only 34 million [173].
Airport
Worcester, MA
Bangor, ME
Burlington, VT
Portland, ME
Manchester, NH
T.F. Green (Providence, RI)
Bradley (Hartford, CT)
Logan
Total
1995
Passengers
(millions)
0.07
0.42
0.85
1.00
0.89
2.00
5.00
24.75
34.98
1999
Passengers
(millions)
0.05
0.42
0.87
1.37
2.83
5.15
5.75
27.05
43.49
Percent
Change
(29%)
0%
2%
37%
218%
158%
15%
9%
24%
1999 Percent
of Total
0.1%
1.0%
2.0%
3.2%
6.5%
11.8%
13.2%
62.2%
100.0%
Adapted from: www.massport.com and Campbell, 1997
Table 7-8: New England Regional Airport Passenger Growth 1995-1999
Nevertheless, it is misleading to interpret regional airport passenger growth as just attracting
passengers away from Logan airport, but instead more realistic to assume that it is also putting
more people on airlines who normally would not have flown. As an illustration, Logan traffic still
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grew 9% between 1995 and 1999. Even with the downward projections, Logan Airport still
faces serious capacity constraints on its ability to effectively serve the region's future air
transportation needs. Table 7-9 summarizes several transportation infrastructure investment
alternatives for New England to consider in addressing its airport capacity issues.
Select Transportation Investment Options for New England's Airport System
1. Construction of a new unidirectional runway at Logan Airport to improve capacity by
giving the ability to segment regional jets and turboprops from the larger passenger jets
during departures under certain airport operating configurations
2. Further infrastructure expansion at regional airports such as Worcester, Manchester, and
Hanscom. Worcester and Manchester will need significant investment in road
infrastructure for ground access if they hope to capture more Logan traffic, while
Hanscom will require investment in baggage systems, terminals, and gates
3. Incentives to shift a greater share of domestic passengers to regional airports, focusing on
international service and long-haul service out of Logan. This will likely require: (1)
investments in incentives to both passengers and airlines to result in desired behavior;
and (2) investment in technology infrastructure to enable operational coordination and
information dissemination
4. Invest in an improved network of regional express bus feeders from the Boston
metropolitan area to the regional airports. This will require additional parking
infrastructure at the park-and-fly lots, which are currently capacity constrained
5. Invest in improved high-speed ground transportation within the Northeast Corridor.
Although Amtrak introduced its 150 mph service Acela service between Boston and New
York in 2000, it is projected only to divert 1.2 million air passengers by 2010 [174],
representing diverted traffic equivalent to only one-year of annual growth at Logan
Airport. However, a recent USDOT study has estimated that investment in "TGV"
quality (200 mph) high-speed rail service with 2 hour travel times and hourly frequencies
of between four to six per hour to New York City could divert approximately 20% of all
air trips. Investment in even more rapid mag-lev rail technology could result in air
diversions to rail on the order of 25% - 27% [175]
6. Improve intermodal air-rail connections. The Northeast Corridor and Amtrak's Acela
line is located only a few hundred yards from the T.F. Green terminal. A high-speed rail
stop at the airport could improve the convenience of the Providence airport for many
more Greater Boston residents. Commuter rail extensions or connectors to the Boston-
Providence and Boston-Worcester lines could also improve the capture rates of the
regional airports
7. Construct a second airport in the Greater Boston area. Although currently a political near
impossibility, future growth rates may require a revisiting of this option
Table 7-9: Transportation Investment Options for New England Air Transportation
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This section has presented three broad transportation issues facing the New England region and a
listing of twenty different infrastructure "solutions" in which the region could choose to invest.
Obviously, in a fiscally resource constrained environment, it is impossible to invest in all desired
projects. Additionally, municipal boundaries make it difficult for a regional investment to gain
necessary political and funding support, and institutional barriers prevent cooperative efforts
between agencies and organizations across the six states. A regional competitive advantage
framework, as was presented in Chapter 6, could provide a helpful context in which to evaluate
and prioritize the aforementioned infrastructure investments for New England.
Introduction to the New England Cluster Assessment
In order to evaluate the regional infrastructure investments, it is first necessary to understand the
needs specific to the region's clusters, the source of New England's competitive advantage. The
next section explores the cluster initiatives conducted within the region in an attempt to look for
useful cross-cutting transportation infrastructure investments. The framework presented in
Chapter 6 will be used in order to (1) assist in understanding New England's cluster
transportation needs; and (2) evaluate the usefulness of the framework. Because a cluster
initiative has not yet been undertaken for the entire region, the assessment is forced to rely on a
state-by-state survey of cluster initiatives. The weaknesses of this approach will be critiqued in
Section 7.8. Note that Maine and Vermont were excluded from the review due to their highly
rural nature and the absence of a cluster initiative for each state.
For each state, the following items will be addressed:
1. Identification of the motivation for the cluster initiative
2. Description of the cluster initiative and the initiative leadership structure
3. A review of the inventory of clusters; assessing their stage of development and the approach
the state is taking to develop or grow them
4. Determining if the initiative identified any specific or general transportation infrastructure
needs for the clusters
5. Investigation of how the economic development plans are linked to the state transportation
plans and the degree to which identified cluster transportation needs are included
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7.4 Rhode Island
7.4.1 Motivation for Cluster Initiative
The motivations to evaluate Rhode Island's clusters resulted from a combination of factors. First,
the Rhode Island economy had performed poorly in the first half of the 1990s, and the state was
experiencing a large population loss and a resulting shortage of skilled labor. Second, key
economic indicators such as number of jobs and per-capita-income were below their mid-1980s
peak. Third, more Rhode Island residents were commuting out-of-state for work than were
employed in total key industries such as jewelry manufacturing and textiles. Total out-of-state
employment rose from 1.8% in 1979 to 6.1% in 1995 [176]. Finally, the state was experiencing a
significant loss in manufacturing jobs to other regions of the country, especially the U.S. South.
In the mid-1990s, the Governor created the Rhode Island Economic Policy Council to examine
the competitive position of the state's industry clusters.
7.4.2 Cluster Initiative and Leadership Structure
Primary responsibility for Rhode Island cluster policy is divided between two organizations: the
Rhode Island Economic Policy Council, responsible for the economic analysis and policy
recommendations; and the Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation, operationally
responsible for assisting cluster-specific industries with their business and policy needs. The two
organizations are summarized below:
Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation (RIEDC): A non-profit public-private
partnership, providing firms access to Rhode Island's economic development services. The
organization's primary responsibility is to assist in the growth and expansion of existing Rhode
Island firms and attract new businesses and investment to the state. RIEDC has specialists in
each Industry Cluster providing policy and operational assistance to firms within the cluster.
Rhode Island Economic Policy Council (RIEPC): A non-profit corporation funded equally by the
private sector and the State of Rhode Island. The Council is composed of members from the
business, labor, higher education, and government sectors5 . RIEPC provides an analysis of the
strengths and weaknesses of the Rhode Island economy, and advise the State Legislature and
Office of the Governor regarding state economic development policy.
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In 1996, the Governor directed the RIEPC to identify and characterize the leading clusters within
the state. The Council mobilized the economic infrastructure stakeholders of the state, with the
notable absence of transportation planning and service stakeholders, and together identified nine
industry clusters within Rhode Island along with nine recommendations to promote their growth.
The RIEPC recommendations were presented to the State General Assembly which incorporated
them into 1997 legislation of seven strategic initiatives for guiding the state agencies responsible
for economic development. Accordingly, the 1998 Economic Development Plan for Rhode
Island incorporates several of the recommendations within its overall goals and objectives for the
state.
7.4.3 State Cluster Inventory and Needs Assessment
1996 RIEPC Cluster Study: Meetinq the Challenge of the New Economy
The initial 1996 study undertaken by the RIEPC identified the state clusters by SIC code and
ranked according to a multi-criteria method, including the number of jobs, sales generated by the
industries, and the location quotient of the agglomeration of industries. The analysis resulted in
the identification of the following nine clusters:
1. Jewelry Manufacturing: Rhode Island is the center of U.S. Jewelry manufacturing,
employing 25% of the U.S. workforce [177]. Other industries located within the state
directly support the jewelry industry, including metal plating, casting, machine tools, and
plastics. Although employment in the sector has been declining over the past fifteen
years, exports have remained stable due to improved productivity. Most of the exports
are domestic, rather than international, though. Despite having all the components of a
working cluster, it appears in fact to be a low-performing, or latent, cluster. Jewelry
firms are relatively closed and cooperation is extremely limited. The needs assessment
focused on the creation of a trade organization to both promote marketing efforts and
information sharing among the cluster firms. No mention was made of specific
transportation needs for this cluster.
2. Precision Metalworking: The cluster included manufacturers which produced small or
intricate components designed to high tolerances. The majority of the Rhode Island firms
provided services on a contract basis, selling its services and components to other
manufacturers rather than selling products directly to Original Equipment Manufacturers
(OEMs) or customers. The industry is able to charge a price premium for quick
turnaround time on design and fabrication, and with 29% of the firms exporting outside
the region [178], an efficient transportation system would be beneficial. The study
concluded that this group of firms did not constitute a working or latent cluster due to the
lack of interaction caused by high level of competition between firms and the lack of a
5 No transportation planning or service representatives sit on the Council
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vertically integrated network of suppliers and producers. No mention was made of
specific transportation needs for this cluster.
3. Boat Building and Marinas: Rhode Island companies have a long history of boat
building, including the pioneering of fiberglass boat production processes in the mid-
1950s. The cluster is composed of approximately 35 companies and has a niche in the
small sailboat market, with approximately 30%-40% market share [179]. Over all, the
small industry does not appear to represent a working or latent cluster, but is regarded as
a potential cluster if it can attract boat component manufacturers (marine electronics and
motors) to the state.
4. Seafood Products: The industry includes fisheries, processors, and wholesalers. The
industry is vertically integrated, but the small size of the industry did not allow
classification as a working or latent cluster. Transportation infrastructure investment was
cited in the needs assessment including improvements to state-owned ports, due to
existing conditions of poorly maintained road surfaces and dilapidated docks.
Additionally, the lack of cold storage facilities in the state cause the industry to ship their
products out of the state for storage adding additional transportation costs.
5. Electronics and Instruments: This cluster represented a diverse number of industries tied
together through their use of precision electronics. Limited buyer-supplier linkages
precluded cluster classification as working or latent. In the needs assessment, improved
transportation infrastructure was not specifically cited. However, a major concern to the
cluster team was that most of the industry had little to no linkage to Boston's Route 128
electronics cluster which is located only one hour away. Transportation infrastructure
was not seen as a playing a limiting role in the lack of linkages, but the proximity of
Boston's cluster was seen as a potential competitive advantage that should be exploited.
6. Financial Services: The concentration of commercial banking, insurance companies, and
financial offices in Rhode Island were similar to national averages, and therefore not
technically a competitive cluster. However, citing the recent expansion of several Boston
financial service firms into Providence, the cluster had the potential to serve as a satellite
for Boston in the financial services area. No specific transportation infrastructure needs
were mentioned in the assessment.
7. Software: As a small component of Rhode Island's industries, with a Location Quotient
(LQ) below 1, this sector did not qualify as a cluster. However, like the financial services
sector, the proximity to Boston was seen as a competitive advantage which could be used
to grow the cluster. In the assessment, the report specifically cited the need to attract
qualified software professionals to the state, and recommended the improvement of
transportation links between Providence and Boston as a means to this end. Specifically,
the report proposed improving the frequency of commuter rail service between the cities
as a way to develop links to Boston's software cluster and in attracting two-career
couples.
8. Biomedical: Similar to the Software sector, the industries do not represent a cluster, but
their proximity to Boston represent a potential opportunity for linkages and growth. No
mention was made of specific transportation needs for this potential cluster.
9. Travel and Tourism: Tourism was determined unlikely ever to contribute economic
growth for the Rhode Island economy in the way that it does for Florida and California.
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However, recent investment in T.F. Green specifically contributed to the growth in this
sector.
The overall recommendations of the cluster study argued against large capital infrastructure
spending or tax subsidies for job creation, and instead advocated state policies encouraging and
enabling firms to make institutional changes needed to become more competitive.
General Assembly Legislation
Based on the RIEPC cluster study, seven strategic economic development initiatives were enacted
by the State General Assembly. Two initiatives were relevant specifically to clusters and
transportation infrastructure:
1. Initiative to Strengthening Global Connections
a. Strategy: increase region's international air capacity by integrating region's air
and rail passenger transportation systems; build a trunk-line connection to the
new global logistics grid, specifically the Suez and NAFTA Corridors
b. Project: Improvements to T.F. Green Airport; intermodal airport train station;
increase and extend commuter rail; invest in container port at Quonset Point
c. Expected Results: shift air trips to high speed rail; shift domestic flights to
Providence and Manchester; decrease in cost of goods sold
2. Develop Industry Clusters
a. Strategy: Position Rhode Island as high value location in Boston metropolitan
area; nurture and expand existing base of industries [180]
Rhode Island Economic Development Plan Goals and Objectives
The State Economic Development Plan is published by the State Planning Council, and is
intended as a basic guide for economic development of the state. The strategic initiatives enacted
by the General Assembly are incorporated within the guide. The State Planning Council has
been designated as the single statewide MPO for transportation planning and is also responsible
for creating the transportation plans for the state. This integrated structure of economic
development and transportation planning is well represented in the Economic Development Plan.
The Plan puts forth three guiding objectives and goals, each of which make specific reference to
transportation infrastructure investment as summarized in Table 7-10 as follows:
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Objective 1 - Jobs: Provide at least 24,000 new employment opportunities for Rhode Island
residents by the year 2020. Recommendation of nine specific policies, including:
. Promote and develop the use of mass transit in order to eliminate spatial barriers to
employment opportunities. Encourage development in densities high enough to facilitate the
economical provision of mass transit.
Objective B - Facilities: Work with economic development practitioners to encourage industrial
development that advances the long-term economic well-being of the state. Recommendation of
16 specific policies, including:
. Ensure adequate investment to maintain and improve a balanced, intermodal transportation
system that meets the needs of the state's commerce and labor force. Maintain shipping
channels and recognize the economic potential of T.F. Green airport.
. Contribute to the stabilization and redevelopment of central business districts through the
provision of supporting services such as transportation access.
Objective C - Business Climate: Maintain a business environment conducive to the sustenance
and growth of suitable industry and climate. Recommendation of 14 specific policies including:
. Maintain public infrastructure. Provide additional transportation infrastructure where it is
clearly demonstrated as necessary and in a manner that will protect the long-term health of
the state's fiscal resources.
Adapted from: Rhode Island State Planning Council, 2000.
Table 7-10: Economic Development Goals and Objectives for Rhode Island
7.4.4 Integration with Transportation Planning
The State Planning Council has a Transportation Advisory Committee responsible for developing
the short- and long-range transportation planning documents, and works cooperatively with the
Rhode Island Department of Transportation (RIDOT), Rhode Island Public Transit Authority
(RIPTA), and the Rhode Island Airport Corporation. Given that the State Planning Council is
responsible for the statewide economic development goals, it is not surprising that they should be
represented to some degree within the Regional Transportation Plan. Two of the four goals for
the plan directly relate to economic development: (1) use transportation to support economic
development, with good access to employment being particularly important; and (2) continue to
integrate the planning process for all aspects of the state's development process across functional
and jurisdictional lines [181].
Additionally, three prominent approved projects within the RTP directly reflect the objectives
established in the Economic Development Plan: (1) develop transportation models to implement
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welfare-to-work goals; (2) study an Interstate ramp system to support full development of the
proposed Quonset Point port; and (3) develop the Warwick Intermodal Rail Station, supporting
the adjacent business district and connecting to T.F. Green Airport [182].
Figure 7-4 traces the flow from cluster study to the regional transportation plan for Rhode Island:
1996
Meeting the Challenge
RIEPC
Stakeholder Participation
Government Agencies
Business Leaders
Higher Education Leaders
Labor Leaders
Economic Development Related
and Funded RTP Projects
1. Welfare-to-Work Modeling
2. Interstate Connection study for
proposed port development
3. Intermodal rail station linked to airport
Cluster Policy 1997 General Assembly
1 Economic Development
Recommendations Legislation
9 Economic Development
Strategic Initiatives
1998 Rhode Island
Economic Development
Plan
3 Economic Development
Obje tives
1998 RTP
Figure 7-4: Rhode Island Cluster Study and Transportation Planning
7.5 Connecticut
7.5.1 Motivation for Cluster Initiative
In 1996 the Connecticut State Legislature passed an Act calling upon the Connecticut Department
of Economic and Community Development (DECD) to move forward with industry cluster
development. Several factors within the state economy prompted the Legislature to pass such a
measure: (1) a skilled labor shortage; (2) limited population growth; (3) aging physical
infrastructure; (4) lower rate of start-up companies than the rest of the nation; and (5) several
national surveys finding the state's "business friendly" image lacking [183].
197
Cluster Initiative and Leadership Structure
Under orders from the State Legislature, the DECD created the Industry Cluster Division within
the department. In 1997, the DECD and the Governor mobilized senior executives from state
industries and government organizations to form five advisory boards and undertake a cluster
study, with the first task to identify the state's primary industries and assess their competitive
needs. The outcome of this mobilization stage was a 1998 task force of 125 business leaders in
Connecticut assembled to study the best method of implementing cluster-based development in
the state. The task force's research identified seven industry clusters critical to Connecticut's
economic competitiveness and led to legislation passed in 1998, called the "Cluster Bill," which
officially launched the Connecticut Industry Cluster Initiative under the DECD. The
organizational structure created for the Initiative is shown in Figure 7-5:
Source: Connecticut Industry Cluster Advisory Board, 1998.
Figure 7-5: Connecticut Cluster Initiative Organizational Structure
One of the most important accomplishments of the legislation was the establishment of the
Governor's Council on Economic Competitiveness and Technology, comprised of a cross-section
of leaders from industry, education, labor, the state legislature, and industry organizations. The
Council meets each quarter to monitor the cluster initiative progress and discusses ways to further
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7.5.2
enhance and support it. While no transportation planning and service representatives sit on the
Governor's Council, they are well-represented in the Infrastructure Issue Advisory Group which
subsequently has evolved into the Transportation Infrastructure Issue Advisory Board.
Continuing work by the Cluster Industry Initiative program led to a second "Cluster Bill" passed
in 1999 further endorsing cluster-based economic development and initiating a research and
development tax credit, among other cluster-friendly tax and funding issues. In 2000, the
Governor's Council sponsored a Connecticut Transportation Summit which resulted in the
creation of a new statewide Transportation Strategy Board responsible for developing long-range
transportation plans consistent with the Cluster Initiative's objectives.
7.5.3 State Cluster Inventory and Needs Assessment
The 1998 task force identified each cluster based strictly on their industry LQ, comparing the
concentration of a Connecticut industry, using SIC codes, with the national concentration. A LQ
of greater than one was used as the criteria for classifying an industry group as a cluster. Based
on the task forces definitions and descriptions contained with in their final report [184], the
inventory of clusters and their development stages can be summarized as follows:
Cluster Development Stage
CLUSTER Working Latent Potential
Financial Services X
Biosciences X
Aerospace Components Manufacturing X
Software/Information Technology X
Metals Manufacturing X
Marine Industry X
Plastics X
Table 7-11: Connecticut's Cluster Inventory
It is interesting to note the aggregated level of cluster detail even though the agglomeration of
insurance-related firms in Hartford, Connecticut is one of the most documented examples of a
working cluster. Still, it falls under the general category of financial services, which in this case
also includes the concentration of financial firms near New York particularly in the city of
Stamford.
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The state's Cluster Initiative relies on what is termed "Cluster Activation" whereby companies in
related industries come together and request formal recognition as an organized industry cluster,
similar to the method employed in Tucson, Arizona, described in Section 5.3.1. The state relies
on corporate leaders to initiate the cluster activation and drive the cluster activities, while the
public sector role is more of facilitator and policy analysis. In general, the Cluster Initiative is not
expecting transportation infrastructure to improve the competitive advantage of its industries.
Instead, the policies and programs are focused more towards workforce development, tax credits,
marketing, and inter-firm organizations. Even so, the attention received and the role assumed by
transportation infrastructure investment over the past five years in Connecticut has far surpassed
any other New England Cluster Initiative.
In the initial cluster transportation needs assessment performed by the initiative's Transportation
Infrastructure Advisory Board the role transportation infrastructure plays in the competitiveness
of the clusters was recognized and recommendations focused on five issues needing immediate
attention [185]:
1. Reducing congestion on 1-95 during peak commuting periods by:
. Increased use of the MetroNorth commuter rail service
. Improved transit and shuttle connections, and demand-responsive jitney service
2. Assure that Connecticut receives the full benefit of the Northeast Corridor high-speed rail
service by improving interstate rail and bus connections, as well as expanded parking at
key stations. Currently the Acela Express stops only in New Haven
3. Enhancing the accessibility of southern Connecticut's airports
4. Provide transportation services enabling former welfare recipients to gain access to jobs
and job-training (Welfare-to-Work)
5. Enhance the competitiveness of Bradley Airport relative to other regional airports by
convening an advisory board to review all aspects of the airport's operations to determine
what steps, if any, could be taken to improve the competitive situation.
Most significant was the second round of transportation needs assessments conducted during the
2000 Connecticut Transportation Summit. The summit found that the state lacked a single entity
with the authority and accountability to establish, monitor, and implement a comprehensive,
statewide transportation strategy which would enhance Connecticut's competitive position and
quality of life for its residents. In response, the Governor's Council created the Transportation
Strategy Board entity, to be established by legislative statute in June 2001 and composed of
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fifteen business, legislative, and transportation agency executives. The Board will be responsible
for developing long-range transportation plans which adhere to the following guiding principles
[186]:
. Explore the transportation network connectivity of Connecticut to New England economies
. Engage both MPOs and other regional planning organizations in developing the strategy
. Develop the appropriate metrics, methodologies, and standards for determining cluster needs
. Play a leadership role with other Northeastern states and eastern Canadian provinces in
advocating and developing a transportation strategy for the entire Northeast region
7.5.4 Integration with Transportation Planning
Overall, the 2001 Connecticut STP addresses or recognizes most of the transportation
investments found in the cluster needs assessment, including investment in Bradley Airport,
connectivity to the Northeast Corridor, Paratransit, and Welfare-to-Work programs. The STP is
prepared jointly by the Connecticut Department of Transportation and the DECD. Furthermore,
the STP summarizes the findings of the Connecticut Transportation Summit 2000, and explicitly
recognizes that the plan must be cognizant of the cluster-based economic development initiatives
being undertaken by the state. Figure 7-6 traces the flow from cluster study to the statewide
transportation plan for Connecticut:
1996 Legislative Act 1997 Advisory Boards 1998 Task Force 1998 "Cluster Bill" Passed
Calling for Cluster-Based -- Convened to Assess CT to Identify --- Establishing official
Economic Development Industry Competitiveness Industry Clusters Organizational Structure
1999 Governor's Council
Begins Quarterly Cluster
Progress Reviews
2000 STP
2000 Governor's Council
Convenes Transportation
Summit
2001 Establishment of the
Transportation Strategy
Board
Figure 7-6: Connecticut Cluster Initiatives and Transportation Planning
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7.6 Massachusetts
7.6.1 Motivation for Cluster Initiative
The cluster studies performed in Massachusetts were some of the first to appear in the nation, due
in large part to Michael Porter's academic position at Harvard University while developing his
theories on competitive advantage and industry clustering. In the late-1980s and early-1990s, the
Massachusetts economy was in the midst of a serious economic downturn with per-capita income
growth and employment levels in 1989 and 1990, below national averages The cause of this
downturn was being attributed to multiple explanations: the high cost of living and doing business
in the region, the loss of high-technology leadership to California, cuts in defense spending, and
so forth. Before Porter's cluster study, most of the assessments of the Massachusetts economy
were broad and aggregated. Porter was motivated to look at both the historical performance of
the state, and the historical and current performance of the states core clusters and other
industries.
7.6.2 Cluster Initiative and Leadership Structure
The first cluster study was an independent report completed by Michael Porter for the Office of
the Secretary of State in 1991, entitled The Competitive Advantage of Massachusetts in which
four core industry clusters were identified. In 1992, the Challenge for Leadership, an initiative
in the early 1990s that brought together Massachusetts government, business, labor, civic, and
religious leaders to address pressing state challenges, chose economic development as the theme
of its annual conference. Monitor Company, Harvard University, and Michael Porter authored a
pro bono study, entitled Toward a Shared Economic Vision for Massachusetts, building upon the
earlier report. The aim of the study was to lay the foundation for a long-term economic vision for
Massachusetts. Governor Weld called for the preparation of an economic strategy for the state as
part of his administration's priority of improving the economic climate of the state. In 1993,
Executive Office of Economic Affairs (EOEA) led the effort to create an economic blueprint
which would serve as guidance for how the Massachusetts state government could partner
business, labor, research, and academic communities to foster an environment of innovation. The
EOEA, partnered with the University of Massachusetts, first hosted a series of focus sessions with
representatives from every region of the state to assess the economic development needs.
Relying heavily upon Porter's work, regional planning agencies' economic development plans,
and the Metropolitan Plan for Greater Boston, an overarching strategy was created citing twelve
categories of action which described specific actions for state government to promote and support
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the implementation of the economic vision. The recommendations by the EOEA were reviewed
by key policy makers, including the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, the
Massachusetts Highway Department, and Massport. The plan was officially adopted in 1994 as
the Commonwealth's Strategic Economic Development Plan and in 2001 still acted as the
primary guiding document for the Department of Economic Development, formerly the EOEA.
More recently, in the mid- and late-1990s, the Massachusetts Technology Collaborative (MTC)
had assumed a strong leadership role in cluster-based activities. The public-private partnership
was formed in 1994 and has taken responsibility for many of the clusters including non-
technology industries. Annually, the organization publishes the Index of the Massachusetts
Innovation Economy looking at factors contributing to or hindering economic growth, similar to
the Indexfor Silicon Valley published by JVSV.
7.6.3 State Cluster Inventory and Needs Assessment
Porter's first cluster inventory in 1991 identified four core clusters in Massachusetts: health care,
information technology, financial services, and knowledge creation services. At the time of
Porter's study, these four clusters represented 35% of the total Massachusetts employment [187].
Porter also identified three other clusters, environmental services, plastics, and metalworking, but
concluded that these were not core, or working clusters. To identify the clusters, Porter analyzed
the SIC data looking for industry concentrations, but supplemented this analysis with dozens of
detailed field interviews and analysis of the exports of each industry to measure the extent to
which they exported their products and services beyond the local economy. Furthermore, he
listed key companies in each cluster adding to the level of detail in his analysis which included 74
health services firms, 56 knowledge-creation enterprises, 57 financial services firms, and 30
information technology companies [188]. An analysis of the factor conditions of each core
cluster resulted in no explicit recommendation of specialized transportation needs for any given
cluster. However, based upon the four clusters shared needs, Porter went on to make ten broad
recommendations about improving the competitiveness of the core industries. The sixth
recommendation, "Infrastructure for the Year 2000," made the following recommendations as a
component of its overall assessment of infrastructure needs:
1. "The Central Artery project will help with [reducing] congestion in reaching Logan
Airport"
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2. "Advanced transportation capability will be needed to better connect the region to the
rest of the world and promote trade. Better direct international air service, a second
Boston airport, and removal of highway bottlenecks merit more detailed study [189]"
In the follow-up study by Porter in 1992, the four core clusters were maintained, and
transportation infrastructure was neither explicitly listed as a strength contributing to the
economy, or a weakness. The high-cost of doing business was cited as a weakness, and
transportation costs were considered. The conclusion of the second study resulted in the
definition of ten needs for Massachusetts which would contribute to economic development, one
of which was additional infrastructure, with Porter arguing "the Commonwealth needs the
transportation infrastructure necessary to compete in the global economy [190]."
The 1994 Strategic Economic Development Plan with its twelve broad categories of action, listed
"Infrastructure Investment for Economic Growth" as one of the action items. The category
explicitly identified the following transportation investments as desirable:
1. Central Artery Project (the "Big Dig")
2. Northeast Corridor High-Speed Rail
3. Logan Airport Modernization
4. Expanded Commuter Rail Service
5. Raising bridge clearances to support doublestacking of freight cargo
Presently, the MTC identifies nine key industries, shown in Figure 7-7. Using SIC code data, the
MTC analyzes and ranks Massachusetts industries based on a multicriteria rating which includes
employment concentration in the state relative to that of the nation, employment share as a share
of total state employment, annual growth rates, and absolute number of establishments. The
MTC also publishes an annual index of thirty indicators of the innovation process and
benchmarks them against similar measurements from leading competitor states. None of the
thirty indicators have a direct connection to transportation infrastructure performance, unlike the
Index of Silicon Valley which includes four indices related to transportation performance (see
Section 5.1.1 for details).
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Figure 7-7: Nine Key Industry Clusters of Massachusetts - 1999
7.6.4 Integration with Transportation Planning
In Massachusetts, regional organizations play an important role in the development and
implementation of transportation plans and programs. All cities and towns are represented by one
of thirteen comprehensive Regional Planning Agencies (RPAs). Local elected officials, or their
designees, from member communities serve on a commission that oversees the policies,
programs, and operations of the RPA. The RPAs provide regional coordination services
regarding a variety of comprehensive planning issues such as transportation, land use, zoning, and
so forth.
Massachusetts also has fifteen Regional Transit Authorities (RTAs) that provide public
transportation services in their designated service areas. In general, Massachusetts RTAs are
independent public authorities. Local elected officials, or their designees, from each of the
communities in the RTA service area serve on a Board that oversees the RTA's policies,
programs, and operations. In general, the RTAs are precluded by state legislation from directly
operating any transportation services; instead, they contract with private providers for all fixed
route, demand responsive, and paratransit services.
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The RPAs and RTAs play an important role in the development and implementation of
transportation policies, plans, and programs through their membership in the Commonwealth's
Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs). The MPOs are charged with conducting the
continuing, cooperative, and comprehensive metropolitan transportation process, as defined by
ISTEA and TEA-21 in the development of regional transportation plans and programs.
Massachusetts' MPOs are comprised, at a minimum, of four agencies: Executive Office of
Transportation and Construction, the lead transportation policy agency; the RPA, representing
regional and local interests; Massachusetts Highway Department, the primary highway
transportation provider; and the RTA, the regional public transportation provider.
Given that Massachusetts has one of the earliest cluster studies and adoption of cluster-based
economic development planning, the 1997 Boston Regional Transportation Plan was examined to
see what elements of the cluster-based economic development policy, if any, were incorporated.
Regarding prioritizing investment projects, the RTP established nine criteria including "Change
in Productivity," an important measure for competitive advantage. However, the projects were
never specifically quantified by this criteria. The RTP also provided fourteen key policies which
would guide the investment decisions. The seventh policy was to "stimulate and sustain regional
economic development through timely transportation investments [191]." The policy went on to
recognize the statewide economic strategy plan adopted by the EOEA in 1994 and took
responsibility with the recommendation in that plan to work closely with economic development
organizations. Beyond this brief paragraph in the RTP recognizing the cluster-based economic
strategy, the projects in the RTP were never directly linked to the economic strategy's
recommendations.
The cluster study chronology and its link to Massachusetts transportation planning in Figure 7-8.
The dotted lines between the 1994 Economic Development Plan and the transportation plans
represent the fact that cluster-based development is nominally represented in each.
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1991
The Competitive Advantage of Massachusetts
Michael Porter (Independent Study)
The Massachusetts Office of the Secretary of State
Harvard University
Identification of 4 "Working" Massachusetts Clusters
1992
Toward a Shared Economic Vision for Massachusetts
Challenge for Leadership Annual Conference
Michael Porter, Harvard University, and Monitor Company
Identification of 5 Important Transportation Infrastructure Investments
1993
Economic Blue Print
MA Executive Office of Economic Affairs, Umass
Key state policy makers including the MBTA, MassHighway,
Massport, and Governor Weld
Economic Blueprint Adopted as
Official Economic Development
Plan (Current as of 2001)
1995 STIP
1994 Massachusetts Strategic
Economic Development Plan..............
" 1997 Greater Boston RTP
Figure 7-8: Massachusetts Cluster Initiatives and Transportation Planning
7.7 New Hampshire
7.7.1 Motivation for Cluster Initiative
In 1992, New Hampshire's economy had undergone significant changes since the mid-1970s,
moving from a focus in textiles and leather products to more industrial and electronic component
manufacturing. At the same time, the state government was moving from an industrial policy of
indifference to one of moderate activism, and the state economy, which first benefited from
Department of Defense expenditures, began to suffer from their cutbacks in the early nineties.
The initial cluster initiative was really not a true initiative, but a research exercise by university
researchers whose goals were to (1) test the application of Porter's theory of competitive
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advantage within the context of New Hampshire, and (2) provide policy guidance to the state of
New Hampshire.
7.7.2 Cluster Initiative and Leadership Structure
The cluster initiative was initially led by the New Hampshire Industry Group (NHIG) which spent
two years identifying the principal, or leading, industries in New Hampshire which compete
successfully in international markets, culminating in a 1994 published study entitled Porter's
Model for Geographic Competitive Advantage: The Case for New Hampshire. The primary
mission of the NHIG is to further the knowledge of industrial and economic competitiveness, and
facilitate endeavors which advance the growth and development of New Hampshire. The NHIG
is composed of professors and economists in the University of New Hampshire's school of
business and economics. In 1998, the New Hampshire Office of State Planning published its bi-
annual State Development Plan which presents a summary analysis of economic conditions for
New Hampshire and proposes economic development initiatives to be undertaken by the state.
The State Development Plan used the NHIG study as a basis for its industrial policy
recommendations, focusing on policies beneficial to the leading industries found in the NHIG
cluster study. In creating the State Development Plan, the Office of State Planning relies on the
guidance of the Governor's Office, NHIG, the International Trade Resource Center (IRTC) which
provides assistance to New Hampshire businesses with exports, and the Department of Resources
and Economic Development.
7.7.3 State Cluster Inventory and Needs Assessment
The NHIG researchers relied on a composite analysis of U.S. Census of Manufacturers, SIC
classifications, and a detailed survey sent out to 350 New Hampshire firms to determine which, if
any clusters existed within the state. The resulting list of industries found to agglomerate within
the state were (1) Machinery and Manufacturing, (2) Electronic Components, (3) Instruments
Manufacturing, and (4) Fabricated Metal Products. These four leading industries made up 48%
of the state's manufacturing employment and 81% of the manufacturing exports [192]. Although
these four industries comprised a large concentration of employment, the NHIG researchers
concluded they did not constitute "working" clusters as they were relatively widely scattered
throughout the state, and reported little integration of supplier networks and trade organizations
within the leading industries. Instead, many of the firms functioned as suppliers to OEMs outside
the New England region. The clusters are more appropriately classified as "potential" clusters.
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Before assessing the needs of the potential clusters, the cluster study considered the advantages of
New Hampshire as related to these industries. The researchers determined that the access to the
Boston market and research universities played an important role in the high-skill level of the
leading industries' workforce. Furthermore, the two southeast counties, closest to Boston, had
both the strongest local economies and the highest concentration of leading industries. The
researchers also found that New Hampshire benefits from its high quality of life, the tax
advantage of New Hampshire - the only state without a broad-based sales or personal income tax,
and relatively low real estate and living costs compared to the Boston metropolitan region.
In assessing the needs of the New Hampshire clusters, the researchers did not make any
recommendation regarding specialized transportation infrastructure required. The State
Development Plan did cite air transportation as one of the keys to retaining and attracting "high-
value-added industries," but did not make any specific infrastructure investment proposals.
Instead, the plan focuses on the need to maintain the state's competitive tax policy and lower cost
of living, recommending in general that the state rely on cost advantages to attract and grow
businesses rather than relying on infrastructure investments. Given that the four leading
industries of New Hampshire did not represent working clusters, the State Development Plan,
recommended that the state follow a "homegrown" formation strategy where the state would
specifically avoid picking "winning and losing" industries, and instead invest in general
economic infrastructure and policies. The Plan recommended strongly that the state not target
any particular industry, but instead focus on generic policies that could benefit all clusters.
7.7.4 Integration with Transportation Planning
The New Hampshire transportation planning and service organizations were not involved in the
cluster studies, nor are the goals of the 1998 State Development Plan reflected in the 1998
Statewide Transportation Plan. The STP lists several criteria for evaluating and selecting
transportation investments, but economic development is not one of them. Figure 7-9
summarizes the New Hampshire cluster initiatives, and highlights the absence of a connection
between the economic development plans and the state transportation plan.
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-- 1994 -- 1998
The Case for New Hampshire ' The State Development Plan 1998 STP
---- NHIG 4 Leading Induskies -- - NH Office of State Planning
identified
NHIG New Harrpshire Governor's Office
New Hiarrpshire Businesses NIG
Dept of Economic Development
Off ice of State Planning
Figure 7-9: New Hampshire Cluster Studies and Transportation Planning
7.8 Assessment of the Extended Framework for New England
To examine the usefulness of the extended ReS/SITE framework, this section will assess New
England using the cluster initiative architecture presented in Section 6.2, and evaluate the
applicability of the cluster transportation needs assessment framework presented in Section 6.3.
The section concludes with a critical examination of the methodology.
Mobilization Stage
Each of the four New England states initiated their cluster studies for essentially the same
reasons. The economic infrastructure representatives were mobilized in the early- to mid-1990s
to address solutions to the growing problems of population loss, shortage of skilled labor,
declining economic indicators such as per-capita-income, defense industry cutbacks, and overall
poor performance of the state economies. The earliest two studies, New Hampshire and
Massachusetts, were initiated by academic institutions in the respective states. The later
initiatives, Rhode Island and Connecticut, were by direct legislative order passed by the state
legislatures. Although each state faced similar economic motivations, it is notable that no region-
wide initiative was undertaken or considered. Instead, each cluster initiative was performed
within the political boundaries of each individual state.
Cluster Leadership Structure
Table 7-12 lists the primary cluster study for the New England states and the organization which
assumed the leading role in the cluster initiative. Only one state, Massachusetts, had an existing
government agency responsible for economic development in the leadership role. Rhode Island
and Connecticut were each led by a public-private partnership specifically created for the cluster
initiative. New Hampshire's efforts were led by a pre-existing public-private partnership. Only
210
one initiative, Connecticut, included the involvement of transportation planning or service
organizations, and as a result, had a much larger emphasis placed on transportation infrastructure
within the initiative. While it is not surprising that transportation planning organizations did not
assume a leadership role, they represent an important component of the economic infrastructure
(as discussed in Section 2.5.3), and their absence implies a lack of institutional linkages between
economic development and transportation planning in some of the states. The Connecticut Issue
Advisory Board, with Transportation Infrastructure as one of the committees, provides an
interesting model for the New England region of an organizational structure which permits the
inclusion of the transportation representatives.
Economic Vision for
Mnssachusefts
Executive Office of Economic
Affairs General Needs NO
Geographic Competitive
NH 94 Advantage: The Case New Hampshire Industry Group None NO
for New Hampshire
Meeting the Challenge Rhode Island Economic Policy General andRI 96 of the New Economy Council Specialzed NO
CT 98 Partnership for Growth Corent tiveness nd Technoloy General Needs YES - Advisory Role
Table 7-12: Summary of New England's Primary Cluster Studies
Cluster Inventory
Table 7-13 lists the inventory of New England clusters as identified in each of the primary cluster
studies. The states identified a total of only six clusters which could be considered "working"
clusters, and one "latent" cluster. The remaining 17 regional industries identified were not in fact
examples of "true" clusters as defined in Chapter 2, rather they were industries selected because
of their higher than average contribution to the states' economies. It is interesting to note that
Rhode Island, the region's smallest state, identified the largest number of industry "clusters" on
which to focus economic policy. Also, for each state, no explicit priorities were given to one
cluster over the other, even though certain concentrations of industries contributed greater shares
of the states' economic output. The lack of clarity on which clusters would be promoted makes it
difficult for transportation planning organizations to prioritize specialized transportation
investment needed to promote specific cluster development or growth.
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MA 92
In formation Technology
Financial Services
Knowledge Creation Services
Machinery and Manufacturing /
Electronics Components
Instruments Manufacturing
Fabricated Metal Products
Jewelry Manufacturing
Precision Metalworking
Boat Building and Marinas
Seafood Products
Electronics and Instruments
Financial Services
Software
Biomedical
Travel and Tourism
Financial Services
Biosciences
Aerospace Components
Software and Information Technology
..... .......... .. . - ..-
Metals Manufacturing
Marine Industry
Plastics
Table 7-13: Inventory of New England's Clusters
Although six working clusters were identified through individual states' cluster studies, to assume
that this inventory represent an accurate list of the New England region's clusters is incorrect.
Each cluster study examined its industries within the constraints of its political borders. The
inventory of clusters might have looked very different if economic regions were considered rather
than state jurisdictional boundaries. The "potential" electronic component clusters of Rhode
Island and New Hampshire may in fact be part of an overall larger, more dynamic "working"
cluster also encompassing the Boston metropolitan region. Furthermore, when economic regions
within New England are considered, industry clusters may emerge that were invisible when only
individual state industries were considered. For evaluation of New England's regional
transportation investments within the regional competitive advantage context, the cluster
inventory presented in Table 7-13 is insufficient. A true regional assessment of New England's
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Health Care Technology
competitive industry clusters is necessary, but based on the discussion in Section 7.2 regarding
the lack of New England regional economic development organizations, it is unclear which group
would take the leadership role in this initiative.
Cluster Needs Assessment
The framework for assessing the specialized needs of clusters presented in Figure 6-3 was
constructed with the intention of prioritizing the effectiveness of transportation investments
within ReS/SITE's multicriteria evaluation methodology. The identification of clusters at the
state level presents at least two obstacles to the successful application of the needs assessment
framework: (1) high-level aggregated cluster types, such as "health care technology," prevent
planning organizations from categorizing specialized transportation needs, and (2) identification
of general transportation needs for all state clusters rather than on a cluster-by-cluster basis. The
identified transportation needs drawn from the statewide cluster studies are summarized in Table
7-14, along with their overlap with the three broad regional transportation issues presented in the
beginning of the chapter.
MA Central Artery project investment General
MA Northeast Corridor High-Speed Rail General /,investment
MA Modernization of Logan Airport General /
MA Expanded commuter rail service General
MA Raise bridge clearances to support Generaldoublestacking of freight cargo
NH --
RI Upgrade state-owned ports Products
RI Improve frequency of commuter rail service Softwarebetween Boston and Providence
RI Invest in T.F. Green Airport Travel and
CT Increased use of commuter rail service General
CT Improved transit connections General
CT Improve High-Speed Rail connections and Generalparking
CT Enhance accessibility of airports General
CT Provide transportation services in support of GeneralWelfare-to-Work
CT Enhance competitiveness of Bradley Airport General
Table 7-14: New England Cluster Needs Assessment Summary
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Only Rhode Island looked at its transportation needs at a cluster-specific level. Rhode Island's
transportation needs assessment was facilitated by the identification of more specific cluster types
such as "Jewelry Manufacturing" and "Seafood Products," however state clusters found to have
specialized transportation needs represented clusters in the lowest priority "potential"
development stage. While the transportation needs framework has limited usefulness applied to
the state cluster studies, it is apparent that investment in regional intermodal freight infrastructure
is less important to the competitiveness of the state clusters as compared to the other two regional
transportation issues. At the same time, it is not possible to ascertain the relative degree of
importance given to regional airport investment versus 1-95 congestion relief investment.
Implementation into Transportation Plans
The Rhode Island and Connecticut transportation plans each contained projects identified in the
economic development initiatives as important for the state's clusters. Massachusetts
transportation plans gave recognition to the cluster-based economic development policy, but did
not specifically incorporate them into either the STIP or Boston's RTP. New Hampshire's
transportation plan excludes economic development considerations altogether within its
transportation plans. A high-level look at the institutional relationships helps to explain some of
this discrepancy:
. Rhode Island is unique in that it has a single MPO responsible for both formally defining
economic development goals and developing the RTP for the entire state. Though
transportation organizations did not participate as stakeholders in the cluster initiative, the
combination of (1) cluster-specific state legislation directed at the MPO; and (2) the MPO's
integrated economic development and transportation planning authority, provided an
institutional structure facilitating the translation of economic development goals into relevant
transportation investments when necessary.
. Connecticut involved its transportation planning and service organizations as participants in
the cluster initiative through its Transportation Infrastructure Advisory Board. The Board
regularly updates the cluster leadership which includes lawmakers and the governor. The
annual Transportation Summits provide a forum for prioritizing cluster needs for inclusion in
the STP. Although the institutional linkages to the state's MPOs are not yet fully developed,
the cluster initiative has created the Transportation Strategy Board with the explicit goal of
developing these links.
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. Massachusetts did not involve its transportation planning organizations in the cluster
initiative, although they did participate in reviewing the formal state economic development
plan. The economic development plan recognizes the state's clusters, but focuses its efforts
on creating a healthy economic environment for all clusters, without specifically targeting
any one. The policy approach is broad and provides little direction for the transportation
organizations. Despite this, four of the five projects recommended by the state's cluster
initiative are being implemented (the notable exception being support of container
doublestacking). It is important to note that the these projects lie outside of the state's
traditional transportation process and have relied more on federal and state legislative
intervention rather than a structured regional transportation planning approach.
. The New Hampshire cluster initiative's recommendation came out strongly against the policy
of large infrastructure investments to support its clusters. With the subsequent adoption of
the initiative as the formal economic development plan for the state, it is unsurprising that
cluster-based transportation investment is not a component of the state's transportation plans.
Evaluation of Framework Usefulness
The chapter concludes with the following critical analysis of the application of the competitive
advantage framework and observations regarding its usefulness within the ReS/SITE
methodology:
. New England cluster initiatives were performed at scale (statewide level) which is
inappropriate for analysis within the regional competitive advantage and transportation
planning framework, and subsequently, it is difficult to ascertain the sources of New
England's competitive advantage considered as a region. The state level does not provide an
appropriate grouping of the economic regions contained in New England. A better scale
would either be at (1) a more micro-level, assessing the competitive advantage of
metropolitan economic regions with provisions for spill across state borders; or (2) a more
macro-level assessment of the competitive advantage of New England as a single economic
region, rather than the sum of six individual state jurisdictions.
. The lack of regional economic development and regional transportation planning
organizations is a barrier to successfully applying the competitive advantage component of
the ReS/SITE framework to the New England region.
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. The application of the framework to New England did not result in specific recommendations
regarding transportation infrastructure investments benefiting the region's competitive
position, nor did it identify the process by which the investments would be prioritized or
implemented. At best, within the competitive advantage context, the framework provides for
the recommendation of prioritizing intermodal freight investments lower than investments for
1-95 congestion relief or regional airport system improvement. The failure of the framework
was due primarily to the two prior observations: an inappropriate scale at which to assess
clusters and competitive advantage, and the lack of regional organizations capable of leading
and implementing a cluster initiative for New England.
. The New England cluster studies did not assess specialized transportation needs on a cluster-
specific basis. Instead, at best, general needs were given which could presumably benefit all
the clusters. This observation is consistent with the findings from the Chapter 5 cases studies
which were performed at the metropolitan, rather than state level. The usefulness of the
cluster transportation needs assessment framework, presented in Figure 6-3, is certainly
unclear. There are two interpretations: (1) the cluster studies are correct in their implicit
assumption that transportation infrastructure has only a second order affect on cluster
competitiveness and is best addressed at a more broad level, or (2) they are overlooking an
important contribution of transportation infrastructure and would benefit from investigating
specific needs for each cluster using the roles that transportation infrastructure may play in
cluster competitiveness as presented in this thesis.
. Different philosophies on the government's role in cluster development hampers the ability of
the framework to assess infrastructure investments at the regional level. New Hampshire
explicitly precludes large infrastructure investments from their guiding cluster-development
policies, and Rhode Island's policy is somewhat ambiguous. In contrast, Connecticut and
Massachusetts both promote infrastructure investment as important for supporting the general
needs of their respective industry clusters. If a regional approach is to be applied to New
England transportation issues within the competitive advantage context, individual state
philosophies must be brought into better alignment.
. Competitive tendencies are still apparent in the examination of economic development and
transportation plans, preventing effective investment decisions at a regional scale. For
example, New Hampshire's economic development plan focuses on improving the state's tax
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and lower cost of living advantages to attract Massachusetts' firms. Also, Connecticut is
looking at investment in Bradley Airport as a means to better attract traffic and freight away
from other New England airports, rather than as a means to more effectively cooperate as a
component of a regional airport system.
. The establishment of Connecticut's Transportation Strategy Board, described in Section 7.5.3
is consistent with the extended ReS/SITE framework. The Board is charged with evaluating
transportation connectivity with the region, working with MPOs to implement a cluster-based
transportation strategy at the regional level, and work with other New England states in
developing a transportation strategy for the entire region. The ability of the Board to achieve
these goals should provide a practical example of the strategies contained within the extended
framework.
. The Cluster Initiative Architecture component presented in Figure 6-1 provided a useful
framework for assessing New England cluster initiatives and their link to transportation plans.
In exploring the Cluster Initiative Architecture, the importance of institutional links between
economic development and transportation planning organizations was made apparent, as
demonstrated by the differences in implementation of the cluster studies' recommendations.
. Evidence of institutional linkages between New England economic development and
transportation organizations, and the varying degrees of the linkage effectiveness, provides
support for the necessity of the Comprehensive Regional Architecture of ReS/SITE to contain
a regional economic development component in addition to the regional service and planning
components.
This completes the chapter's goal of evaluating the New England region within the context of the
extended ReS/SITE framework. The next chapter will present the final assessment of the
extended framework and identify further opportunities for more effectively addressing the
integration of regional competitive advantage and transportation planning.
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Chapter 8. Summary and Findings
In response to Sussman and Conklin's call [193] to more fully explore the regional strategic
transportation planning framework within the context of regional competitive advantage and
economic development, this thesis has pursued four basic objectives:
1. To develop the concept of regional competitive advantage and its relationship with industry
clusters and economic development. This was the subject of Chapter 2.
2. To review the relationship between economic development and transportation planning, and
explore case studies of past regional competitive advantage analyses and the corresponding
regional transportation plans. This was subject of Chapters 3 through 5.
3. To provide a framework for integrating the notion of regional competitive advantage within a
region's ongoing transportation planning process. This was the subject of Chapter 6.
4. To evaluate the New England region within the context of the proposed framework. This was
the subject of Chapter 7.
This chapter will briefly summarize the material presented in this thesis. Section 8.1 will
summarize the motivation for this thesis. Section 8.2 will review the key ideas presented in each
chapter. Section 8.3 will review the key findings of this thesis. Finally, Section 8.4 will suggest
some areas for further research.
8.1 Motivation of Thesis
Considerations for economic development within regional strategic transportation planning often
focus on overly narrow measures of economic benefits for a region as a whole, such as job or
wage growth, and business output. Regional economic development depends more strongly on
the sources of regional competitive advantage, often associated with industry clusters and their
sustained productivity growth. To more appropriately consider economic development, it was
suggested that a shift towards a regional transportation planning approach is needed. This will
identify, develop, and integrate transportation infrastructure investments which: (1) effectively
support local industry clusters; and (2) create the opportunity to develop and maintain a regional
competitive advantage through productivity growth. MIT's ReS/SITE framework was seen as
providing a logical interconnection between regional competitive advantage theory and strategic
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transportation planning, through its use of regional architecture [194]. By extending ReS/SITE's
regional architecture component, we hoped to gain insight into how the notion of regional
competitive advantage fits within the strategic transportation planning process.
8.2 Summary of Thesis
Chapter 2 provided an extended treatment of regional competitive advantage and industry
clusters. An economic region, as defined by Pendleton [195], was shown to be the appropriate
unit of geographic scale to evaluate transportation investments within the context of competitive
advantage. Next, Porter's diamond framework of competitive advantage was introduced [196],
and the natural outcome of the framework was shown to be the phenomenon of industry
clustering, a concept that has become one of the leading drivers behind regional economic
development policy.
The notion of industry clusters was shown to be difficult to apply in practice. For clusters to
become a useful subject of analysis and policy, the concept needed to be more rigorously defined.
To assist in this definition, clusters were classified by their stage of development and along five
different dimensions. Three stages of development were given: a working cluster, a latent cluster,
and a potential cluster; with working clusters representing the stage of development in which a
region is realizing a competitive advantage. Using the progressive classification and dimension
characterization, industry clusters could be segmented into categories for policy analysis.
A cluster-based economic development framework recommended by the U.S. Department of
Commerce was introduced and described as a four-stage process: (1) the Mobilization Stage, (2)
the Diagnostic Stage, (3) the Collaborative Strategy Stage, and (4) the Implementation Stage.
The effectiveness of these cluster-based strategies was evaluated and critiqued, with the
conclusion being that the benefit of industry clusters is not as much a "revolution" in regional
theory, as it is a comprehensive approach for understanding regional economic conditions and
trends. Clusters were seen as a mechanism for linking together several aspects of regional policy
interests into a single framework.
The chapter concluded with the presentation of eight ways in which transportation planning and
infrastructure could be integrated within the cluster framework:
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. As a factor input within Porter's diamond framework of competitive advantage
. As a means of supporting and enhancing the efficiency of other competitive diamond inputs
. As a key component of a region's economic infrastructure
. As a key stakeholder and participant in cluster-based economic development initiatives
. As a facilitator of innovation
. As a facilitator of collaboration
. As providing scenario-specific efficiencies for cluster-based initiatives
. As an industry cluster itself
Chapter 3 differentiated between economic development and economic growth. Economic
development was described as a qualitative change in the structure of a region's economy.
Economic growth was seen as a quantitative change in the scale of the economy. Defined this
way, economic development was seen as both a prerequisite and result of economic growth.
It was shown that with a sparse regional transportation network, the impacts of an investment
could be more easily identified. Historically, a common rational for investment decisions was
based on the assumption that a high-quality transportation infrastructure was an essential
prerequisite for economic development and growth. For more advanced economies, where
transportation is already well-developed, a key question was seen to emerge: are the same
arguments for linking transportation investment and economic development still relevant? The
research of Banister and Berechman was surveyed in which they propose that new priorities are
present in developed, regional economies that cause many of the traditional arguments to be
weakened, or to even no longer apply. These new priorities include: (1) transportation
investment increasingly viewed as a process with strong political, social, and environmental
implications; (2) flexible location decisions by the public and industry create patterns of
interactions and travel which are more complex; (3) new economic forces at work as regional
economies move from manufacturing-based to service and information industries; and (4) a
changed demographic profile of the population, with increased life expectancy and new
household structures.
In summary, further investment in transportation infrastructure would not on its own result in
economic development or growth. Instead, transportation investments acted as a complement to
other, more important underlying, or "necessary" conditions. Banister and Berechman claimed
that three sets of necessary conditions were required:
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1. Economic conditions
2. Investment conditions
3. Political, policy, and institutional conditions.
Individually, the necessary conditions have little to no impact on economic development, and
even if combined in pairs, their effect is limited. Bannister and Berechman argue that it is only
when all three necessary conditions are present and working together that economic development
from transportation investment will potentially follow.
The state of the practice regarding the degree to which transportation planning agencies include
economic evaluation of infrastructure investments was explored; we found that regional
economic development goals were rarely taken into consideration. Furthermore, the
measurements used to evaluate the economic impact of investments were typically related more
towards economic growth, rather than economic development. The chapter concluded by
revisiting the notion of clusters and further linking them to transportation investment by the
ability of the infrastructure to facilitate: (1) productivity improvement, (2) cluster specialization,
(3) face-to-face communication, and (4) expanded access to specialized inputs and outputs.
Chapter 4 described the central function that the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO)
sometimes plays in regional transportation planning, and examined the role MPOs may play in
regional economic development policy. While less than one-third of MPOs have specific
responsibilities related to economic development, most are involved to some degree in regional
economic development planning. The MPO was determined to be an important integration point
for the linking of economic development policy and transportation planning. However, the
argument was made that the institutional responsibilities of a typical MPO preclude it from
playing a leadership role in cluster-based initiatives, though they play an important supporting
role in many of the efforts. The chapter concluded with the presentation of the ReS/SITE
framework, highlighting the Comprehensive Regional Architecture component, with its
methodology to describe institutional linkages and information exchange, as a promising point of
integration between the strategic transportation planning framework and economic development
initiatives.
Having introduced the concepts of regional competitive advantage, industry clusters, economic
development, and regional strategic transportation planning in Chapters 2 through 4, Chapter 5
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next examined four case studies applying these concepts at the metropolitan and state-wide level.
The case studies were: the San Francisco Bay Area and Silicon Valley; the Twin Cities in
Minnesota; Tucson, Arizona; and the Transportation Cornerstone Project in Florida. Several
important observations from these case studies were made:
. Cluster-specific transportation needs are rarely identified. Common to all cluster studies was
the identification of more general transportation needs applicable across all clusters.
. In general, the link between economic development and transportation planning is limited or
absent in most regional economic and transportation plans. MPO-developed Regional
Transportation Plans (RTP) offer general goals for economic-based considerations, but do not
define measurable performance objectives, or recognize cluster-based economic development
initiatives.
. For initiatives conducted at a statewide level, there is a mismatch in the geographic scope of
the planning: identified clusters operate on a regional, national, and international scale, while
transportation planning occurs at a decentralized level driven by individual MPOs.
. Although a region's cluster-based economic development organizations may play a very
active role in assessing the region's transportation network, and are institutionally linked to
the MPO, the RTP often does not reflect the economic development organizations' stated
transportation priorities.
. A MPO-led cluster study does not guarantee that the MPO's RTP will be tied to cluster-based
development as was demonstrated in the Twin Cities case.
. Project prioritization for inclusion in regional transportation plans generally reflect "home-to-
work" travel issues such as travel time, delays, safety, and mobility; rather than a "goods-to-
market" issues such as freight mobility and economic development.
Chapters 2 through 5 achieved the first two objectives of the thesis-developing the concept of
regional competitive advantage and clusters, and examining the link between economic
development and transportation planning in both theory and practice. Chapter 6 considered the
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third objective we ask the basic question-how does the notion of regional competitive advantage
fit within a region's ongoing transportation planning process?
In order to answer this question, Chapter 6 proposed using the cluster initiative framework,
shown again in Figure 8-1, to examine the role transportation planning and service organizations
play in a region's cluster-based economic development policies.
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Figure 8-1: The Cluster Initiative Framework Revisited
Insight into regional economic development policy and its important institutional and
informational linkages to transportation planning is gained through an examination of a cluster
initiative's economic input and output representatives, leadership structure, regional cluster
inventory, needs assessment, and related regional transportation plans.
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The needs assessment component was further developed with the intention of assisting
transportation planning organizations in better determining the specialized infrastructure needs of
individual clusters. Figure 8-2 graphically depicts the suggested systematic approach.
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Figure 8-2: Cluster-Specific Transportation Needs Assessment
The reasoning behind the needs assessment was based on the argument that a factor input, such as
transportation infrastructure, must be tailored to a cluster's needs if it is to contribute to sustaining
competitive advantage. The more specialized the factor input is, the more scarce it becomes and
thus more difficult it is for competing regions to replicate. By segmenting clusters by their
development stage and dimension, it was hoped that a transportation planning organization could
better evaluate an infrastructure investment's ability to assist in developing or sustaining the
region's competitive advantage. However, based on the Chapter 5 case study results and the
subsequent evaluation of the New England region in Chapter 7, it was determined that existing
cluster studies do not provide a sufficient level of detail from which to make an effective
assessment of a cluster's specialized transportation needs.
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Chapter 6 concluded with making the required adjustments to regional architecture in order to
incorporate economic development initiatives in addition to service and planning activities, as
shown in Figure 8-3:
iRSTP Strategic Plans
Comprehensive Regional Architecture (CRA)
Regional Service \Regional Planning
Architecture (RSA) Architecture (RPA) Regional
infrastructure
Regional E conomic (I
Development Architecture (REDA) '-----
------------------------------------------------------
Figure 8-3: The Extended ReS/SITE Comprehensive Regional Architecture Component
Just as transportation service and planning organizations are organized to produce an integrated
series of plans, economic development-oriented institutions need to coordinate their initiatives
with implementing organizations. The concept of Regional Architectures was further
differentiated to address the subset of institutions that focus on planning, services, and economic
development respectively. The purpose of this is to motivate the development of transportation
plans and services that are more robust with respect to regional competitive advantage. Chapter 6
expanded Makler's Comprehensive Regional Architecture to include the Regional Economic
Development Architecture (REDA). The Regional Strategic Transportation Plan (RSTP) now
includes components which (1) address anticipated transportation investment needs based on the
set of possible regional outcomes captured in scenarios - the Regional Infrastructure, and (2)
address the set of relationships that describe how the service, planning, and economic
development institutions interact to provide an integrated set of transportation plans within a
region - the Comprehensive Regional Architecture (CRA).
The addition of the REDA enabled the Strategic Plans component of ReS/SITE to incorporate the
planning responsibilities covering each of the three necessary conditions, identified by Banister
and Berechman in Chapter 3, that are required before economic development can occur.
Planning related to regional economic conditions is contained within the REDA architecture,
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while political, policy, and institutional conditions is jointly contained within the RPA, RSA, and
REDA architectures. Lastly, the actual investment is contained within the RI.
The implication of this revised RSTP is that the ReS/SITE framework now involves a more
descriptive analysis of a strategic transportation decision-making process, incorporating important
elements of regional competitive advantage and addressing clusters' collective transportation
needs. Using clusters as a frame of reference, the REDA architecture has the potential to give
additional insight into economic development needs that would not typically be considered within
the traditional transportation planning process.
Chapter 7 addressed the fourth and final objective of the thesis, the application of the framework
to the New England region. Pendleton's region classification scheme was first used to validate
the assumption that New England could be considered, to a first approximation, an economic
region rather than simply six separate political jurisdictions (i.e. states). After identifying
regional economic development and transportation planning organizations, transportation issues
impacting the entire region were assessed and categorized into three broad areas: 1-95 congestion
relief, improvement of intermodal freight competitiveness, and improving the regional airport
system. It was proposed that the extended ReS/SITE framework could provide a helpful context
in which to evaluate and prioritize these infrastructure investments for New England in
consideration of cluster needs.
Using the cluster initiative framework, the states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire
and Rhode Island were evaluated and the institutional linkages between economic development
and the transportation plans identified. The chapter concluded that within the competitive
advantage context, New England intermodal freight investments should be prioritized lower than
investments in 1-95 congestion relief or regional airport system improvement. Additionally, in
exploring the Cluster Initiative framework within New England, the importance of institutional
links between economic development and transportation planning organizations was made
apparent, as demonstrated by the differences between states in implementation of the cluster
studies' recommendations within the transportation plans. Finally, because the New England
cluster studies did not assess specialized transportation needs on a cluster-specific basis, the
usefulness of the cluster-based transportation needs assessment approach, developed in Chapter 6,
was limited. However, in general, by considering clusters collectively for a particular region, it is
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possible to add transportation as a broad need beyond what is traditionally considered in
economic development planning.
8.3 Key Findings of Thesis
There are several key findings that can be drawn from this thesis. Each of these is described in as
follows:
For assessing competitive advantage considerations within regional strategic
transportation planning, industry clusters may provide a useful starting point. A region
is said to gain competitive advantage if it is able to sustain a growth in productivity. Regions
able to gain competitive advantage exhibit an economic environment which promotes
geographically concentrated clusters of industries. It follows, that to address competitive
advantage within transportation planning, it is beneficial to consider transportation
investments in the context of industry clusters. The popularity of cluster-based economic
development policies is growing in the United States, and to fulfill TEA-21's charge that
transportation investment decisions support metropolitan economic vitality, the need to
integrate cluster-based policies and goals within on-going transportation planning is more
relevant. The cluster initiative framework presented in Chapter 6 provides a useful means to
identify (1) the key stakeholders of a cluster-based initiative, (2) the leadership structure and
roles played by transportation planning organizations, (3) the inventory of important regional
clusters, (4) the infrastructure needs of the clusters, and (5) priority cluster-related investments
for implementation within the relevant transportation plans. Through this methodology, the
important institutional linkages between economic development and transportation planning
organizations can be better identified and improved.
. In a developed economy, it is very difficult to determine how regional transportation
planning can support individual clusters' specialized needs. The scale of a cluster's
individual needs is on a micro-scale when compared with the macro-scale of a region's
overall transportation needs. However, this is not to say that a general strategy to establish,
develop, or grow regional clusters should not include effective regional transportation
planning. By combining needs over multiple clusters, generalized needs can be assessed and
an overall cluster support strategy could be incorporated in regional transportation planning.
Incorporation of the generalized needs may result in transportation planning choices different
from decisions made without consideration of regional clusters. Overall, the scale of
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providing general cluster support, rather than individual cluster support, is better matched to
the scale of regional transportation planning.
Some examples of general cluster needs which could be supported by transportation planning
at the regional scale include:
- Improved Quality of Life: In developed economies, many of the regional clusters will be
knowledge-intensive industries, requiring a workforce with intellectual capital. To attract
and retain this type of workforce, regional quality of life issues are important. Congestion
and reduced mobility can constrain and reduce regional quality of life and negatively
impact all clusters. Regional transportation strategies which address these issues can
support overall regional cluster needs.
- Effective Face-to-Face Communication: Face-to-face communication is considered
essential for any type of cluster development, playing an important role in providing
informal linkages between companies within clusters which facilitate both innovation and
cooperation, two important factors of competitive advantage. Strategies improving the
effectiveness of inter-regional and intra-regional transportation linkages will have an
impact on the efficiency in which face-to-face communication occurs for all regional
clusters.
- Access to Specialized Inputs: Cluster firms benefit by having a broader and more qualified
supply of specialized inputs such as a labor force and suppliers. Marginal productivity of
the clusters can improve as inefficient inputs are substituted by expanding the access to
more highly productive and efficient services. Regional transportation investments in inter-
city networks, such as commuter rail for increased access to skilled labor, or improved
freight corridors for increased access to suppliers, can support the general specialized input
needs of multiple clusters.
. In developing economies, the scale of individual cluster needs and transportation
planning may be better matched as the industries and transportation networks are
earlier in their development stages. With a smaller number industries and few inter- and
intra-regional linkages, a developing country's potential clusters might benefit from tailored
transportation investments.
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. Consideration of the scale at which cluster-initiatives are performed is important in
determining the appropriateness of addressing competitive advantage within regional
transportation planning. Similar to the prior finding, Pendleton's assertion that economic
and transportation activity should be planned and managed on approximately the same
geographic scale holds true for cluster-based initiatives and regional strategic transportation
planning. The appropriate geographic scale within the competitive advantage context is the
economic region, although many cluster studies are performed at a political jurisdiction-based
scale, such as at the state level. Unless regional transportation planning and economic policies
are aligned at the same scale, the ability to evaluate and prioritize transportation infrastructure
investments with competitive advantage considerations is, at best, limited.
. The addition of a Regional Economic Development Architecture (REDA) component to
ReS/SITE extends the usefulness of the framework. In the cases studied in Chapter 5,
regional clusters were not considered in the way in which the extended ReS/SITE can do
through its REDA component. Therefore, the outcomes of the transportation planning
processes examined may well have been different had the ReS/SITE framework been used.
Even with well-established cluster-based economic policies in regions such as the Twin Cities
and Silicon Valley, there existed a mismatch between the economic goals of the regional
transportation plans and the policies of the economic development organizations. A review of
New England showed that the degree to which the cluster policies were reflected in
transportation plans was affected by the nature of the institutional linkages between the
transportation and economic development organizations. Including REDA within the
ReS/SITE framework provides the opportunity to map these linkages both as they exist in
practice and as an example of "best-practice" under more ideal institutional relationships.
Furthermore, Regional Infrastructure (RI) and REDA are not discrete or independent elements.
The extent to which the RI is actually deployed depends on the REDA's ability to identify and
prioritize investments which support a region's competitive advantage, and integrate them
within the Regional Planning (RPA) and Regional Service (RSA) Architecture elements. The
extended ReS/SITE framework as proposed by this thesis is shown in Figure 8-4:
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Figure 8-4: The Extended ReS/SITE Framework
The integration of REDA within the Strategic Planning component of ReS/SITE also provides
an opportunity to address two other shortcoming of current transportation practice: (1) the
necessity to integrate regional freight movement needs, and (2) the need to adequately involve
private sector entities. Because both freight and private sector entities are typically well-
represented within the framework of economic development initiatives, their roles and
involvement will also be expanded within the on-going regional transportation planning
process.
Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) often play a central role in transportation,
but rarely have the institutional capacity to successfully lead a cluster initiative.
Although the MPO might play an active role in the cluster initiative, except for some unique
examples, it does not have the institutional capacity to lead a cluster-based economic
development initiative. A cluster initiative, undertaken in order to support the development of
regional competitive advantage, relies on regional transportation planning architecture
components within its process; this means that the ReS/SITE framework is dependent on the
pre-existence of a cluster initiative if it is to effectively incorporate regional competitive
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advantage within its components. Transportation investment alone cannot result in economic
development as we have defined it, and is dependent on the interaction with other necessary
conditions for the potential that economic development will occur.
8.4 Suggestions for Further Research
Economic development policy and regional planning are constantly evolving practices, and
several different areas could benefit from further research as described below:
There is little empirical cluster research which has rigorously examined the impact which
specialized transportation infrastructure might actually play in productivity growth in
developed economies. Most studies simply assume that transportation infrastructure's
important cluster-specific role is in providing a means by which industries can efficiently co-
locate in geographically concentrated areas by taking advantage of reduced transportation
costs. In Chapters 2 and 3, this thesis proposed several other ways in which transportation
infrastructure could be considered in meeting specialized cluster needs.
A logical follow-up to this research includes looking into the specialized transportation needs
of individual types of clusters. To date, cluster initiatives typically regard transportation
investments as second order impacts; however this research has proposed several broad
categories in which transportation infrastructure might affect the competitive advantage of
individual clusters, such as impacting face-to-face communication (allowing for innovation)
and improving access to specialized inputs such as skilled labor. It would be beneficial to
explore several types of specific clusters, for example mutual fund or medical devices
clusters, in order to empirically determine what transportation investments could in fact
impact cluster competitiveness. An approach similar to the methodology for Florida's
Transportation Cornerstone Project, as described in Section 5.4, could be used.
. This research has only evaluated cluster initiatives in the United States. In reality, the
concept of clusters and competitive advantage has gained popularity across the developed
world. The scope of the research could be expanded internationally to assess the degree to
which cluster-based policies are reflected in transportation planning, and describe the
different institutional linkages that exist in other countries. Additionally, evaluation could be
made of the notion that that assessment of specialized transportation needs for industry
clusters may be more relevant for regions in the developing world.
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. It would be interesting to expand the causal loop map presented in Figure 5-2 into a working
System Dynamics model in order to quantify and compare the relative effects of improving
different factor inputs to a regional cluster. This type of model could also be used to evaluate
the benefit trade-offs which may occur between an infrastructure investment tailored
specifically to an individual cluster, or an investment which serves the more general needs of
multiple clusters. Do the economic development benefits achieved through increased
competitive advantage from a single cluster outweigh the more general benefits gained from
less-specialized investments impacting multiple clusters?
. The proposed Regional Economic Development Architecture (REDA) component of
ReS/SITE was introduced at a very high level within this research. The framework would
benefit from a detailed architecture map describing the specific information flows and
institutional relationships between economic development and transportation planning
organizations. Candidates for this map might include the Bay Area, Rhode Island, and after
its Transportation Strategy Board is implemented, Connecticut. From a theoretical aspect, it
would also be interesting to design the regional economic and transportation institutions and
plans that would be needed to undertake successful integrated strategic planning (economic
and transportation) for New England at the regional level.
. Benefit would be gained by an expansion of the ReS/SITE framework to describe how
regional economic development goals and needs could be reflected in the shorter-range
operational and system management plans. Similarly, it would be helpful to determine
appropriate and practical measures for evaluating short- and long-range transportation plans
within the context of regional competitive advantage.
. It would be interesting to expand the REDA beyond the notion of clusters. An assessment
could be made of other economic development policies which are currently employed and the
degree to which their goals are incorporated into the transportation planning process.
This thesis has attempted to advance the ReS/SITE framework and strategic transportation
planning by incorporating consideration for regional competitive advantage. It is hoped that this
research will generate interest into developing a better understanding of the ability of
transportation infrastructure investment to impact a region's competitive advantage and economic
development.
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Appendix: Transportation Planning Shortcomings and ReS/SITE
The ReS/SITE project identified eight categories of short comings in regional strategic
transportation planning through a review of strategic plans from the Netherlands, the States of
Washington, Iowa, New Mexico, Florida, and others. What follows is are excerpts from the
Sussman and Conklin paper (2001) summarizing the shortcomings and describing how the
ReS/SITE process addresses these planning shortcomings [197]. A list of references for the
ReS/SITE research is also provided.
Excerpted from Sussman and Conklin (2001):
Intermodalism
Intermodalism can be described as using different, interconnected modes of travel to complete a
person trip or freight movement. The importance of intermodalism is often overlooked, as are
intermodal connections and multimodal solutions to problems. In practice, many plans can be
characterized as a set of modestly-related unimodal plans rather than an integrated intermodal
plan.
The ReS/SITE process is inherently intermodal in nature. Intermodal planning is enhanced by the
regional architecture output of the planning process. This regional architecture defines how
agencies with different modal responsibilities should cooperate in providing transportation
services. The process encourages considering different modal solutions to problems the region is
facing with different outcomes for the various scenarios considered.
Technology Scanning
Technology scanning involves considering which technological developments will impact
transportation systems and how. For example, one could examine new ITS technologies and
vehicle developments to help determine what type of system management techniques may be
available with the planning horizon that are not available today. Few regional strategic plans
include such an element.
A technology scan is an important component of the planning process. The planning agency
could apply the ReS/SITE scenario process to consider the impacts of technology. The agency
243
can then consider what new technologies may have an impact on the future requirements and
operation of the transportation system and prepare the plan to accommodate these future
developments. Further, the regional architecture, with its ITS roots and an emphasis on
information technology and communications, is responsive to new technological approaches to
solving transportation problems.
Freight
Many transportation plans do not adequately address the needs of freight movement. Much of
transportation planning emphasizes passenger transportation; freight mobility is given less
attention despite its criticality for regional economic development.
Freight services providers should be included in the ReS/SITE regional architecture. These
entities, such as railroads and motor carriers, have the explicit business responsibility for
operating a service. The relationships between these operators and the providers of the
infrastructure they use should be explicitly addressed in the development of a regional
architecture. Freight mobility is an important service provided by the transportation system and
essential to maintaining the economic health of a region. Different freight transportation
requirements will be highlighted in different scenarios.
Private Sector Involvement
Transportation planning today does not adequately involve private sector entities such as major
employers, shippers, and carriers. Public sector agencies and citizen activists largely dominate
the process with modest opportunity for input from the business community. While the ability of
the private sector to deliver needed transportation infrastructure through creative public-private
partnerships has been taking hold, the role of such partnerships in more process-related,
regionally-scaled planning has been limited.
Private-sector entities, such as major employers, manufacturers, and service providers in the
region, should be involved in the regional architecture. It is important that the needs of the local
business community are addressed in the products of the ReS/SITE planning process. The role of
the business community in the regional architecture and the private sector's ability to deliver new
infrastructure should be outlined in the plan. The private sector can also be included in the
planning process through scenario development in which the perspectives of private-sector
organizations on the future can be explicitly reflected.
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Economic Integration
Transportation and economic development are inherently linked. Most transportation plans do
not adequately assess the importance of transportation investment in retaining or achieving a
competitive advantage, especially in the context of the global economy. Also these plans
sometimes fail to address the local economic development needs that can be spurred on by
transportation investment.
This shortcoming is addressed through the development of scenarios. Different economic effects
can be explicitly reflected in the planning process. Furthermore, the scenario development
process can assist the region in developing a plan that is robust across varying degrees of
economic vitality.
"National Information Infrastructure" (Nl1): Telecommunications/Transportation Relationships
The transportation system is placing increasing demands on the "National Information
Infrastructure" as ITS technologies continue to be employed around the world. Further,
transportation infrastructure is often used as a right-of-way for information infrastructure. The
interdependence of these systems is rarely addressed in transportation plans.
The NII should be an important component of ReS/SITE's regional architecture in that it enables
high levels of interaction between different institutions. Further, it is appropriate to consider how
changes in the NII may affect the transportation system through the scenarios, in addition to
developing an independent assessment of the interactions between these two systems. The
planning process should outline the communication requirements of operating the transportation
system both in terms of the institutions involved and the infrastructure needed.
Master Plan Perspective
Many transportation plans are focused on capital investment rather than the operation of the
regional transportation system. The plans often simply identify specific projects, implementation
requirements, and timetables rather than considering the overall operation of the regional
transportation system.
The ReS/SITE process focused on regional competitive and quality of life goals, rather than on a
project-selection process. Further, through developing a regional architecture focused on
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information sharing, the process is not focused solely on infrastructure delivery. Rather, the
ReS/SITE process is focused on meeting transportation needs of the reigon through operations as
well as investment.
Human Resource Development
Strategic plans rarely address the need to develop transportation professionals for the future. The
plans fail to address the "human capital" needs of the transportation system.
To an extent, scenarios, viewed as a mechanism to broaden the perspectives of planners have a
human resource development aspect. In addition, it is important that the planning agency address
these human capital issues independently as part of their planning process. The human resource
requirements of operating the transportation system should be identified and a plan for
developing these resources should be outlined.
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